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Default de se: The Interpretation of the Ewe logophor1
Abigail Anne Bimpeh - Goethe University, Frankfurt
Abstract. This paper aims at evaluating two contradicting generalizations regarding the inter-
pretation of logophoric pronouns, using data from Ewedomegbe (the Northern Ghanaian dialect
of Ewe). Clements (1975), for instance, and many others propose that the default interpretation of
the Ewe logophoric pronoun ye` is unambiguously attitude de se like PRO in English, see Chierchia
(1989). This view is challenged by Pearson (2015), who presents data that shows that ye` may be
read de re as well. I presented real-world examples of ‘mistaken’ identity to ten native informants,
as well as examples of dream reports to two native informants. Regarding ‘mistaken identity’, the
judgments confirm the standard view by Clements (1975) and others that the logophoric pronoun
ye` seems unambiguously attitude de se. For dream reports, the judgments show that they may not
be useful in shedding light on the de re, de se distinction. I discuss possible explanations for the
different judgments.
1 Introduction
Logophoric pronouns are pronouns used in indirect discourse to report the thoughts, feelings, emo-
tions or attitudes of an individual (Clements 1975). As observed by Sells (1987), logophoric pro-
nouns appear within sentential arguments of predicates of communication and mental experience.
The canonical use of the logophoric pronoun is to distinguish the attitude holder (the one whose
thoughts are being communicated) from all others. This means that in English, when Mawuse
utters (1a), a report in the form of (1b) or (1c) is expected.
(1) a. Mawuse said “I am hungry”. Direct discourse
b. Mawuse said she is hungry. Indirect discourse
c. Mawuse claimed PRO to be hungry. Infinitive construction
Although (1b) effectively communicates Mawuse’s speech in (1a), it is ambiguous. The am-
biguity of (1b) stems from the use of the pronoun she. Inasmuch as she refers to Mawuse, she
could also refer to some other person who hasn’t been mentioned in the discourse. Consequently,
to disambiguate (1b), PRO, the null pronominal element which acts as the subject of infinitives
and gerunds (Chierchia 1989; Schlenker 1999) is used. PRO is used because when embedded un-
1I am grateful to many people for discussions on earlier versions of this material. Firstly, I would like to thank
the organisers and audience of TripleA 5 especially, Alassane Kiemtore´, Jozina Vander Klok, Mary Amaechi and
Rajesh Bhatt for their useful comments. I am also grateful to my informants for their patience, time and cooperation.
Many thanks to Amy Rose Deal for being an inspiration. I gratefully acknowledge comments from Ce´cile Meier,
Chris Collins, Daniel Hole, Ede T. Zimmermann, Esther Rinke, Felix Ameka and audience of CALL 2018, Frank
Sode, Hazel Pearson, Heidi Klockmann, Idan Landau, Katharina Hartmann, Malte Zimmermann, Martin Everaert,
Petra Schulz, Philippe Schlenker, Selikem Gotah, Winnie Lechner, Zheng Shen; and my colleagues: Astrid, Caro, Eu,
Fenna, Lai, Lydia, Melly, Priscilla, Ruby, Sam, Sanja, Yranahan.
der an attitude verb, it is always understood to report a first person’s (or second person’s) thought
(Schlenker 2011). Thus, (1c) does this successfully.
The notion of logophoricity was pioneered by Hage`ge (1974) who observed that unlike in
English, in many African languages including Ewe (Clements 1975), there is a dedicated overt
pronoun, different from the third person pronoun, to show logophoricity. The first part of this pa-
per is concerned with the state of the art regarding logophoricity in Ewe, the notion of de re and de
se, and two contrasting views regarding its interpretation. The rest of the paper addresses the prob-
lem arising from the contrasting views and outlines some explanations for the varying judgments.
2 Logophoricity in Ewe, De re and De se Attitude Reports
This section involves logophoricity in Ewe and briefly describes the concept of de se and de re in
relation to logophoricty.
2.1 Logophoricity in Ewe
The logophoric pronoun in Ewe is ye`2. It is used exclusively in indirect discourse in Ewe, and
is replaced in direct discourse by the appropriate first person singular pronoun (Clements 1975).
Thus, ye` is restricted to the environment of attitude predicates such as think, say, believe, among
others. Should reference be made to any person other than the attitude holder, the third person
singular pronoun is used. Notably, Ewe presents a case of obviation (i.e disjoint in reference)3. In
the scope of attitude predicates, the third person pronoun e´ does not denote the attitude holder. The
data4 below replicates Clements (1975)’s findings on logophoricity in Ewe. Consider (2).
(2) a. Mawuse
Mawuse
gblO
said
be
COMP
“dO
stomach
le
is
nye
1SG
wu`-m”.
kill-PROG
Direct discourse
‘Mawuse said: “I am hungry”.’
b. Mawuse
Mawuse
gblO
said
be
COMP
dO
stomach
le
is
ye`
LOG
wu`-m.
kill-PROG
Indirect discourse
‘Mawusei said shei/⇤j is hungry.’
c. Mawuse
Mawuse
gblO
said
be
COMP
dO
stomach
le
is
e´
3SG
wu`-m.
kill-PROG
Indirect discourse: obviation
‘Mawusei said shej/⇤i is hungry.’
The logophoric pronoun ye` also has a plural counterpart ye`-wo´ which is used to report the
thoughts and perceptions of plural attitude holders, as in (3). Note that, obviation pretains here as
well (see (3-b)). ye`-wo´ differs from the regular third person plural pronoun wo´ and again, in the
scope of an attitude predicate wo´ does not refer to the subject of an attitude.
2I elicited yı`, a variant of ye` from my Peki informants.
3I thank Rajesh Bhatt for discussions on the subject.
4Some speakers prefer to use the order wu` nye in (2a). I thank Chris Collins for notifying me.
(3) a. Eli
Eli
kple
CONJ
Mansa
Mansa
xOese
believe
be
COMP
ye`-wo´
LOG-PL
dze-agbagba.
do-well
‘Eli and Mansai believed that theyi did well.’
b. Eli
Eli
kple
CONJ
Mansa
Mansa
xOese
believe
be
COMP
wo´
3PL
dze-agbagba.
do-well
Eli and Mansai believed that theyj did well.’
In Ewe, there are cases where two attitude predicates can interract. As observed by Agbedor
(2014), in such instances, coreference is between two possible antecedents, Adzo´a and Ama in (4).
(4) Adzo´a
Adzo´a
su´su´
think
be
COMP
Ama
Ama
gblO
say
be
COMP
ye`
LOG
lO
love
Kofi.
Kofi
‘Adzo´ai thinks that Amaj said that shei/j loves Kofi’ (Agbedor 2014, p. 58 e.x. 17).
Remarkably, the complementizer be is a ‘logophoric licensor’5 in that it always introduces an
attitude which may be reported. As is the case cross-linguistically, the complementizer be seems to
have developed historically from the verb be ‘say’6. Consequently, irrespective of the attitude verb,
a report without be renders the said report ungrammatical, as shown in (5a). In the case where the
attitude verb is gblO, also ‘say’, the attitude is marked twice. Consider example (2) again. It is also
possible to exclude gblO from (2) since gblO may be optional in Ewe. In such instances, as shown
in (5b), be is assumed to serve as both the verb and complementizer.
(5) a. *Mawuse
Mawuse
gblO/xOese/su´su´
said/believe/think
dO
stomach
le
is
ye`
LOG
wu`-m.
kill-PROG
‘Mawusei said/believe/think shei is hungry.’
[intended: Mawuse said/believed/thought that she is hungry]
b. Mawuse
Mawuse
be
said
dO
stomach
le
is
ye`
LOG
wu`-m.
kill-PROG
‘Mawusei said shei/⇤j is hungry.’
2.2 The Philosophical View of De re and De se
De re and de se are Latin words which mean ‘of the thing itself’ and ‘of oneself’ respectively
(McKay and Nelson 2014). These terms are used in intensional semantics to make referential and
attitudinal distinction. Following D. Lewis (1979, pp. 521-539), ascription of properties to indi-
viduals is known as attitude de re, whereas self-ascription of properties is termed attitude de se,
also known as ‘self-ascription’ or ‘reference de se’. I illustrate this distinction with a well-known
example from Kaplan (1989, p. 533).
5The term is used by Agbedor (2014).
6Examples: kO, ka´, ku-ti and ke are complementizers derrived from the verb say in Gokana, Igbo, Chewa and Efik
respectively (c.f. Dimmendaal 2001, p. 143)
(6) S1 (de se): Kaplan believes: “my pants are on fire.”
S2 (de re): Kaplan sees himself in a reflecting glass, unaware that he is watching himself.
He ascribes to himself, under the description “the one I am watching”, the property of
wearing pants that are on fire .
a. Kaplan believes that his pants are on fire. [ S1, S2]
b. Kaplan believes of himself that his pants are on fire. [ S1, #S2]
In S1, Kaplan holds a de se belief about himself. This means that he sees that his pants are on
fire and he is aware of this fact. By contrast, in S2, Kaplan has a belief about a certain res i.e the
one whose pants are on fire, although himself. His mental state is not of someone who says “my
pants are on fire”. This is known as the de re reading. As such, (6-a) can be used to describe both
S1 and S2 but (6-b) can only be used to describe S1.
Having described briefly logophoricity, PRO and the philosophical view of de se and de re atti-
tudes, a close link can be observed between the logophoric pronoun, PRO and attitude de se. First,
according to (Morgan 1970; Sells 1987, among others), logophoric pronouns behave semantically
like PRO. The analogy, therefore, is that since it holds true that both PRO and logophoric pronouns
can only be used to report an “I”-attitude, they must have an “I”-reading (de se). I move on to
discuss the two views concerning this claim.
3 The Standard vs. The Competing View
In determining the interpretation of logophoric pronouns, contexts are known to play an essential
role. As a result, scholars have generated scenarios such as (6) to tease apart different readings of
logophors. We can summarise the issue at hand in table 1.
Table 1.
coreference de se coreference de re dis-joint reference
ye` ? ye` e´
Do logophoric pronouns like ye` permit de re readings? Two generalisations can be found in the
literature concerning the interpretation of the Ewe logophor. I classify them as “the standard” and
“the competing” view. I use the term “the standard” in the sense that it is the widely-held view,
and “the competing”, on the grounds that it stems from more current research that challenges the
widely-held view.
“The standard” view generally assigns a de se interpretation to logophoric pronouns, i.e when
the speech is reported from the first person’s perspective (see Sells 1987; Chierchia 1989, etc). In
“the competing” view, however, ‘pure’ Ewe and Mina are used as a case study to show that a de re
interpretation may be expressed (see Pearson 2012; Pearson 2015). In this section, I present both
views with respect to ‘mistaken’ identity scenarios (3.1) and dream reports (3.2).
3.1 Mistaken Identity Scenarios
The standard take on logophoric pronouns is that they are de se elements (see Chierchia 1989;
Schlenker 1999; Anand 2006, etc). To refer to an attitude holder in reported speech, a logophoric
pronoun or PRO (for English) is used. As Clements (1975) rightly puts it, the logophoric pronoun
unambiguously establishes the correct assignment of co-reference. One of the problems, however,
arises in the so-called ‘mistaken’ identity contexts, where the attitude holder seems to be in an ‘un-
conscious’ state such that he or she does not have knowledge of being the referent of the reported
speech act. Consider (6) and (7).
(7) John is so drunk that he has forgotten he is a candidate in the election. He watches someone
on TV and finds that that person is a terrific candidate, who should definitely be elected.
Unbeknownst to John, the candidate he is watching on TV is John himself (Schlenker 2011,
p. 12).
a. John hopes that he will be elected. true
b. John hopes PRO to be elected (in real-life, John does not want to win). false
(8) John has just found an old paper that he wrote, but he doesn’t realize that he is the author
of the paper. He reads it and is impressed by what a good paper it is. He says, “whoever
wrote this paper is clever” (Pearson 2015, p. 79).
a. John said that he is clever. true
b. John claimed PRO to be clever. false
In the standard view, given (7) and (8), the (a) alternatives are read as true and ambiguous, since
he can refer to John himself or someone other than John. On the contrary, it is false to report the
(b) alternatives as John’s hope or speech. It is not the case that John thought “I should be elected”
or “I am clever” in (7) and (8). Thus, PRO is not the candidate on TV nor the author of the paper.
Alternatives (b) would then be construed de se. De se requires the awareness of an attitude holder
for something to be attributed to him. The difference, therefore, between the alternatives in (a) and
those in (b) is the awareness of John in both scenarios.
As stated earlier, logophoric pronouns seem to share distributional properties with PRO in the
sense that they can only occur in an embedded clause and when they do, they obligatorily refer to
some designated argument of the embedding verb (see Chierchia 1989; Schlenker 1999, etc). Also,
as suggested by Reinhart (1990), signalling a de se reading is one of the functions of logophoric
pronouns in a discourse. In effect, we may conclude that logophoric pronouns are unambiguosly
de se although it remains an empirical question. In Ewe, logophoricity has been investigated by
Clements (1975) and Agbedor (2014), among others. The interpretation of the Ewe logophor was
not discussed until Pearson (2015).
In the “competing view”, Pearson (2015) proposes ye` to have a de re construal in ‘pure’ Ewe
and Mina (dialect of Ewe spoken in Togo) see (9), a translation of (8) above. According to her, ye`
is a pronoun that picks out the bearer of the attitude (attitude holder) reported by the sentence in
which it occurs but does not require that the attitude holder thinks of himself or herself in a first
person way, hence, the use of ye` in (9) with respect to the context in (8). I will return to ‘mistaken’
identity in (4.2).
(9) John
John
gblO
said
be
COMP
ye`
LOG
nya´
know
agbale˜.
book
‘Johni said hei is clever.’
3.2 Dream Reports
It is not possible for an individual to inhabit two different worlds at a given time. Thus, we are
usually in the third person, when we dream of being another individual. Percus and Sauerland
(2003) differentiate between the two identities we have in dreams namely, the ‘dream self’ (the
individual we are in our dreams) and the ‘dream subject’ (the individual who does the dreaming).
In (10), John is the ‘dream subject’ and Bill, the ‘dream self’.
(10) John dreamt that he was Bill and he got married to his granddaughter.
As discussed by Percus and Sauerland (2003), one might expect dream-sentences with more
than one pronoun, like (10), to allow readings on which any pronoun can correlate with either
the ‘dream self’ or the ‘dream subject’. However, this is not the case. Percus and Sauerland
(2003) propose the Oneiric Reference Constraint, from here on, ORC, to, as it were, guide the
interpretation of such dream sentences. The ORC says:
“A sentence of the form X dreamed that ...pronoun... allows a reading in which the
pronoun has the dream-self as its correlate only when the following condition is met:
some pronoun whose correlate is the dream-self on the reading in question must not
be asymmetrically c-commanded by any pronoun whose correlate is X” (Percus and
Sauerland 2003, p. 5).
In other words, a pronoun which picks out the dream self (de se) cannot be c-commanded by
another pronoun that merely refers (de re) to the dreamer. ORC, therefore, disallows a reading in
which the ‘dream self’, Bill, is the correlate of his and the ‘dream subject’, John, the correlate of
he, given that he c-commands his. Pearson (2015) suggests that dream reports serve as productive
grounds for testing the claims under discussion due to the possibility of a shift in reference. Ac-
cording to her, in dream reports, a de se pronoun should be able to select the ‘dream self’ whereas,
a de re one should be able to select the ‘dream subject’. In the previous example (10), we can
assume the following readings:
In John’s dream...
i. Billdese was marrying Bill’sdese granddaughter.
ii. Billdese was marrying John’sdere granddaughter.
iii. # Johndere was marrying Bill’sdese granddaughter.
iv. Johndere was marrying John’sdere granddaughter.
Given this pattern for English, we would expect Ewe to behave in a similar manner in (11)
and (12). This means that ye` should pick out Bill (dream self) and e´ should pick out John (dream
subject). On the contrary, ye` picks out both the ‘dream subject’ and the ‘dream self’, similar
to option (ii) in the English paradigm, a rather surprising observation. This observation poses
questions to the widely-held view about logophorics: whether it is correct to pair up the notions of
logophorics and de se on one hand, and pair up the concept of ‘dream self’, ‘dream subject’ with
that of de re and de se on the other hand. I will maintain the view that the notion of logophoricity
and de se are closely related. The consequence will be that the theory of interpreting dreams may
not be useful for shedding light on the de re, de se distinction afterall7, given the behaviour of ye` in
(11) and (12). (11) and (12) simply show that in dreams everything is possible, the ‘dream subject’
can take the perspective of the ‘dream self’ because he perceives this person.
(11) John
John
ku´drO˜
dream
be
COMP
ye`
LOG
nye
COP
Bill
Bill
eye
CONJ
ye`
LOG
ãe
married
ye`-êe
LOG-POSS
tOgbuiyOvi.
granddaughter
‘John dreamt that he was Bill and he married his granddaughter.’
(12) John dreamt that he was Barack Obama and he gave himself a gift.
a. John
John
ku´drO˜
dream
be
COMP
ye`
LOG
nye
COP
Barack
Barack
Obama
Obama
eye
CONJ
ye`
LOG
na
gave
ye`
LOG
ãokui
REFL
nu-nana
thing-give.REDU
aãe.
INDEF
‘John dreamt that he was Barack Obama and he gave himself a gift.’
4 Interpretation of ye`: default de se
In light of contrasting views in the literature on ‘mistaken’ identity scenarios and dream reports,
this section contributes to the discussion on the interpretation of ye`.
4.1 Data Collection
In order to test the interpretation of ye`, I set up a small elicitation production task. Ten infor-
mants 8(native speakers of Ewedomegbe) evaluated the naturalness of sentences over Skype and
WhatsApp video, coupled with introspection (native speaker intuition). The voice note feature on
WhatsApp was also used to elicit data. Two informants come from Peki, one from Ho central, five
from Hlefi and the other two come from suburbs of Ho namely, Sokode Gbogame and Abutia-Teti.
The first part of the task was to expose them to structures that did not involve ‘mistaken’ identity.
For instance, Mawuse and Akpene are chatting. Mawuse says to Akpene ”I am hungry”. What did
Mawuse say? Mawuse gblO be. . .
Then I provided scenarios from both “standard”, “competing” views and discovered scenarios
(e.g. (6), (8), (14), etc) and asked my informants to report them in indirect discourse. To guide
them, I would ask questions about what the attitude holder said, believed, thought, etc, depending
7Ede Zimmermann and Rajesh Bhatt also thought this to be the case.
8My informants are multilinguals of Ewedomegbe (Ewe), English and Akan (Asanti twi dialect of Akan). They
presently live in Ghana and have had some basic formal training in Ewe (they speak Ewedomegbe, read and write
Ewe).
on the type of attitude predicate used. They were given a blank space to fill in the gaps with the
appropriate pronoun. For instance, John be . . . nya´ agbale/nu´. In order not to misconstrue the
domain of ye`, I required that they substitute the phrases involving res e.g. John be wo´ a tsia ame
si le TV la dzi ‘the person on TV’, with the suitable pronoun since most of them produced such
sentences. Elicitation took a maximum of 30 minutes per session depending on availability and
cooperation of the research subjects. English and Ewedomegbe was used interchangeably during
elicitation.
4.2 Mistaken Identity Scenarios
As a native speaker, I find Pearson (2015)’s conclusion (ye` has a de re reading) rather untenable. I
could think of a situation where a report can be made about what I have said about ‘someone, who
is actually me’, with ye`, but only as a manner of speaking, maybe for stylistic effects. Suppose I
cooked for a group of friends and as a way of complementing myself, I say “whoever prepared this
food is a good cook”, any of my friends could use (13) to represent my thoughts.
(13) Abby
Abby
be
say
ye`
LOG
nye
is
nu-ãa-la
thing-cook-one.who
nyui.
good
‘Abby said she is a good cook.’
Apart from a context like (13), it is simply impossible to refer to one’s res with ye`. I would
not use ye` in a ‘mistaken’ identity context. My research subjects were overwhelmed by the infor-
mational complexity of the ‘mistaken’ identity scenarios (e.g. Kaplan’s pants on fire). I therefore,
took a detour from such scenarios and presented real-world examples9, which seemed to make the
task easier. My research subjects could relate to these examples better.
(14) An Asian woman was declared missing from a party touring the Eldgja´ volcanic region in
south Iceland after getting off the party’s bus to freshen up. She only hopped off the bus
briefly, but had also changed her clothes - and her fellow travelers did not recognize her
when she climbed back on again to continue the party’s journey. When the details of the
missing person were issued, the woman reportedly didn’t recognize her own description
[woman with a pink sweater] and unwittingly joined the search party for herself, seeDaily
Mail for South Iceland Scenario10
In the South Iceland Scenario recapped as (15) and (16), (15) is supposed to report the state of
mind of the Asian woman at the time of the search. “The Asian woman believes that she is lost”
means “The Asian woman believes that the woman in the pink sweater is lost”. The difference
between the readings is: in the de se reading the Asian woman knows that she is the woman with
the pink sweater and in the de re reading she does not. My informants produced the following
sentences with respect to (14):
i. Asia nyOnu O xOese be ame aãe bu´ ‘The Asian woman believed someone was lost.’
9I am grateful to Amy Rose Deal for this idea.
10http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2195642/Asian-tourist-unwittingly-joins-search-HERSELF-failing-recognise-tour-groups-description-missingwoman.
html. Thanks to Amy Rose Deal for pointing out this example.
ii. Asia nyOnu la bu´i be nyOnu aãe bu´ ‘The Asian woman thinks a woman is lost.’
Given the replacement task, they then preferred (15) to (16) to capture the belief of the Asian
woman although (16) is grammatical in the language.
(15) Asia
Asian
nyOnu
woman
la
DEF
xOese
believes
be
COMP
e´
3SG
bu´.
is lost
‘The Asian woman believes that she is lost.’
[e´ = the woman with the pink sweater]
(16) Asia
Asian
nyOnu
woman
la
DEF
xOese
believes
be
COMP
ye`
LOG
bu´.
is lost
# ‘The Asian woman believes of herself to be lost.’
[ye` 6= the woman with the pink sweater]
Pearson (2015)’s theory of interpreting logophoric pronouns predicts that the belief of the Asian
woman in the South Iceland Scenario may be expressed in Ewe by means of the logophoric pro-
noun ye`, having a genuine de re reading. However, based on (15), it is evident that logophoric ye`
may not be used in a de re reading in Ewedomegbe. It is impossible to interpret ye` as represent-
ing the individual that everybody is looking for in the South Iceland Scenario. The Asian woman
would never claim “I am lost” although she will learn at some point that she was missing. Another
natural scenario 11 worth pondering over is as follows:
(17) Fatu loves singing. The problem is that she sings very badly. When she sings, she dis-
turbs everybody around. Fatu, however is persuaded that she is a great singer, and that
she could have a great artistic career. Things become worse when Fatu gets it into her
head to bring out an album. In order to discourage her, her brother decided to record her
discreetly on his mobile phone as she was singing in the kitchen. He then sent her the
recording with the following question: “She sings well, doesn’t she?” Fatu listened to the
recording, and answered his brother: “That girl sounds horrible. She doesn’t sing well at
all”. Unfortunately, Fatu does not realize that it is her own voice that she has just heard.
(18) Fatu
Fatu
xOese
believe
be
COMP
ye`
LOG
me
NEG
dzı`
sing
na
HAB
ha
song
nyuie
good
o.
NEG
‘Fatu believes that she does not sing well.’ [ye` 6= the person with the bad voice]
We can observe that (18) is unacceptable given (17). In all worlds compatible with Fatu’s
believes, she is a great singer. She would never accept (18) as communicating her doxastic state.
4.3 Dream Reports
We have seen in section (3.2) above that ye` selects both the ‘dream subject’ and the ‘dream
self’. From the many discussions with my informants, I observed a difficulty to grasp the idea
of “counter-identity” in dreams. Do we really dream of being another? This could be a pschologi-
cal question and not a linguistic one. Subjects of attitudes may have counterparts to represent them
11Many thanks to Alassane Kiemtore´ of University of Stuttgart for sharing this scenario with me.
in other worlds but they themselves are not there. My informants could relate to what is known
as “malaria-dreams”12 or better, being younger than they are in reality in their dreams. However,
the person they are in their dreams is still them. A possible explanation of ye` in dream reports
is that the use of ye` signals cognitive access to both the ‘dream self’ and ‘dream subject’ even if
they are different individuals; or that, ye` prefers a ‘strict’-identity (John is John and John is Bill
in all worlds). I tried to push the idea of “counter-identity” once more and (19) was the result.
Alternative (i), (ii) and (iv) seemed to be available.
(19) John
John
ku´drO˜
dream
be
COMP
ye`
LOG
nye
COP
Bill
Bill
eye
CONJ
ye`
LOG
abe
as
Bill
Bill
ãe
married
ye`-êe
LOG-POSS
tOgbuiyOvi.
granddaughter
‘John dreamt that he was Bill and as Bill he married his grand daughter.’
This means John’s mental state is of one that says the following: In John’s dream...
i. Billdese was marrying Bill’sdese granddaughter (“I dreamt that I was Bill and I, as Bill, married
my granddaughter”).
ii. Billdese was marrying John’sdere granddaughter (“I dreamt that I was Bill and I as Bill, married
my real self’s granddaughter”).
iii. # Johndere was marrying Bill’sdese granddaughter.
iv. Johndere was marrying John’sdere granddaughter (“I dreamt that I was Bill (but it doesnt matter
who I was in my dream), I, as my real self, married my real self’s granddaughter”).
With (19), it is possible that the presence of abe ‘as’ forces a de se reading since “as-phrases”
have a subject preference13. However, this is the best my informants could give me given the diffi-
culty at hand.
5 Explanations
This section attempts to offer some possible explanations to the differences in judgments with
respect to ‘mistaken’ identity scenarios.
5.1 Dialectal Variation: ‘Pure’ Ewe and Togo Ewe
The differences in judgments could be an effect of different dialects or registers. Note, however,
that all dialects of Ewe are mutually intelligible (Ameka 1991). I present the language situation in
Ewe and Togo.
‘Pure’ Ewe belongs to the Kwa branch of the Niger-Congo language family14. According to
12These are dreams people have after taking medication for malaria. It is usually in the form of nightmares (e.g.
one could dream of being dead, in coma or admitted to the hospital). Worse, one could hallucinate.
13Thanks to Idan Landau for pointing this out.
14It is odd to refer to the variety of Ewe spoken in Ghana as ‘pure’. However, I suspect Pearson’s informants used
the term to refer to the written standard variety of Ewe.
M. P. Lewis, Simons, Fennig, et al. (2009), Ewe can further be classified as an Atlantic-Congo,
Volta-Congo, Left Bank, and Gbe language. It has been noted that the name Ewe applies to a
written standard (developed in the nineteenth century, with a high degree of coastal content) and
several spoken mutually intelligible dialects in the Volta region of Ghana and southern part of
Togo (Ameka 1991). Broadly, the dialects spoken in Ghana can be grouped geographically into:
Southern or coastal dialects and Northern or inland dialects, characterized indigenously as Ewe-
domegbe. The southern dialects are spoken in areas such as Anlo (ANlO), Tongu (TONu), Avenor,
Dzodze, etc. while the Northern dialects are spoken in areas such as Ho, Kpedze, Hohoe, Peki,
Kpando, Fodome, Danyi, Kpele, among others.
Togo, on the other hand, is a multilingual country. According to M. P. Lewis, Simons, Fennig,
et al. (2009), 44 languages are spoken in the country. Among the languages spoken, French is the
official language, while the interethnic languages used are French and ‘Mina’ (i.e. the dialect of
Ewe spoken in Lome, the capital of Togo). ‘Mina’ is also known as ‘Mina-Ewe’, ‘Ewe-Mina’,
‘Gengbe’ or simply ‘Gen’(Essizewa 2009; C. F. Voegelin and F. M. Voegelin 1964, p. 62).
Strikingly, Gen belongs to the Gbe dialect cluster15 of which Ewe also belongs (Essizewa
2009). It remains unclear why Pearson’s informants chose ye` in a ‘mistaken’ identity scenario if
for all dialects of Ewe, spoken in both Ghana and Togo, ye` is a logophoric pronoun used to report
the attitude or feelings of some person.
5.2 Methodology
The difference in judgment may also be a result of methods used to elicit data. I adopted elicitation
production, coupled with a truth value judgment task (selection and replacement task). The reason
was to allow informants to demonstrate their knowledge of the logophoric pronoun, by producing
sentences which required the use of this pronoun. The replacement task, particularly, allowed
for comparison between my responses and Pearson’s. On the other hand, Pearson (2015) used
grammaticality judgment as well as truth value judgment tasks. I suppose that the point of the
task is not to judge whether or not a sentence is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ in the language; otherwise, all the
sentences with ye` is grammatical in the language. This may have influenced Pearson’s responses.
5.3 Confused Informants
Differences in judgment could occur as a result of confusion on the part of Pearson’s informants
which was also the case for my informants. It was observed that the ‘mistaken’ identity scenarios
were notoriously difficult to understand and it was difficult to explain the point of the judgment
task to the informants. In such scenarios, the attitude holders are often temporarily disoriented
and informants found it hard in deciding from what time to report their attitude; the time when
the attitude holders don’t know who they are from the time they gained information about their
identity.
The first three of my informants reported ye` as possible in ‘mistaken’ identity reports as well,
but it turned out that they didn’t realise a difference between the point of view of the attitude
holder and point of view of the reporter. My informants (the first three) judged the sentences on
15https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/03/Gbe languages.png
the grounds that they knew the attitude holders meant to talk about themselves. They certainly
misunderstood the point of the test and they confirmed that they may have lacked comprehension.
One of them actually said to me “enya kpakpa makOmakO fomeviwo ka ye´ ne tsO va na mı´?” ‘what
kinds of confusing stories have you brought to us?’ I had to explain the distinction between the
attitude holder as res meaning, he’s not aware that he is himself, and the attitude holder as himself
several times for most of my data collection session.
Given that Pearson used grammaticality and truth judgment tasks, I am tempted to also attribute
misrepresented sentences of (20), a real-life scenario, to be evaluated by informants. To see this,
compare (20-a) with (20-b).
(20) Following a spate of burglaries, a policeman was alerted by CCTV operators that someone
was acting suspiciously, and chased after that individual, unaware that it was himself16.
a. Sodza
Policeman
xOse
believe
be
COMPL
ye`
LOG
nyi
COP
fianfitO.
thief
‘The policemani believed that hei was a thief’ (Pearson 2015, p. 99).
b. KpovitO
Policeman
la
DEF
xOese
believe
be
COMP
ye`
LOG
le
is
amesi
person
wo`
3SG
bu`
think
fı`fı`
thiefing
le
of
Nuti
him
la
DEF
dı´-m.
search-PROG
‘The policeman believed that he was looking for a suspect’ [From my informant].
c. KpovitO
policeman
la
DEF
xOese
believe
be
COMP
e´
3SG
nye
COP
fiafitO.
thief
‘The policeman believed that he was a thief.’
[e´ = the individual being chased by the policeman]
From (20-a) and (20-b) one can observe that the choice of words differ. Note, that one of
Pearson’s consultants (consultant 3) consistently rejects sentence (20-a). The policeman believed
he was looking for a suspect and not a thief. Trivial as this may seem, I think the res i.e the
individual being chased is that of the CCTV operator (see footnote for full scenario) and not even the
policeman. The judgments could have been sharper. Now, suppose it is the case that the policeman
was looking for a thief, my infromants would rather produce (20-c) as a suitable construction with
respect to the scenario.
5.4 Verbs Used
Interpretation of the logophoric pronoun may depend on the kind(s) of verb. For instance, Chier-
chia (1989, p. 17) suggests that a verb like persuade in (21) has an unambiguos de se reading.
Whereas, verbs of causation such as, force, make, etc in (22) unambiguosly have a de re reading.
(21) a. John persuaded Mary to be fired.
b. John persuaded Mary to bring about a situation where she is fired.
16http://uk.news.yahoo.com/policeman-chased-himself-for-20-minutes-while-looking-for-suspect.html.
(22) a. John forced Mary to leave.
b. John forced Mary to bring about a situation where she leaves.
Chierchia (1989) proposes that (21-a) asymetrically entails (21-b) while, (22-a) entails (22-b)
and (22-b) in turn entails (22-a). Mary controls the complement of persuade in (21-a). She is
persuaded to bring about a situation where she and nobody else is fired, involving an indirect
attribution of the property of being fired to Mary. The same cannot be said for the use of force in
(22). ye` does not show up an equivalent Ewe example (23). Instead we use a connecting pronoun
ne´, this needs further investigation.
(23) John
John
te´-ãe
push-unto
Mary
Mary
dzı´
prep
be
COMP
ne´
pronoun
dzo´.
leave
‘John forced Mary to leave.’
Pearson (2015) investigates verbs like say, think and believe. Some of those verbs are known
as control verbs and some as exceptional case marking verbs. For ‘mistaken’ identity scenarios, I
found the same judgments for the verbs gblO ‘say’, xOese ‘believe’, mOkpOkpO ‘hope’ and bu`/su´su´
‘think’ in Ewedomegbe.
(24) a. John
John
gblO
say
be
COMP
e´
3SG
nya´
know
agbale˜.
book
‘Johni said that hej is clever.’
b. John
John
xOese
believed
be
COMP
e´
3SG
nya´
know
agbale˜.
book
‘Johni believed that hej is clever.’
c. John
John
bu`
thought
be
COMP
e´
3SG
nya´
know
agbale˜.
book
‘Johni thought that hej is clever.’
d. John
John
nO
be
mOkpOkpO
hope
me
in
be
COMP
e´
3SG
nya´
know
agbale˜.
book
‘Johni hoped that hej is clever.’
My informants would not use ye` regarding these verbs to communicate John’s feelings, if he
was unaware that he was the subject of the attitude. They always preferred e´ to ye`.
6 Conclusion
I conclude that ye` is a regular logophoric pronoun in Ewedomegbe, just like other logophoric
pronouns in other languages. As discussed, an attitude report involving ye` cannot be used to de-
scribe a situation where the attitude holder is unaware of his or her immediate condition. Thus, the
awareness of the attitude holder is a prominent condition in determining the interpretation of the
logophoric pronoun. Future research would have to show whether there are indeed dialectal dif-
ferences with respect to the interpretation of logophors. Also, future research would have to work
with examples like the South Iceland scenario. It would be interesting to investigate the kinds of
‘mistaken’ identity scenarios that allow a de se reading. Although Pearson (2015) involved five
informants and I, ten, involving more participants will be great for future work. Concerning dream
reports, I propose that dream reports may not be good grounds for shedding light on the de re, de
se distinction. The use of the notions de re and de se in dream reports seems to be different from
the use of de re and de se in attitude reports. Ewe shows this. It is not possible to say that the
dream subject is always de re.
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Iterative-Reciprocal Polysemy in Logoori1
John Gluckman — University of Kansas
Abstract. The affix -an in Logoori (Luhya, Bantu) is used to mark iterated events and recipro-
cal situations. I illustrate that this dual use reflects a single meaning: -an is an event-pluralizer
which cumulatively pluralizes semantically monovalent events, a category which includes recipro-
cal events. The analysis predicts -an’s morpho-syntactic and semantic distribution. An outcome of
the analysis is that reciprocity is emergent in Logoori, i.e., it is a result of putting together indepen-
dently needed semantic processes (Heim et al., 1991). Finally, I discuss cross-linguistic variation
in reciprocal “polysemy,” focusing in particular on cognate -an’s across Narrow Bantu languages.
1 Introduction
Cross-linguistically, markers of reciprocity are known to display a high degree of polysemy: the
same marker used for reciprocal situations may also serve some other function(s) in the language
(Lichtenberk, 1985; Frajzyngier and Curl, 1999; Ko¨nig and Gast, 2008; Nedjalkov, 2007). Here,
I address one such case in Logoori (Luhya, Bantu, JE41), where the verbal extension -an can be
used to indicate a reciprocal situation as in (1a) as well as an iterated event at in (1b).2
(1) a. avaana
2child
va-lol-an-i
2SM-see-AN-FV
‘The children saw each other.’
b. Sira
1Sira
y-ashiamul-an-i
1SM-sneeze-AN-FV
‘Sira sneezed repeatedly.’
Along with reciprocal-reflexive and reciprocal-sociative polysemies, Nedjalkov (2007) lists the
reciprocal-iterative polysemy as one of the three most robustly attested patterns found in reciprocal
constructions cross-linguistically. (See also discussions of cross-linguistic patterns in Frajzyngier
and Curl 1999; Ko¨nig and Gast 2008). This suggests that the pattern in Logoori is not an accident
of the language, rather it reflects a deeper connection between reciprocity and event plurality.
I propose below an analysis of -an that semantically, syntactically, and morphologically unifies
its use and distribution: -an always expresses a cumulative plural event for single-participant (i.e.,
intransitive) events. While this meaning is transparently observed in (1b), it is a sub-component
of the meaning found in (1a). The analysis fully explains not only -an’s meaning contribution, but
also its morphological and syntactic distribution.
1Immense thanks to my Logoori teachers Mwabeni Lavusa Indire, Bernard Lavussa, and Walter Kigali. Thanks
also to Pam Munro, Yael Sharvit, Dave Odden, Mike Diercks, Margit Bowler, and audiences at UCLA’s American
Indian Seminar, the University of Kansas, and ACAL 49 at MSU, and naturally the feedback from attendees of TripleA
5 in Konstanz. All errors are my own.
2 Luhya (also Luyia) languages are spoken in Western Kenya and Uganda. Logoori is also known as Logoli,
Maragoli, Luragooli, Llogoori.
AC : Anticausative
APPL : Applicative
CAUS : Causative
FV : Final Vowel
PRES : Present
PASS : Passive
PAST : Past
REFL : Reflexive
SM : Subject Marker
This paper makes two broader points. First, reciprocity in Logoori is compositional. Reciprocal
meaning arises as a result of combining independently motivated syntactico-semantic processes,
as argued for English in Heim et al. (1991). Second, reciprocal “polysemies” arise when languages
grammaticalize — or recruit morphology for — subcomponents of the complex semantics of reci-
procity. In these cases, other processes “pick up the slack” for filling in the rest of reciprocal
meaning.
2 Iterative use
Attached to some verbs, -an can be used to indicate an iterative, or sometimes intensive event Ta-
ble 1.3 (See Maslova 2007; Nurse and Philippson 2003 for similar uses in other Bantu languages).
kumera ‘to grow’ (intr) kumerana ‘to grow fast, a lot’
kumeeda ‘to increase’ (intr) kumeedana ‘to increase steadily.’
kusunduka ‘to spill’ (intr) kusundukana ‘to spill here and there’
kwuma ‘to freeze’ (intr) kwumana ‘to freeze over and over’
kwishiamula ‘to sneeze’ kwishiamulana ‘to sneeze over and over.’
kwivora ‘to give birth’ kwivorana ‘to breed, increase in #’s’
kuhanzuka ‘to shout’ kuhanzukana ‘to shout over and over’
kunagora ‘to run’ kunagorana ‘to run over and over, keep running’
. . . . . .
Table 1: Iterative/intensive uses of -an. (Ku- is the class 15 infinitival prefix.)
In its iterative use, -an expresses two pieces of meaning.
1. The event of the predicate involves a single participant. This functionally restricts -an to
appearing with intransitive predicates.
2. The event of the predicate is a cumulative plural event.
I illustrate these two properties in the next sections.
2.1 Property 1: Cumulative plurality
I assume that an event of P is cumulatively plural if it is perceived as being a single event of P with
multiple sub-events of P (Krifka, 1989; Sternefeld, 1998). Thus, -an is only felicitous where there
is a perceived single event involving multiple sub-events, as shown in the following contexts.
(2) Sira
Sira
y-ashiamul-an-i
1SM-sneeze-AN-FV
‘Sira sneezed repeatedly.’
(a) X Sira had a fit of sneezing.
(b) 7 Over the course of the day, Sira sneezed mul-
tiple times.
3I assume that the intensive reading is a type of iterative event.
(3) kisaga
7branch
ki-vun-ik-an-i
7SM-break-AC-AN-FV
‘The branch broke in many pieces.’
(a) X Sira stepped on a branch, and it broke
in many pieces.
(b) 7 Over the course of the day, many people
stepped on a branch, breaking it in many
pieces.
It’s worth noting that -an does not impose any sort of structure on the sub-events. They can be
consecutive, as in (2), or they can be simultaneous, as in (3). All that matters is that the sub-events
are perceived as being a part of some larger macro-event.
2.2 Property 2: Single-participant events
Though -an pluralizes events, it cannot be used with all event-predicates. For instance, it is not
permitted with transitive verbs.
(4) a. * Sira
1Sira
a-ras-an-i
1SM-throw-AN-FV
mpira
3ball
[intended: ‘Sira threw the ball repeatedly’]
b. * Sira
1Sira
a-duy-an-i
1SM-hit-AN-FV
Imali
1Imali
[intended: ‘Sira hit Imali repeatedly.’
As can be observed in Table 1, -an’s occurrence is restricted to intransitives. However, cru-
cially, -an is restricted to a particular kind of intransitive, namely, semantic intransitives. I take
this term to mean an event which only has a single participant. This differs from syntactic intran-
sitivity, which may not involve a single-participant event.
The distinction can be seen in -an’s restriction to co-occuring with only one kind of derived
intransitive. In Logoori, there are two ways to derive an intransitive verb from a transitive verb:
passivization and anticausativization (Gluckman and Bowler, 2016).4
(5) a. mpira
3ball
gu-ras-w-i
3SM-throw-PASS-FV
(na
by
Sira)
Sira
PASSIVE
‘The ball was thrown (by Sira)’
b. mpira
3ball
gu-ras-ik-i
3SM-throw-AC-FV
(*na
by
Sira)
Sira
ANTICAUSATIVE
‘The ball was thrown (by Sira).’ (⇡ ‘The ball threw.’)
One canonical difference between passives and anticausatives is whether reference to the de-
moted Agent is permitted. Passives permit explicit reference to the implicit Agent in a by/na-phrase
(5a). Thus, passives are taken to be syntactically intransitive, but semantically transitive, in that the
event of the predicate still involves two participants. Anticausatives on the other hand do not permit
4The verbal extension -Vk has a number of differ labels and uses across Bantu (Nurse and Philippson, 2003). I
refer the reader to Gluckman and Bowler (2016) for evidence that its function in Logoori is that of an anticausative
marker — though the argument goes through whether this is true or not.
(implicit or explicit) reference to the Agent (5b). This is because anticausatives involve semantic
intransitivity: the overall valency has been decreased by one (cf, Kemmer 1993; Haspelmath 1993;
Scha¨fer 2008 among many others).
Returning to -an, we observe that it can only pluralize derived anticausatives, and not passives.5
(6) a. * mpira
3ball
gu-ras-w-an-i
3SM-throw-PASS-AN-FV
(na
by
Sira)
Sira
b. mpira
3ball
gu-ras-ik-an-i
3SM-throw-AC-AN-FV
(*na
by
Sira)
Sira
‘The ball was thrown repeatedly.’
(i.e., it was juggled)
(7) a. * amaaze
6water
ga-sund-w-an-i
6SM-spill-PASS-AN-FV
b. amaaze
6water
ga-sund-uk-an-i
6SM-spill-AC-AN-FV
‘The water spilled here and there.’
[Speaker comment: ‘Like when the waiter brought it to the table. It was sloshing
around.’]
This follows if -an is sensitive to the number of semantic arguments that are associated with
the predicate. Observe in fact that there is a distinct transitive (cumulative) event pluralizer -
any (<-añ>). -Any may only occur with transitive predicates, and is restricted to passive derived
intransitives.
(8) a. * Sira
1Sira
y-ashiamul-any-i
1SM-sneeze-ANY-FV
[intended: ‘Sira sneezed repeatedly.’]
b. Sira
1Sira
a-ras-any-i
1SM-threw-ANY-FV
mpira
ball
‘Sira threw the ball repeatedly’ (i.e., he juggled the ball).
c. mpira
3ball
gu-ras-any-w-i
3SM-throw-ANY-PASS-FV
‘The ball was thrown repeatedly’ (i.e., it was juggled).6
d. * mpira
3ball
gu-ras-ik-any-i
3SM-throw-AC-ANY-FV
5There is no phonological reason to rule out (6a), (7a). Also, no other ordering of the suffixes works.
6Note the different ordering of the pluralizer and voice morphology: -any must precede the passive, but -an
must follow the anticausative. I believe this reflects the different function of anticausative vs. passive heads, rather
than a (morpho-)syntactic difference between the two different event pluralizers. See Gluckman (to appear) for more
discussion. Thanks to Claire Halpert for useful comments on this topic.
2.3 Defining iterative -an
Given that -an expresses both plurality and intransitivity, I define -an as a cumulative event plu-
ralizer, with a presupposition such that the event it pluralizes only has a single participant.  is
ordering on events.7
(9) J-anK =  Phv,sti e w:
Presupposition: e has a single event participant
Assertion: 9e1, e2[P (e)(w)& P (e1)(w)& P (e2)(w)& e1 6= e2 & e1, e2 e] & 8e0, e00[P (e0)(w)
& P(e00)(w)! P (e0   e00)(w)]
I assume that the single event participant restriction can be satisfied by a plural individual (cf Link
1983; Schwarzschild 1996 among others).
I propose that -an is an instantiation of verbal number in a Number Phrase (NumP). Syntac-
tically, NumP sits on top of the verbal domain, including the external argument assumed to be in
VoiceP (Kratzer, 1996).
(10)
NumP
VoiceP
Voice
V
-ashiamul-
sneeze
Voice
;
DP
Sira
Numpl
-an
I assume that Bantu verbs are morphologically constructed via head movement reflecting the Mir-
ror Principle (Baker, 1985). As the verb (V) moves up the tree to its surface position (likely in C),
it collects heads on its way. The result is that heads which are lower in the structure will appear
closer to the root.
The meaning and tree in (9) and (10) make two predictions about the use and morpho-syntactic
location of -an. First, we predict that subjects should be able to scope under the pluralizer. This
prediction is borne out. In the following, the subject is distributed among events of sneezing. Each
event involves a single (different) participant.
(11) In a meeting, everyone sneezed once all at the same time.
avaana
2person
va-shiamul-an-i
2SM-sneeze-AN-FV
‘People sneezed.’
The second prediction concerns where -an appears with respect to valency increasing and de-
creasing morphology. -An should always appear outside of valency decreasing morphology (i.e.,
7The definition of cumulativity (minus the presupposition) is adapted from Krifka (1989).
the anticausative marker -Vk). That is, -an may only appear after a single-participant-event verb
phrase has been derived.
Again, this prediction is borne out. As we saw earlier, when the anticausative and -an co-occur,
the anticausative must precede -an, which reflects the fact that -Vk sits lower in the structure.
(12) a. mpira
3ball
gu-ras-ik-an-i
3SM-throw-AC-AN-FV
‘The ball was thrown repeatedly.’
b.
NumP
VoiceP
VP
-ras- mpira
throw ball
Voice
-ik
Numpl
-an
On the other hand, -an should always appear inside of valency increasing morphology. For
instance, when a causative affix -iz is added, the valency is increased by one. In this case, we
predict that -an should only be able to appear inside of -iz, since it must pluralize the event before
another event-participant is added.8
(13) a. Sira
Sira
y-ashiamul-an-iz-i
1SM-sneeze-AN-CAUS-FV
muundu
person
CAUSATIVE
‘Sira made someone sneeze repeatedly.’ (*yashiamul-iz-an-i)
b.
CausP
Caus0
NumP
VoiceP
muundu -ashiamul-
someone sneeze
Numpl
-an
Caus
-iz
DP
Sira
Likewise, when an applied argument is added to the event structure, because this process cre-
ates a two-participant event, -an must pluralize the event before the argument can be added, pre-
dicting that -an should appear before the applicative -el/-il.
8Note that, despite the translation on (13), it is not clear whether -iz in fact adds another event, in addition to adding
another argument. A more accurate translation might be “Sira sneezed someone.”
(14) Sira
1Sira
y-ashiamul-an-il-i
1SM-sneeze-AN-APPL-FV
muundu
person
APPLICATIVE
‘Sira sneezed repeatedly for someone.’ (*yashiamul-il-an-i)
Moreover, we have evidence from scope that the added arguments are above the pluralizer.
With applied arguments, the added argument cannot scope under the pluralizer. This is evident
using the indefinite muundu, ‘someone.’ The example in (14) is not felicitous if Sira sneezed once
for a lot of different people. It can only mean that there is some particular person for whom Sira
sneezed over and over.
3 Reciprocal use
In addition to its iterative use, -an can be used to indicate a reciprocal situation. This use of -an is
robustly found across (Narrow) Bantu languages (Dammann, 1954; Mchombo, 1993b; Dalrymple
et al., 1994; Nurse and Philippson, 2003; Maslova, 2007) among many others.
(15) a. avaana
2child
va-lol-an-i
2SM-see-AN-FV
‘The children saw each other.’
b. Sira
1Sira
na
and
Imali
1Imali
va-duy-an-i
2SM-hit-AN-FV
‘Sira and Imali hit each other.’
As pointed out for Chichewa (Bantu) by Mchombo (1993b, 2007), reciprocal-an has many of
the core properties we associate with reciprocal markers. For instance, it is subject to locality and
c-command conditions (i.e., Condition A).
(16) a. * avaana
2child
va-vor-i
2SM-say-FV
[ ndii
that
Maina
1Maina
a-lol-an-i
1SM-see-AN-FV
] LOCALITY
‘*The children said that Maina saw each other.’
b. * muremi
1friend
y-a
1-of
avaana
2child
a-lol-an-i
1SM-see-AN-FV
C-COMMAND
‘*The children’s friend saw each other.’
Similarly, there are conditions on the phi-features of the antecedent: it must be plural.
(17) a. *Maina
1Maina
a-lol-an-i
1SM-see-AN-FV
‘*Maina saw each other.’
Reciprocal constructions also display something akin to “subject-orientation” (putting aside
complexities of how to define the term “subject”). For instance, the antecedent for a reciprocal
cannot be the Goal in a Double Object construction.
(18) * Sira
1Sira
a-many-an-i
1SM-show-AN-FV
avaana
2child
[intended: ‘Sira showed the children each other (in the mirror).’]
Finally, reciprocal-an always appears outside of valency increasing morphology. The other
ordering yields an iterative reading of -an.
(19) a. avaana
2child
va-sek-iz-an-i
2SM-laugh-CAUS-AN-FV
CAUSATIVE
‘The children made each other laugh.’ (6=vasek-an-iz-i)
b. avaana
2child
va-hanzuk-il-an-i
2SM-shout-APPL-AN-FV
APPLICATIVE
‘The children shouted at each other’ (6=vahanzuk-an-il-i)
This of course directly contradicts what was observed earlier for the iterative use of -an. Indeed,
all of the properties associated with the reciprocal use are not observed with the iterative use. There
are no conditions on the “antecedent” (i.e., the subject) with iterative-an.
However, although there is no apparent (morpho-)syntactic evidence to connect the two uses,
we can state that -an has a uniform semantic distribution. This is because reciprocal situations are
also cumulatively plural events with a single (plural) event participant (Klaiman, 1991; Kemmer,
1993; Evans et al., 2011). Thus, we can say that -an expresses a part of the meaning associated
with reciprocity. I will spell out this idea in the next section.9
4 The meaning of reciprocity
Reciprocal meaning can be broken down into independent pieces of meaning. This is the central
observation of Heim et al. (1991), who argue that a plausible semantics for each coupled with a
plausible semantics for other (plus assumptions about movement) can derive reciprocal meaning in
English, since reciprocity always involves some sort of distributor (each) and a “distinctor” (other).
Since Heim et al, there has been a growing amount of research into the particular semantic
pieces that make up reciprocity (Beck, 2001; Schein, 2001; Evans et al., 2011) among others. I
focus here on two of them.
9It’s worth noting that in Logoori, -an cannot appear in the associative construction, commonly found in Bantu
languages (Dammann, 1954; Vitale, 1981; Maslova, 2007; Dimitriadis, 2008). (It’s also called the sociative, comitative
or discontinuous reciprocal (Nurse and Philippson, 2003; Maslova, 2007).) The associative allows the plural group
whose members are in a reciprocal relation to be syntactically divided between the subject and an associative phrase.
(1) Sira a-na-pend-an-a na Imali (Swahili)
* Sira
1Sira
y-a-yaanz-an-a
1SM-PRES-love-AN-FV
na
and
Imali
Imali
(Logoori)
‘Sira and Imali love each other’
However, associative constructions are possible with inherently reciprocal predicates in Logoori like kwaagana, ‘to
meet,’ kufana ‘to resemble,’ etc. Note that all inherently reciprocal verbs appear to bear a lexicalized -anmarker at the
end.
First, reciprocal situations are intransitive — in fact, they describe single-participant events in
that there is only a single argument of the predicate which fill two distinct grammatical positions
(Klaiman, 1991; Kemmer, 1993):10 The idea is sketched in (20).
(20) VP
DPiV
DPi
The tree in (20) describes an event with a single participant (DPi) which is mapped to two
grammatical positions. (Note that DPi could itself denote a plurality.) That is, the event of the verb
involves one less “distinct” argument (Kemmer, 1993). Indeed, in many languages the reduction
in valency is reflected in the appearance of valency-reducing morphology in the expression of
reciprocity (Nedjalkov, 2007).
Moreover, reciprocal situations are cumulatively plural events (Carlson, 1998; Kemmer, 1993;
Schein, 1993; Dimitriadis, 2008). In this respect, they always appear to describe a maximal event
of P which consists of sub-events of P.11
(21) Last week, Imali stared at Sira. The following day, Sira stared at Imali.
a. # Sira
Sira
na
and
Imali
Imali
va-hondolel-an-i
2SM-stare-AN-FV
‘#Sira and Imali stared at each other.’
[Speaker comment: “This only makes sense if Sira and Imali are staring at each
other at the same time.”]
(22) On Tuesday, Sira kicked Imali. On Wednesday, Imali kicked Sira.
a. # Sira
Sira
na
and
Imali
Imali
va-nagiz-an-i
2SM-kick-AN-FV
‘#Sira and Imali kicked each other.’
[Speaker comment: “No. . . They did it on different days? They need to do it like
one after the other.”]
Thus, since reciprocals are also cumulatively plural and semantically intransitive, the appear-
ance of -an is expected: it is the element that cumulatively pluralizes single-participant events. In
other words, -an pluralizes a single-participant event, which can be mapped to different syntactic
configurations:
10I’ll note that reciprocals do not act syntactically intransitive in Logoori, unlike in Chichewa (Dalrymple et al.,
1994; Mchombo, 1993a). See also Safir and Sikuku 2018 for a similar observation for Lubukusu, a related Luhya
language. It’s worth noting that -an can be used with other syntactically transitive, but semantically intransitive
predicates, including cognate objects (e.g., sneeze a big sneeze). I take this as further evidence that -an is sensitive to
semantic, not syntactic transitivity.
11It’s pointed out in Bruening (2007) that there are differences between stative and non-stative reciprocal expres-
sions. I use both kinds of verbs to control for this.
(23) a. Iterative use:
VP
VDP
-an
b. Reciprocal use:
VP
DPiV
DPi
-an
On this analysis, -an does not come with reciprocal meaning; it’s always an event pluralizer.
The reciprocal meaning must be compositional, i.e., a result of putting together different pieces of
the meaning parts of reciprocity, one of which is event plurality of intransitive predicates. I discuss
what else is needed to get the meaning in section 5.
Before that, consider again the (morpho-)syntactic reciprocal properties discussed earlier. First,
observe that locality and c-command (i.e., Condition A) are enforced because -an can only occur
with intransitive predicates.
(24) a. * avaana
2child
va-vor-i
2SM-say-FV
[ ndii
that
Maina
1Maina
a-lol-an-i
1SM-see-AN-FV
] LOCALITY
‘*The children said that Maina saw each other.’
b. * muremi
1friend
y-a
1-of
avaana
2child
a-lol-an-i
1SM-see-AN-FV
C-COMMAND
‘*The children’s friend saw each other.’
The verb phrase containing -lol-, ‘see’ doesn’t describe a single-participant event in either (24a)
or (24b).
Similarly, -an can never have a non-subject antecedent because it would require that -an attach
to something that isn’t a property of events, say a (low) applicative phrase.
(25) * Sira
1Sira
a-many-an-i
1SM-show-AN-FV
avaana
2child
[intended: ‘Sira showed the children each other (in the mirror).’]
The verb phrase doesn’t describe an event with a single-participant in (25). Moreover, there is
no plausible projection below VP that could conceivably be construed as a single-participant event.
Finally, if -an appears outside of valency increasing morphology, then it can only have a recip-
rocal use. Again, this follows as long as the DPs are “indistinct,” i.e. are co-referential.12
12Presumably, the fact that -an must appear with a plural antecedent reduces to a blocking effect. With a singular
antecedent, the only possible interpretation is that of a reflexive action, which is expressed using the affix i- (again,
commonly found across Bantu languages). For space reasons, I must leave the expression of the reflexive prefix/object-
marker i- out of the discussion here. A couple of notes may be useful for future work though. The reflexive appears
to cover the semantic space of reciprocals in that it is compatible with Murray’s (2008) so-called “mixed” readings.
Second, reflexive and reciprocal affixes may co-occur in certain contexts. See Safir and Sikuku 2018 for related
observations in Lubukusu (Luhya).
(26) a. avaana
2child
va-sek-iz-an-i
2SM-laugh-CAUS-AN-FV
CAUSATIVE
‘The children made each other laugh.’ (6=vasek-an-iz-i)
b. avaana
2child
va-hanzuk-il-an-i
2SM-shout-APPL-AN-FV
APPLICATIVE
‘The children shouted at each other’ (6=vahanzuk-an-il-i)
5 The rest of reciprocity
Since -an doesn’t express reciprocity, only event plurality, then the reciprocal meaning must come
from somewhere else. As noted above, there is a long tradition of treating reciprocity as compo-
sitional. Independent processes that are found in the language “conspire” to create a reciprocal
meaning (Heim et al., 1991; Davies, 2000; Faller, 2004). Of particular importance is the well-
known fact that there is a parallel between reciprocal situations and relational plurals (Fiengo and
Lasnik, 1973; Langendoen, 1978; Dalrymple et al., 1994; Beck, 2001) among others. Both rela-
tional plurals and reciprocals involve different mappings between the subject and object, i.e., the
“strong” and “weak” readings.13
The strong reading is characterized by having every individual in the subject noun phrase be
in a relation with every individual in the object noun phrase, and vice versa. Thus in (27), the
strong reading holds if each of Sira, Maina, and Khufu all saw each of Imali, Kageha, Mariamu,
and Imali, Kageha, and Mariamu were each seen by Sira, Maina, and Khufu.
(27) avikura
2boy
va-vagaa
2-three
va-lol-i
2SM-see-FV
avakana
2girl
va-vagaa
2-three
‘Three boys saw three girls.’
Strong reading:
Sira
Maina
Khufu
Imali
Kageha
Mariamu
Weak reading (one of many):
Sira
Maina
Khufu
Imali
Kageha
Mariamu
On the weak reading, every individual in the subject noun phrase is in a relation with at least
one individual in the object noun phrase, and vice versa. Note that in Logoori, these two readings
are not morphologically marked in any way. There is some implicit semantic processes, say, a
distributivity operator, that creates the mappings.
13There are many ways a reciprocal/plural relation can be “weak” — indeed the strong reading can be framed as a
type of weak reading (Bruening, 2007). Under the right contexts, all the ambiguities are available in Logoori for both
relational plurals, as well as reciprocals. -An also gives rise to scope ambiguities with intensional verbs, i.e., Sira and
Imali think they saw each other.
The weak and strong readings are also found in reciprocal situations in Logoori. The strong
reading is the one in which each of Sira, Maina, and Abisai sees each (other) boy.14 The weak
reading is where each of Sira, Maina, and Abisai sees (at least) one other boy.
(28) avikura
2child
va-vagaa
2-three
va-lol-an-i
2SM-see-AN-FV
‘Three boys saw each other.’
Strong reading:
Sira
Maina
Abisai
Sira
Maina
Abisai
Weak reading (one of many):
Sira
Maina
Abisai
Sira
Maina
Abisai
Given that there must be some mechanism for calculating a relational plural, the same mech-
anism applies in a reciprocal construction. The difference is that the reciprocal involves two co-
referential DPs filling each syntactic position.
Plural relation Reciprocal plural relation
VP
DPjV
DPi
VP
DPiV
DPi
There are many formal theories for how to derive to plural relations (Heim et al., 1991; Beck,
2001; Sternefeld, 1998; Murray, 2008). Any of these is compatible with the proposal above (mod-
ulo theoretical differences). More importantly, the mapping of the subject and object only form a
part of reciprocal meaning. -An contributes that the reciprocal situations are also cumulative plural
events. In other words, relation plurals are not necessarily cumulatively plural events. This piece
of meaning does not come as part of the asserted meaning of relation plural sentences like (27)
(though it may be part of pragmatic meaning), thus it must be provided some other way.
6 On reciprocal polysemy cross-linguistically
Among the various types of reciprocal polysemies mentioned earlier, it’s notable that the “sec-
ond” meaning is always something that forms a sub-component of overall reciprocal meaning. For
instance, reciprocal-reflexive polysemy (e.g., Romance SE) can be analyzed as the grammatical-
ization of the a mapping between two co-referentical, possibly plural, individuals. See Murray
(2008) for Cheyenne and Safir (1996) more generally. With reciprocal-sociative polysemy (e.g.,
14The reflexive relation is left out of strong reciprocity in Logoori — though this is not always cross-linguistically
true (Murray, 2008).
Ancient Greek) the marker expresses that there is a collective/cumulative plural individual as a
single event participant. See Dixon (1988) for Boumaa Fijian and Dimitriadis (2008) for related
Bantu languages. As argued above reciprocal-iterative polysemy grammaticalizes the event plu-
rality found in reciprocal situations. Similar facts have been reported in Davies (2000); Faller
(2004). Importantly, (as noted by Nedjalkov (2007)) we don’t find, say, a reciprocal-telic poly-
semy, or a reciprocal-definite polysemy. This is presumably because telicity/definiteness aren’t
sub-components of RECIPROCITY.
Finally, what implications does Logoori’s -an have for the numerous cognate -an’s across
Bantu? A clue for future work is that -an often functions closer to a sociative marker in many
Bantu languages (cf footnote 9). This suggests that -an is a quantifier in those languages, but over
individuals. Interestingly, Maslova (1999) makes essentially this argument. The variation in -an’s
use could then be attributed to whether -an in a particular language is allowed to quantify over
individuals, events, or even both. In other words, -an is never a “reciprocator,” it always expresses
some sub-component of reciprocal meaning.
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How to be an embedded clause: say complementizers in Bantu1
Claire Halpert — University of Minnesota
Abstract. Recent work on a number of Bantu languages has given us new information on the
morphosyntax of finite complement clauses in the Bantu family, revealing a rich picture of mor-
phologically complex complementizers (e.g. Diercks 2013, Baker et al 2012, Letsholo and Safir
2017, Pietraszko 2017, Halpert 2018). In this paper, I survey some of this evidence, focusing in
particular on complementizers that are built out of say verbs. I draw from my own fieldwork on
Zulu to show that even when complementizers have a common lexical base, their behavior can
vary widely depending on the particular morphological makeup of the complementizer. Compar-
ing Zulu complementizers and those found in some other Bantu languages, we find support for
recent semantic approaches to finite complement clauses and can begin to refine their ideas about
which syntactic properties correspond to particular embedding strategies (e.g. Elliott 2016, Kratzer
2015, 2016; Moulton 2009, 2015).
1 Introduction
There is a large body of research that investigates the syntactic and semantic status of finite em-
bedded clauses (FCCs). Much of this research has taken English as a starting point, focusing on
apparent puzzles such as the distributional puzzle illustrated below: in (1), a CP argument of a verb
has the same distribution as a DP argument, while in (2), the distribution of CP and DP arguments
of a noun diverge:
(1) a. I know the story.
b. I know that dinosaurs are extinct.
(2) a. my knowledge *(of) the story
b. my knowledge (*of) that dinosaurs are extinct
A common stance on English FCCs (e.g. Stowell, 1981) is that they are less restricted than
DPs in their distribution because the do not require syntactic case. This type of view assumes
that FCCs, by nature of their category, can combine with their selecting head (a verb, noun, or
adjective) without any need to satisfy other syntactic requirements.
Research on a typologically broad range of languages suggests that there is good reason to
believe that FCCs in fact have a more complicated structure, involving, for example, relativiza-
tion (e.g. Aboh, 2010; Caponigro and Polinsky, 2011; Kayne, 2014). Recent research on FCCs in
Bantu languages similarly reveals a growing catalog of morphosyntactically complex embedding
strategies that vary across languages and across complementizer type in their properties (for ex-
ample, Baker and Safir, 2012; Diercks, 2013; Halpert, 2015, 2018; Letsholo and Safir, submitted;
Pietraszko, to apepar).
1Thanks to my Zulu consultants for their assistance with all data, patience and good senses of humor. Thanks in
particular to Mthuli Percival Buthelezi, Monwa Mhlophe, and Mandisa Ndlovu. Thanks as well to participants in my
LSA 2017 summer course, the audience at AAA5, Michael Diercks, Angelika Kratzer, and Keir Moulton for useful
discussion on some of the ideas and data discussed here.
This paper focuses on some morphosyntactic properties of Bantu FCCs and illustrates what
they can teach us about different means of embedding FCCs. In particular, I investigate com-
plementizers that are built from say verbs and show that a fine-grained understanding of their
morphological makeup is necessary to account for their syntactic behavior.
1.1 Why say complementizers?
The discussion of the morphosyntax of FCCs and their complementizers in this paper is informed
by some recent semantic approaches to FCCs.
Moulton (2015) argues that embedded argument CPs are predicates of propositional content, of
type e,st. Although they appear to be arguments of verbs (and nouns), elements of this type cannot
saturate any predicates. When they combine with non-verbal predicates (like content nouns), they
do so via predicate modification. In order to combine with verbal predicates, he argues, FCCs must
undergo a short step of A-movement, leaving behind a trace of type e to compose with the verb.
This approach captures some key facts about FCCs in a number of languages: it gives us a
way to understand the differences in CP vs. DP distribution shown in (1) and (2); it captures
meaning alternations between FCCs and propositional DPs (Elliott, 2016). It also correctly predicts
observed opacity effects: the A-movement step required for FCCs to compose with the verb renders
them opaque for A-movement (but not for A-bar movement). Finally, this semantically-motivated
approach converges with syntactic approaches that treat FCCs in some languages as instances of
relativization (see again Aboh, 2010; Caponigro and Polinsky, 2011; Kayne, 2014).
At the same time, we know that not all FCCs across languages show these properties. Moulton
(2015) himself notes that in some languages, the picture is notably different: FCCs cannot combine
with content nominals, are transparent to A movement, and don’t otherwise show evidence of
having undergone movement. He concludes that these FCCs might be in situ saturators. In other
words, they have a semantic type that doesn’t require the movement operations described above.
What does it mean to be an in situ saturator? Kratzer (2016) suggests that all FCCs are either
nominal modifiers (i.e., predicates, along the lines of Moulton above) or verbal modifiers. Kratzer
points out that that clauses sometimes do more work than we usually give them credit for, includ-
ing: force normally unergative verbs to take speech-report interpretations or contain a source for
speech interpretations, as in (3a), and yielding harmonic modal interpretations, as in (3b):
(3) a. She grumbled that you didn’t explain very well.
b. She advised that you should explain better.
Kratzer suggests that the articulated left periphery of the embedded clause can be the source
of these properties. In particular, high modality operators in an embedded clause can be the true
source of modal meanings (as opposed to, say, an attitude verb) and a say verb at the very edge of
an embedded clause can create embedded speech reports.
Indeed, as Kratzer (2016) notes, many languages have complementizers built out of a (say)
verb; Moulton (2016) observes, building on Kratzer, that these “verby” complementizers tend to
have the signature of in situ saturators. This type of FCC, then, would be a verbal modifier. It can
remain in situ because it is not attempting to saturate an argument slot of a verb, but rather can
combine with the predicate via event identification
These ideas provide a useful compass for an investigation of FCCs in Bantu languages, allow-
ing us to probe for behaviors that are typical of in situ and ex situ saturators and giving us some
expectations for what the morphosyntactic makeup of the clausal periphery (and C in particular)
might tell us about the behavior of a particular FCC. As we will see in the following sections,
say-complementizers in Bantu languages are not a unified set: the presence of a lexical say verb
in the complementizer alone is not predictive of FCC behavior.
In section 2, I turn to Zulu and Ndebele, which have a say complementizer with nominal
morphology that has more or less nominal properties. FCCs headed by this complementizer appear
to combine with the selecting predicate like a nominal argument would. We can compare this
complementizer to a different say complementizer in Zulu that has aspect and mood morphology;
FCCs headed by this complementizer indeed have more properties that Kratzer attributes to verbal
modifers. Lubukusu also has a range of say complementizers and shows yet another pattern of
morphology involving agreement with the superordinate subject (Baker and Safir, 2012; Diercks,
2013). In section 3, I overview the properties of agreeing C in Lubukusu and sketch a possible
approach where these FCCs could be treated as verbal modifiers. The initial empirical picture that
emerges from these languages shows that syntacticians and semanticists alike should take seriously
the rich morphological makeup of C heads in Bantu languages and that these languages present
ideal places to investigate our ideas of how FCCs compose with selecting predicates.
2 Flavors of ‘say’-complementizer in Zulu
Zulu has multiple complementizers built out of the verbal root thi ‘say.’ I focus here on two of the
most prevalent ones: ukuthi and sengathi.
The first, ukuthi, is a generic complementizer, compatible with essentially every FCC type
(declaratives, interrogatives, indicatives, subjunctives). The uku prefix is noun class 15/17 mor-
phology (also found on infinitive clauses). The second, sengathi, has a more restricted distribu-
tion. It is a comparative complementizer, typically appearing with subjunctive or modal embedded
clauses, though it can also embed indicatives. Its morphological makeup is slightly more complex:
se is aspect2 and nga is modality, marking potential ‘can/may’.
Does the presence of of the -thi ‘say’ root yield the consequences Kratzer might expect? As
we will see in this section, these complementizers have radically different distributions and mor-
phosyntactic properties. At a glance, both show properties of in situ saturators (as expected), but a
closer look suggests that we need to treat them differently syntactically (and probably also seman-
tically).
2.1 Ukuthi’s noun-y tendencies
The examples in (4) illustrate ukuthi’s versatility as an FCC complementizer, introducing comple-
ments to speech act verbs (4a), verbs of belief (4b), factive verbs (4c), verbs of desire (4d), raising
2This is perhaps a bit imprecise: se is often translated as meaning something like ‘now’ or ‘already’ (Doke, 1997
[1927])... in standard use, it appears as a verbal prefix preceding subject agreement, apparently as a contracted form
of a verbal auxiliary.
verbs (4e), and interrogative verbs (4f):3
(4) Ukuthi as a neutral complementizer
a. Ngi-tshel-e
1SG.S-tell-PFV
uManqoba
AUG.1M
ukuthi
C
uZuma
AUG.1Z
ngeke
never
a-khokh-e
1SBJV-pay-PFV
lutho
14thing
‘ I told Manqoba that Zuma won’t pay anything’
b. Ngi-sola
1SG.S-suspect
ukuthi
C
uSipho
AUG.1S
u-bula-w-e
1S-kill-PASS-PFV
w-umkhovu
COP-AUG.3zombie
‘I suspect that Sipho was killed by a zombie.’4
c. uSandile
AUG.1S
u-bon-e
1S-see-PFV
ukuthi
C
inkawu
AUG.9monkey
i-ny-ile
9S-shit-PFV
‘Sandile saw that the monkey shit itself.’
d. ngi-funa
1SG.S-want
ukuthi
C
uXolani
AUG.1X
a-win-e
1SBJV-win-SBJV
umjaho
AUG.3race
‘I want Xolani to win the race.’
e. ku-bonakala
17S-seem
ukuthi
C
uXolani
AUG.1X
u-win-e
1S-win-PST
umjaho
AUG.3race
‘It seems that Xolani won the race.’
f. ngi-buza
1SG.S-ask
ukuthi
C
u-kuphi
1S-15.where
‘I’m asking where he is.’
As we saw at the beginning of this section, ukuthi is morphologically complex and contains a
plausible nominal prefix. Indeed, ukuthi CPs share a number of properties with DPs. In particular,
as we’ll see in this section, CPs can control phi-agreement under the same conditions as nominals
and their distribution and morphological marking mirrors that of nominal arguments.
We saw above that ukuthi is composed of noun class 15/175 morphology on the verb root -thi.
As I demonstrate in Halpert (2012, 2015, 2018), ukuthi CPs can control class 15/17 agreement on
verbs—just like nominals. In Zulu, phi-agreement tracks vP-external (or pro-dropped) nominals.6
Class 15/17 object agreement can appear when an ukuthi CP is vP-external—there is no expletive
object agreement in Zulu, so this must be true agreement with CP:
3Bantu agreement is for noun class. Zulu has 15 of the 22 Bantu noun classes (numbers 1–11, 14–17); even
numbers are typically plurals of odd-numbered classes. A nominal agrees if the noun class marked on the noun
matches the number of the agreement marker. I mark class 1 subject agreement as 1S, but 1SG.S for 1st person
singular, etc.; object agreement is marked similarly with O. Other abbreviations follow the Leipzig Glossing Rules
with the addition of the following: ASSOC associative, AUG augment vowel, FV final vowel, PRO pronominal, YA
(present tense) disjoint marker.
4Zulu zombies are corpses reanimated by practitioners of malicious magic (abathakathi) and kept under the control
of a particular person. Throughout this handout, solitary zombies are of the Zulu type, while pluralities of zombies are
American.
5These two classes have merged in modern Zulu.
6I use the distribution of the so-called conjoint/disjoint alternation to diagnose the right edge of vP. A morpheme ya
predictably appears on present tense verbs when the verb is at the right edge of vP; material that follows a ya-marked
verb is reliably vP-external (Halpert, 2015).
(5) vP-external nominal can control phi-agreement
a. ngi-funa
1SG-want
uku-dla
AUG.15-food
vP ]
b. * ngi-ku-funa
1SG-17O-want
ukudla
AUG.15-food
vP ]
c. ngi-ya-ku-funa
1SG-YA-17O-want
vP ] ukudla
AUG.15-food
‘I want food.’
(6) ukuthi-CP can control phi-agreement
a. ngi-funa
1SG-want
ukuthi
C
si-hlul-e
1PL.SBJV-defeat-SBJV
imikhovu
AUG.4zombie
vP ]
‘I want us to defeat the zombies.’
b. * ngi-ku-funa
1SG-17O-want
ukuthi
C
si-hlul-e
1PL.SBJV-defeat-SBJV
imikhovu
AUG.4zombie
vP ]
c. ngi-ya-ku-funa
1SG-YA-17O-want
vP ] ukuthi
C
si-hlul-e
1PL.SBJV-defeat-SBJV
imikhovu
AUG.4zombie
‘I (do) want us to defeat the zombies.’
In terms of FCC distribution, a large number of verbal predicates in Zulu take unmarked ukuthi
FCCs or nominal complements, just as we see in a language like English:
(7) Verbal predicate: direct complementation
a. ngi-cabanga
1SG-think
[CP ukuthi
C
imikhovu
AUG.4zombie
i-fik-ile]
4S-arrive-PFV
‘I think that the zombies have arrived.’
b. Cabanga
think
[DP isu
AUG.5plan
so-ku-hlula
5ASSOC.AUG-15-defeat
imikhovu]!
AUG.4zombie
‘Think of a plan to defeat the zombies!’
Unlike in English, however, when a predicate requires nominal arguments to be marked by an
oblique prefix, an ukuthi CP complement must be marked by that same prefix. We see this pattern
with the oblique/instrumental marker nga- in (8) and with comitative na in (9):
(8) Verbal predicate: complements marked by nga
a. ngi-phuph-e
1SG-dream-PST
[ngokuthi
NGA.C
imikhovu
AUG.4zombie
i-fik-ile]
4S-arrive-PFV
‘I dreamed that the zombies came.’ (*ukuthi)
b. ngi-phuph-e
1SG-dream-PST
ngemikhovu
NGA.AUG.4zombie
‘I dreamed about zombies.’ (*imikhovu)
(9) Verbal predicate: complements marked by na
a. A-ngi-vumelan-i
NEG-1SG-agree-NEG
nokuthi
NA.C
uZuma
AUG.1Zuma
a-nga-khokh-i
1SBJV-NEG-pay-NEG
lutho
14.thing
‘I don’t agree with Zuma not paying anything.’ (*ukuthi)
b. A-ngi-vumelan-i
NEG-1SG-agree-NEG
nomthetho
NA.AUG.1law
‘I don’t agree with the law.’ (*umthetho)
Finally, we can compare ukuthi CPs to nominals in noun complement position. In Zulu, the
nominal complement of a content noun (the internal argument of the corresponding verb) is marked
with the the so-called ‘associative construction’ (Sabelo, 1990; Halpert, 2015). This morpheme
appears on all adnominal dependents, including possessors, in (10), and other modifiers (11).
(10) Associative morphology marks possessors
umkhovu
AUG.3zombie
wo-mthakathi
3ASSOC.AUG-1wizard
‘the wizard’s zombie’
(11) Associative morphology marks nominal modifiers
isiminyaminya
AUG.7swarm
se-mikhovu
7ASSOC.AUG-4zombie
‘a horde of zombies’
As (12a) and (13a) show, ukuthi CPs must also bear this morphology—just like nominals—
even though they would be unmarked as the complement to a corresponding verb, as in (12b) and
(13b).
(12) a. umcabango
AUG.3thought
[wokuthi
3ASSOC.C
imikhovu
AUG.4zombie
i-fik-ile]
4S-arrive-PFV
‘the thought that the zombies arrived’ (*ukuthi)
b. umcabango
AUG.3thought
wemikhovu
3ASSOC.AUG4zombie
‘the thought of zombies’
(13) a. iphupho
AUG.5dream
[lokuthi
5ASSOC.C
imikhovu
AUG.4zombie
i-fik-ile]
4S-arrive-PFV
‘the dream that the zombies arrived’ (*ukuthi)
b. iphupho
AUG.5dream
lemikhovu
5ASSOC.AUG.4zombie
‘the dream about zombies’
This behavior is a sharp departure from the pattern we observed in English in (2), where FCCs
had a different (and apparently less restricted) distribution than nominal complements to a noun.
Zulu, it appears, sidesteps the English puzzle we saw in the introduction: ukuthi CPs show the
same basic distribution as nominals. While the basic distributional properties show no difference
between CPs and nominals in Zulu, systematic differences emerge when we look more closely.
First, ukuthi CPs extrapose more easily than nominals—and they do not need to control agree-
ment when they do. The so-called conjoint morpheme ya marks present-tense verbs that are final
in vP (Halpert, 2015). In (14a), the impossibility of ya tells us that a true nominal cannot appear
outside of vP without agreement. In (14b), the grammaticality of ya shows that an ukuthi clause
can extrapose under the same circumstances.
(14) a. * ngi-ya-funa
1SG-YA-want
vP ] uku-dla
AUG.15-food
b. ngi-ya-funa
1SG-YA-want
vP ] ukuthi
C
si-hlul-e
1PL.SBJV-defeat-SBJV
imikhovu
AUG.4zombie
‘I want us to defeat the zombies.’
Second, ukuthi CPs prepose less easily than nominals—they cannot appear in canonical pre-
verbal subject position, as in (15a). The ungrammaticality of the ukuthi clause in subject position
here contrasts with the grammatical complex nominal subject (containing the ukuthi CP) in (15b)
and the (nominalized) infinitive clause in (15c).
(15) a. * [CP ukuthi
C
wenza
1S-do
izinhlolovo
AUG.10interview
zakho]
10ASSOC.2SG.PRO
ku-ya-ngi-jabulisa
17S-YA-1SG.O-happy.CAUS
intended: ‘That you’re doing your interviews makes me happy.’
b. [DP indaba
AUG.9news
[yokuthi
9ASSOC.C
wenza
1S-do
izinhlolovo
AUG.10interview
zakho]]
10ASSOC.2SG.PRO
i-ya-ngi-jabulisa
9S-YA-1SG.O-happy.CAUS
‘The news that you’re doing your interviews makes me happy.’
c. [TP ukw-enza
AUG.15-do
kwakho
15ASSOC.2SG.PRO
izinhlolovo]
AUG.10interviews
ku-ya-ngi-jabulisa
15S-ya1SG.O-happy.CAUS
‘Your doing the interviews makes me happy.
This second difference has a major syntactic consequence: it leads to hyperraising configura-
tions in Zulu. I argue in Halpert (2018) that ukuthi CPs are (phi) goals for T but cannot satisfy
T’s need for a filled specifier in Zulu (an EPP property on T) due to the distributional restriction
observed above. I propose that in Zulu, a T head that agrees with one of these unmoveable ukuthi
CPs continues to probe (now inside the CP) to find a moveable goal.
This collection of properties suggests that although ukuthi CPs are built from a say verb and
show a number of basic distributional properties that Moulton (2015) ascribes to in situ CP satu-
rators, these properties are probably better understood as nominal properties. At the same time,
they are somehow distinct from nominals—as we saw with their distributional differences from
nominals in (14) and (15).
The importance of a close morphosyntactic analysis of complementizers is driven home by
Pietraszko (to apepar), who compares these patterns in Zulu to the behavior of ukuthi in closely-
related Ndebele. In Ndebele, as Pietraszko (to apepar) demonstrates, the basic distributional facts
are the same, but ukuthi CPs show even more parallels to nominals. Notably, in Ndebele, ukuthi
can be productively morphosyntactically decomposed, losing its initial augment vowel in precisely
the environments where a nominal can (see Halpert, 2015, for an overview of these environments
in Zulu)—which Zulu does not permit. In addition, ukuthi CPs in Ndebele can appear in canonical
subject position. Pietraszko concludes that ukuthi CPs in Ndebele involve an overt nominal shell,
where the u initial vowel is analyzed as a D head that nominalizes the CP. From the outside, then,
ukuthiCPs in Ndebele are completely syntactically indistinguishable from nominals. This variation
between Ndebele and Zulu highlights the fact that Zulu ukuthi CPs do not share all properties with
nominals. What should we make of this difference? One possibility is that Zulu ukuthi CPs involve
nominal structure just like in Ndbele, but the Zulu strategy involves a null noun (or D), while
Ndebele interprets the u of ukuthi as an overt D. On such an approach, we could interpret Zulu’s
distributional differences as a result of restrictions on where null nominal structure can appear.
In short, we learn from ukuthi in Zulu and Ndebele that say-based complementizers don’t need
to be verby. Instead, we need to let the morphology on C tell the full story.
2.2 Back to sengathi
Sengathi is often translated as ‘as if’, ‘like’, ‘would that’, or ‘apparently’. Its distribution is roughly
similar to that of comparative complementizers in English (see, e.g. López-Couso and Méndez-
Naya, 2012, 2015, and references therein).
Sengathi is used to introduce comparative clauses that modify a main predicate:
(16) a. u-hleka
1S-laugh
sengathi
C
u-ya-qala
1S-YA-begin
uku-hleka
INF-laugh
‘He’s laughing as if it’s his first laugh ever.’ (i.e., a lot)
b. u-gula
1S-be.sick
sengathi
C
u-zo-fa
1S-FUT-die
‘She seems sick enough to die.’
Unlike the English complementizers like and as if, (components of) which are also used in
other comparative constructions, sengathi is unrelated to the Zulu comparative preposition -njenga
(see Bender and Flickinger, 1999; Rooryck, 2000; López-Couso and Méndez-Naya, 2012, 2015,
on the English connection):7
(17) a. uMfundo
AUG.1M
u-gijima
1S-run
njengo-mntwana
like.AUG-1child
‘Mfundo runs like a baby.’
b. uMfundo
AUG.1M
u-gijima
1S-run
sengathi
C
u-ng-umntwana
1S-COP-AUG.1child
‘Mfundo runs like he’s a baby.’
7At a glance, it appears that both elements have the morpheme nga in common; a closer look suggests that this is
accidental homophony: as Doke et al. (2005) details, sengathi developed out of high-toned modal ngá, while njenga-
contains low-toned nga, which I suspect developed out of the low-toned instrumental preposition nga-.
In clausal comparison, the sengathi clause is plausibly a low VP-adjunct. The unavailability of
the conjoint ya (which would have marked a verb at the vP-edge) tells us that the sengathi CP must
be inside vP.
(18) * u-ya-hleka
1S-YA-laugh
vP ] sengathi
C
u-ya-qala
1S-YA-begin
uku-hleka
INF-laugh
‘He’s laughing as if it’s his first laugh ever.’
Even more strikingly, the sengathi clause must appear immediately after the verb. When a
sengathi clause modifies a predicate with a nominal complement, the nominal cannot intervene
between V and sengathi—it must dislocate or be pro dropped.
(19) a. * u-dla
1S-eat
inyama
AUG.9meat
sengathi
C
u-ya-yi-qabuka
1S-YA-9O-discover
b. (inyama)
AUG.9meat
u-yi-dla
1S-9O-eat
sengathi
C
u-ya-yi-qabuka
1S-YA-9O-discover
‘He’s eating it/meat as if he’s just discovered it.’
c. u-dla
1S-eat
sengathi
C
inyama
AUG.9meat
u-ya-yi-qabuka
1S-YA-9O-discover
‘He’s eating as if he’s just discovered meat.’
This behavior is reminiscent of certain low adverbs, like kahle ‘well’, which has a similar need
to be vP-internal and verb-adjacent (Halpert, 2015).8
There are a number of environments where sengathi clauses are plausibly true complements to
the matrix predicate, rather than adjuncts. In particular, it is common in complements to fisa ‘wish’
and bonakala ‘seem’ and can also appear a a complement to some verbs of belief and perception.
In these constructions, the embedded predicate can be indicative, but is often subjunctive or modal.
(20) a. ngi-fisa
1SG-wish
[sengathi
C
si-hlul-e
1PL.SBJV-defeat-SBJV
imikhovu]
AUG.4zombie
‘I wish for us to defeat the zombies.’
b. ngi-fisa
1SG.S-wish
[sengathi
C
ngi-nga-dla
1SG.S-MOD-eat
inyama]
AUG-9meat
‘I wish that I could eat meat.’
c. ku-bonakala
17S-seem
[sengathi
C
uSipho
AUG.1S
u-pheka
1S-cook
idina]
AUG.5dinner
‘It seems like Sipho is cooking dinner.’
d. ngi-zwa
1SG.S-hear
[sengathi
C
u-zo-fika
1S-FUT-arrive
kusasa
tomorrow
‘I think he might possibly arrive tomorrow.’
8A possible interpretation of these facts is that these low adjuncts tend to be focused elements. Focused elements
in Zulu must be verb-adjacent and vP-final, often forcing other material to evacuate vP (Cheng and Downing, 2012).
There are a few reasons to think these are cases of true embedding. First, sengathiCPs alternate
with ukuthi CPs in some cases where a complement clause is required (more on this difference
later). Second, some verbs strongly prefer sengathi CPs. Finally, wh-elements that originate inside
a sengathi CP can be clefted in the matrix clause (21a), with a corresponding agreement marker in
the clause of origin, or can take matrix scope from a position in the embedded clause, as in (21b)
(see Sabel and Zeller, 2006, on the basic properties of wh-constructions in Zulu):
(21) a. Y-ini
COP-AUG.9what
o-ku-bonakala
REL-17S-seem
[sengathi
C
uSipho
AUG.1S
u-ya-yi-pheka]?
1S-YA-9O-cook
b. Ku-bonakala
17S-seem
[sengathi
C
y-ini
COP-AUG.9what
uSipho
1S-S
a-yi-pheka-yo]?
1S.REL-9O-cook-REL
‘What does it seem that Sipho is cooking?’
We know from our examination of ukuthi that say-complementizers in Zulu can have nouny
properties. If we look at the morphological clues, as we saw, sengathi is different, showing no
evidence of nominal properties. Indeed, unlike ukuthi CPs, sengathi CPs can’t control agreement:9
(22) a. ngi-fisa
1SG-wish
[sengathi
C
si-hlul-e
1PL.SBJV-defeat-SBJV
imikhovu]
AUG.4zombie
‘I wish for us to defeat the zombies.’
b. * ngi-ya-ku-fisa
1SG-YA-17O-wish
vP ] [sengathi
C
si-hlul-e
1PL.SBJV-defeat-SBJV
imikhovu]
AUG.4zombie
‘I (do) wish for us to defeat the zombies.’
Like adjunct sengathi clauses, embedded sengathi CPs can’t move at all:
(23) * ngi-ya-fisa
1SG-YA-want
vP ] [sengathi
C
si-hlul-e
1PL.SBJV-defeat-SBJV
imikhovu]
AUG.4zombie
intended: ‘I wish for us to defeat the zombies.’
In fact, sengathi CPs cannot combine with nominals at all, either directly or via the associative
strategy used by ukuthi CPs:
(24) a. isifiso
AUG.7wish
sa-mi
7ASSOC-1SG
[sokuthi
7ASSOC.C
si-hlule
2PL-defeat.SBJV
imikhovu]
AUG.4zombie
‘my wish that we defeat the zombies’
b. * isifiso
AUG.7wish
sa-mi
7ASSOC-1SG
[(sa-)sengathi
(7ASSOC)-C
si-hlule
2PL-defeat.SBJV
imihovu]
AUG.4zombie
It seems reasonable, then, to think of these as the verbal modifier type of FCC (Moulton’s in
situ saturator): they must be inside vP and cannot combine directly with nominals. Moulton (2015)
predicts that in situ saturator CPs are transparent for raising, but that doesn’t seem to be the case
for sengathi CPs in Zulu: when they combine with raising-predicates, they permit a copy-raising
type construction (in contrast to ukuthi CPs):
9I show in (22b) that class 15/17 agreement with the clause is ungrammatical—the same pattern holds for all
possible noun classes.
(25) a. Le
9DEM
ncwadi
9book
i-bonakala
9S-seem
[sengathi
C
abafundi
AUG.2student
ba-ya-yi-thanda]
2S-YA-9O-like
‘This book seems/looks like the students like it.
b. * Le
9DEM
ncwadi
9book
i-bonakala
9S-seem
[ukuthi
C
abafundi
AUG.2student
ba-ya-yi-thanda]
2S-YA-9O-like
(26) a. u-bonakala
1S-seem
[sengathi
C
inja
AUG.9dog
yakhe
9ASSOC.1PRO
i-shon-ile]
9S-die-PFV
‘She looks like her dog just died.’
(speaker comment: ‘you have to be looking at her to say this’)
b. * u-bonakala
1S-seem
[ukuthi
C
inja
AUG.9dog
yakhe
9ASSOC.1PRO
i-shon-ile]
9S-die-PFV
This difference might actually be good news for the Kratzerian take: if an FCC is a verbal
adjunct, it would be odd to have transparency for A-movement, despite Moulton’s characterization.
In the next subsection, I will take a closer look at the differences between ukuthi and sengathi and
return to this question of transparency.
2.3 Ukuthi vs Sengathi
The previous subsections suggest that although both sengathi and ukuthi are built from a say verb,
they show different syntactic behavior that likely requires different strategies for semantic compo-
sition. We saw that ukuthi has a number of nominal properties (while still being distinct from true
nominals), while sengathi looks more like a verby complementizer.
Table one summarizes the properties of FCCs headed by the two complementizers, in compar-
ison to DPs and infinitives.
comp to
V
phi-
features
preposition
marked
extrapose
w/Agr
SpecTP
ok
extrapose
w/o Agr
A-
extraction
DP ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗
INF ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗
ukuthi-
CP
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓
sengathi-
CP
✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
Table 1: Clause types and their properties in Zulu
Recall that sengathi is morphologically more complex than the basic say complementizers that
Kratzer (2016) discusses—in particular, it appears to contain a modal morpheme. The modal flavor
that it contributes is easiest to see in direct comparison to ukuthi.
Kratzer (2016) and Moulton (2016) note that locating the source of modality inside the embed-
ded clause means that the matrix verb is semantically light(er) than we thought. In Zulu, speakers
will often describe sengathi and ukuthi as interchangeable when both are possible. When you look
closely, though, you find systematic meaning differences that have to do with speaker attitude:10
(27) Likelihood of outcome
a. ngi-fisa
1SG-wish
ukuthi
C
si-hlul-e
1PL.SBJV-defeat-SBJV
imikhovu
AUG.4zombie
‘I wish for us to defeat the zombies.’ (seems possible)
b. ngi-fisa
1SG-wish
sengathi
C
si-hlul-e
1PL.SBJV-defeat-SBJV
imikhovu
AUG.4zombie
‘I want us to defeat the zombies.’ (situation seems truly hopeless)
(28) Reliability of information
a. ngi-zwa
1SG.S-hear
ukuthi
C
u-zo-fika
1S-FUT-arrive
kusasa
tomorrow
‘I heard that he will arrive tomorrow.’
b. ngi-zwa
1SG.S-hear
sengathi
C
u-zo-fika
1S-FUT-arrive
kusasa
tomorrow
‘I think that he might possibly arrive tomorrow.’
(29) Plausibility
a. uManqoba
AUG.1M
u-sola
1S-suspect
ukuthi
C
uSipho
AUG.1Sipho
u-bula-w-e
1S-kill-PASS-PFV
w-umkhovu
COP-AUG.3zombie
‘Manqoba suspects that Sipho was killed by a zombie.’ (speaker commits to believing
in zombies, even if doubts the M’s suspicion)
b. uManqoba
AUG.1M
u-sola
1S-suspect
sengathi
C
uSipho
AUG.1Sipho
u-bula-w-e
1S-kill-PASS-PFV
w-umkhovu
COP-AUG.3zombie
‘Manqoba suspects that Sipho was killed by a zombie.’ (speaker highly doubts claim
and doesn’t commit to believing in zombies)
(30) Factivity
a. uMandisa
AUG.1M
u-bona
1S-see
ukuthi
C
ngi-ya-m-thanda
1SG.S-YA-1O-like
‘Mandisa sees that I like her.’ (factive)
b. uMandisa
AUG.1M
u-bona
1S-see
sengathi
C
ngi-ya-m-thanda
1SG.S-YA-1O-like
‘Mandisa thinks that I like her (but I don’t).’
As the examples above show, sengathi has a surprisingly wide distribution—but with serious
consequences for the interpretation of the upstairs verb (like bona above). In languages like Zulu,
10A note about these examples: the English paraphrases were offered by a Zulu consultant who was asked to give
a grammaticality judgment on the Zulu sentences. Paraphrases were checked with 2-3 other speakers who confirmed
the judgment and meaning. The parentheticals reflect information conveyed by speakers in conversations about the
context in which these would be used.
then, we may not want to put too many restrictions on “selection” of specialized say-based com-
plementizers. This seems like a good result for Kratzer: if these FCCs are in fact more like verbal
adjuncts, then they should be able to attach to a wide variety of predicates. The modal contribution
that the ngamorphology makes is most transparent when the matrix verb does not typically receive
a modal meaning.
To summarize, this basic comparison of two Zulu say complementizers teaches us to pay close
attention to the morphological makeup of particular C heads; the verb-y and noun-y tendencies of
these Zulu FCCs are written transparently in the morphology on C. We also learn from Zulu that the
typology suggested byMoulton (2015) perhaps does not capture the full range of FCC possibilities.
The ukuthi CPs in Zulu show many properties that Moulton (2015) suggest are typical of in situ
saturators, but they appear to achieve these properties as a result of their nominal-like structure
(though recall that they do not share all properties with nominals). The sengathi CPs also show a
number of Moulton’s suggested in situ properties, but they are perhaps better treated as low verbal
adjuncts.
3 Lubukusu’s verb-y C head
Another Bantu language, Lubukusu, is well-documented as having a variety of C heads and embed-
ded clause types (Baker and Safir, 2012; Diercks, 2013). Baker and Safir (2012) look at differences
in syntactic and semantic behavior of different clauses in Lubukusu, but group all FCCs together.
Here I focus on the more fine-grained discussion found in Diercks (2013). Diercks gives the fol-
lowing list of C heads that embed declarative clauses (excluding relative or focus-related Cs):
C use
mbo generic embedding complementizer
Ø generic embedding complementizer similar to mbo
nga ‘because’, ‘as’, ‘that’
oli comparative: ‘like’, ‘as if’ (also appears with perception verbs)
bali ‘that’; reporting unreliable information
AGR-li ‘that’; agrees with superordinate subject
Table 2: Lubukusu FCC heads
Diercks offers the following characterizations of the complementizers: mbo has the widest
availability, though some speakers feel it’s not originally Lubukusu; Ø is also widely available and
generic11; nga is more restricted, typically appearing in reason clauses, but sometimes in more
general FCCs; oli is described as a comparative and can show up with certain raising verbs; bali
has an evidential-like reading, indicating that the source of the information in the embedded clause
is unreliable; AGR-li agrees with the superordinate subject.
The -li that appears in these last three complementizers is the verb say, so as in Zulu, Lubukusu
has a family of morphologically complex say-based complementizers. Diercks classifies oli and
11As far as I can tell, this is at odds with Baker and Safir (2012) on the null C head.
bali as “non-agreeing”, as the following agreement paradigm shows, it is plausible that they in fact
involve 2NDsingular and 3RDplural agreement, respectively:
SG PL
1ST n-di khu-li
2ND o-li mu-li
3RD(class 1/2) a-li ba-li
Class N N-li N-li
Table 3: Lubukusu C agreement
The final say complementizer involves transparent phi-agreement with the most local superor-
dinate subject (Diercks, 2013, (7)). In other words, agreement on this complementizer is controlled
by the subject in the selecting clause, as (31a) below shows:
(31) a. baba-ndu
AUG.2-people
ba-bol-el-a
2S-said-APPL-FV
Alfredi
1Alfred
ba-li
2-C
a-kha-khile
1S-FUT-conquer
‘The people told Alfred that he will win.’
b. Alfredi
1Alfred
ka-bol-el-a
1S-said-APPL-FV
baba-ndu
AUG.2-person
a-li
1-C
ba-kha-khil-e
2S-FUT-conquer
‘Alfred told the people that they will win.’
The puzzle that Diercks (2013) investigates is how to capture this funny agree relationship in
the syntax, given that the apparent goal of the agreement (the superordinate subject) is above the
probe (the embedded C head) and doesn’t even need to be the structurally closest DP to C. Diercks’
solution is to break the agree dependency into two parts, proposing an operator in the embedded
clause that is a subject-oriented anaphor that is locally bound (in the immediate superordinate
clause):
(32) [TP Subject1 . . . [CP OP1 [ . . . C . . . ] ] ]
Binding Agree
(33) Indirect Agree
i. an unvalued feature (or feature bundle) F is valued by X(P)
ii. X(P)’s features are valued or controlled by some YP.
If we take Kratzer’s approach that some FCCs are verbal adjuncts, we might find another way
to account for this agreement pattern. In Bantu languages, it is quite common for phi-features from
a particular source to be expressed on multiple elements in a phrase; we find it both in clauses with
multiple verbs and (often inside nominals) in cases of concord (see, e.g., Carstens, 2001, 2005,
2011; Halpert, 2015). In particular, following Kratzer, if the say complementizer is combining
with the main verb via event identification, then it’s more integrated into the matrix clause than
Diercks assumes. The “matching” agreement with the selecting clause is the same sort of matching
agreement we get in Bantu auxiliary constructions. Like sengathi in Zulu, it also appears that these
agreeing verb-y complementizers in Lubukusu do not permit raising (Diercks, 2013), which would
be consistent with the idea that clauses introduced as verbal adjuncts might in fact be opaque for
raising.
4 Conclusion
We have now seen a number of FCCs in Zulu, Ndebele, and Lubukusu that are built around say
complementizers that exhibit a variety of syntactic properties. I have suggested in this paper that
there is a direct connection between the morphosyntactic makeup of the complementizer itself and
the particular syntactic and semantic properties of the embedded clause. This type of morpho-
logically complex verb-based complementizer is pervasive in the Bantu language family (see, for
example Letsholo and Safir, submitted, on agreeing and voice-matching C in Ikalanga), making
these languages an ideal place to look to sharpen our understanding of complementizer syntax
and semantics. The complexity of these complementizers gives us a way to test recent ideas that
FCCs may combine with selecting predicates in fundamentally different ways and may contribute
semantic import that was previously attributed to the selecting clause (e.g. Moulton, 2015; Kratzer,
2016). As I hope to have shown here, the view from Bantu indicates that this is a promising line of
inquiry.
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Vietnamese Anaphora: Binding Principles and the Lack Thereof1
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Abstract. Vietnamese poses a challenge for both classic and competition-based accounts of the
Binding Theory. While, at first glance, Vietnamese seems not to be subject to any of the classic
Binding Principles, we discuss each of the conditions and argue that Vietnamese still fits within
the realm of cross-linguistic patterns. We also present novel data that illustrate context-dependent
competition based accounts fare better in capturing coreferent readings of personal pronouns.
1 Introduction
The Binding Theory is often seen as a universal set of principles that regulate possible patterns
of coreference in natural language. However, cross-linguistic patterns cannot all be accounted for
under the assumption of universal constraints. In this paper, we investigate the degree to which the
Binding Theory guides the interpretation of referring expressions in Vietnamese, a language which
allows for apparent violations of all three Binding Principles. The crux of the paper focuses on the
possible interpretations of mình and nó, as illustrated below.
(1) Luna1
Luna
nói
say
là
that
Ginny2
Ginny
trách
criticize
mình1/2
SELF
‘Luna said Ginny criticizes her(self).’
(2) Luna1
Luna
nói
say
là
that
Ginny2
Ginny
trách
criticize
nó1/2
3SG
‘Luna said Ginny criticizes her(self).’
In (1), the reflexive form mình can refer back to either the local subject Ginny or the long-distance
subject Luna. Meanwhile, the non-reflexive pronoun, nó, in (2) exhibits the same pattern when
it appears in the same syntactic environment. This perplexing observation presents an interesting
puzzle for syntactic and semantic theories of Binding. Not only is the complementary distribution
of reflexives and non-reflexives not met in Vietnamese, but, at first glance, both mình and nó seem
to be impervious to Principles A and B, in their classic form.
In this paper, we discuss data that supports as well as contradicts classic or current accounts of the
Binding Theory, and we sketch out an analysis of the distributional and interpretative properties of
the referent forms in the language. The organization is as follows. In the next section, we briefly
introduce the necessary background regarding the language and classic Binding Theory accounts
(Chomsky, 1981, 1986). In the third section, we discuss data which illustrates the lack of the classic
binding principles in Vietnamese, with a particular emphasis on Principles A and C. In section 4,
we then focus on Principle B, discuss competition-based accounts of the Binding Theory (Reinhart,
1We would like to thank Kyle Johnson, Brian Dillon, Lyn Frazier and Rajesh Bhatt. We are more than grateful for
all their encouragement and feedback, and for all the extremely helpful discussions. We also thank the organizers and
audience of TripleA 5, June 27-29, held at the University of Konstanz, for their patience and feedback, and Jessica
Zipf for her incredible support. Last but not least, we thank our consultants for all the data presented here.
1983; Rooryck & Vanden Wyngaerd, 2011; Roelofsen, 2010) and how the Vietnamese data fares
against them. We argue that, in Vietnamese, the bound and coreferent readings for the personal
pronoun nó, although grammatically possible, are a matter of context-dependent preference. Under
a view where competition between forms and interpretations is at play in deriving Condition B
effects, another puzzle in Vietnamese is represented by the reflexive marker t¸, which greatly
increases the preference for bound and coreferent readings of nó. Section 5 discusses t¸ from the
perspective of VP emphatic reflexive markers (Ahn, 2010). Finally, section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Setting the Stage
2.1 Language Background
Vietnamese is part of the Austroasiatic language family and is spoken by roughly 96 million native
speakers in Vietnam. The data discussed in this paper is representative of the Southern dialect, as
our informants live in the area of Saigon. The data reported in this paper was collected by means
of direct elicitation from four primary consultants, both in person and online.
The table in (3) offers an overview of the Vietnamese pronominal system, zooming in on singular
pronouns for the sake of simplicity. The morphological form of personal pronouns is sensitive
to person, number, honorificity and gender (the latter for honorific pronouns). Meanwhile, the
reflexive pronoun is morphologically underspecified: mình does not vary across the paradigm.
(3) Singular Pronouns in Vietnamese
PERSONAL REFLEXIVE
1SG tôi mình
2SG b§n mình
3SG.M.HON Íng mình
3SG.F.HON b£ mình
3SG.HHON nó mình
In Vietnamese, gendered pronouns are not only honorifc, but their distribution is more restricted
than that of nó, their subhonorific counterpart. Consequently, the data discussed in the present
paper focuses on the contrast between the subhonorific personal pronoun nó and the reflexive
mình (both bolded in (3)), neither of which is specified for gender.
2.2 Classic Binding Theory
Traditionally, the three Binding Conditions (Chomsky, 1981, 1986) are taken to be innate, indepen-
dent and universal principles. Despite a large body of work over the years, including more recent
findings regarding Khanty (Volkova & Reuland, 2014), Jambi (Cole et al., 2017), and Chamorro
(Wagers et al., 2017)), which provide evidence against their universality, the notion of Binding
Principles is still canon. The most well-known versions of the BT conditions are given below.
(4) a. Condition A
An anaphor must be locally bound (in its binding domain).
Chomsky (1986); Bu¨ring (2005); Charnavel & Sportiche (2016), a.o.
b. Condition B
A pronoun must be free in its binding/coargument domain.
Chomsky (1986); Bu¨ring (2005), a.o.
c. Condition C
An R-expression must be free. Chomsky (1986)
Although what qualifies as a binding domain has been subject to significant changes in the lit-
erature on Binding Theory in its classic form, the formulation of the conditions proper has been
more or less consistent. With the emergence of competition-based accounts of the constraints on
pronominal binding and coreference (see Section 4 for an overview), the arguments in favor of the
principles in (4) have varied in strength from condition to condition: Condition A still sees strong
support (see Charnavel & Sportiche (2016), for instance), while Condition C has seen a consider-
able amount of counterevidence (starting with Lasnik (1989)). Nevertheless, the sentences in (5)
illustrate how the classic Binding conditions hold in English.
(5) a. Luna1 said that Ginny2 criticizes herself*1/2. CONDITION A COMPLIANT
b. Luna1 said that Ginny2 criticizes her1/*2. CONDITION B COMPLIANT
c. *Luna1 said that Ginny2 criticizes Ginny2. CONDITION C COMPLIANT
In (5a), the reflexive herself can only refer to the local subject, and not to the long-distance sub-
ject, Luna. In other words, herself has to be bound by a c-commanding antecedent within the
same sentence (Ginny), thus obeying Condition A. On the other hand, the personal pronoun her in
(5b) cannot be bound by a clausemate c-commanding antecedent: non-local Luna is an available
antecedent for her, but clause-mate Ginny is not. The utterance in (5b) illustrates that her obeys
Condition B. Similarly, (5c) shows that, in English, referential expressions (like Ginny) cannot be
‘bound’: a non-pronominal DP cannot be repeated in order to target the same referent. Although
English provides evidence for the classic versions of the Binding Conditions, not all languages do.
Compare the sentences in (5) to their Vietnamese counterparts below.
(6) a. Luna1
Luna
nói
say
là
that
Ginny2
Ginny
trách
criticize
mình1/2
SELF
‘Luna said that Ginny criticizes her / herself.’
b. Luna1
Luna
nói
say
là
that
Ginny2
Ginny
trách
criticize
nó1/2
3SG
‘Luna said that Ginny criticizes her / herself.’
c. Luna1
Luna
nói
say
là
that
Ginny2
Ginny
trách
criticize
Ginny2
Ginny
‘Luna said that Ginny criticizes Ginny.’
Even though mình is the invariant reflexive pronoun in Vietnamese, (6a) illustrates that mình,
unlike English herself, can corefer with either Luna or Ginny. In a similar fashion, the personal
pronoun nó in (6b) can refer to either of the two antecedents, thus violating Condition B in its form
in (4b). Finally, the sentence in (6c) shows that repeated names do not lead to ungrammaticality
in Vietnamese. The contrast between (5) and (6) naturally leads to the following question: are
conditions A, B and C grammaticized in English, but not in Vietnamese?
3 The Lack Thereof
3.1 Principles A and B need not apply
In order to determine whether Conditions A an B are grammaticized in English and Vietnamese,
we presented our English and Vietnamese consultants with sentences such as (7a) and (7b), and
then asked a question of the type in (8) below, to check the strength of each condition.
(7) a. Luna says that Ginny often criticizes herself / her. ENGLISH
b. Luna
Luna
nói
says
là
that
Ginny
Ginny
hay
often
trách
criticizes
mình
SELF
/
/
nó.
3SG
VIETNAMESE
‘Luna says that Ginny often criticizes her.’
(8) Who does Ginny often criticize?
a. Luna (LONG DISTANCE) b. Ginny (LOCAL)
While our English consultants make a very strong distinction between herself and her, the differ-
ence between mình and nó is not as clear cut. To a question like the one in (8), all of our 4 English
informants chose the long distance referent, Luna, for her, and the local referent, Ginny, for her-
self. On the other hand, our 4 Vietnamese consultants said that choosing the long-distance referent
feels more natural in sentences like (7b), irrespective of whether the pronominal is mình or nó, and
that they prefer Luna as an antecedent; however, both interpretations are possible.2 We take these
empirical facts as evidence that the classic versions of Conditions A and B are grammaticized in
English, and that they are more of a preferential soft constraint in Vietnamese.
2This difference between English and Vietnamese was corroborated by the data from an online forced-choice task
pilot experiment ran on the two languages, via IbexFarm (Drummond, 2013). There is a slightly stronger preference
for the long-distant referent when nó is used, but an overall dispreference for the local antecedent.
3.2 A note on C
Another question of interest is whether Condition C is grammaticized in one language, but not
in the other. Based on acceptability ratings of sentences such as the ones in (9) coming from
4 speakers of each language, while the English (9a) is rated at around 2.5/73, our Vietnamese
consultants rate (9b) at around 5.5/74. The three point difference on the Likert scale is informative
with respect to how hard of a constraint Condition C is in each language.5 Data like the one in
(9) motivates our claim that Condition C might be grammaticized in English, but that it is most
definitenly not a hard constraint in Vietnamese.
(9) a. Hermione knew that Hermione was smart. ENGLISH: 2.5
b. Hermione
Hermione
bi∏t
knew
là
that
Hermione
Hermione
thông minh.
smart
VIETNAMESE: 5.5
‘Hermione knew that she was smart.’
At first glance, it seems that Vietnamese does not obey any of the classic BT Conditions. How-
ever, the observation that the Binding Principles face considerable challenges in the face of cross-
linguistic data should not be that surprising. Certainty regarding the classic version of the BT
conditions has wavered singificantly over the years. For instance, not only does Lasnik (1989)
briefly discuss that languages like Thai and Vietnamese might not be subject to Condition C, but
he also notes, as many do later on as well (Schlenker (2005); Patel-Grosz (2015), a.o.), that English
also exhibits Condition C violations. One such case is represented by anaphoric epithets.
(10) a. Peter convinced John1 that the idiot1 is smart.
b. Peter convinced the director1 that the director1 is smart.
As illustrated above, epithets like the idiot, and even more traditional R-expressions like the di-
rector, can and do refer to previously introduced antecedents. This data is in direct conflict with
Condition C, according to which R-expressions like the director should necessarily introduce a new
discourse referent within the same sentence. For this and other reasons, more recent versions of the
classic Binding Theory accounts, such as Bu¨ring (2005), do not explicitly include a Condition C
among the Binding Conditions. Despite the difference in acceptability ratings in (9), Vietnamese
is not an outlier with respect to Condition C per-se: Condition C seems to generally be inconsis-
tently applied. Another possible take on the difference in ratings for the English and Vietnamese
alternatives of (9) stems from Gordon et al. (1993), who look at repeated name penalties. In this
sense, Vietnamese might exhibit a lower repeated name penalty than English.
3Two ratings of 2/7 and two ratings of 3/7.
4Two ratings of 5/7 and two ratings of 6/7.
5Once again, this 3-point difference is corroborated by data coming from an online acceptability rating pilot exper-
iment ran on English and Vietnamese, via IbexFarm (Drummond, 2013).
3.3 Condition A in Vietnamese
Of the three classic BT conditions, the one that truly stands the test of time is Condition A. The
notion of exempt anaphora or long-distance anaphora has been a primitive for those working on
reflexives ever since Huang & Tang (1991). Crucially, in (11) below, the self -pronoun ziji has a
non-local interpretation in (11): it may refer to the long-distance subject, Zhangsan.
(11) Zhangsan1
Zhangsan
renwei
think
Lisi
Lisi
hai-le
hurt-ASP
ziji1.
SELF
MANDARIN
‘Zhangsan thought that Lisi hurt him’ (Huang & Tang, 1991)
An important observation is that exempt anaphora seem to be logophoric (Huang & Liu, 2001;
Charnavel & Sportiche, 2016), i.e. perspective-dependent. The take on these exempt anaphora is
that they are, in fact, subject to Condition A (Charnavel & Sportiche, 2016). While reflexive pro-
nouns like himself are subject to classic Condition A, with the clause being the binding domain,
logophors are argued to also be subject to Condition A, with a larger discourse-dependent binding
domain. In essence, they are bound via a logophoric operator within the sentence; the main dif-
ference is that this logophoric operator need not be coindexed with the local subject, but with any
perspective holder in the local context (including the speaker).
We assume that Vietnamese mình is an exempt anaphor, similarly to Mandarin ziji or Icelandic
sig. For data and argumentation in support of this assumption, see Bui (in preparation). Some
of the facts discussed in Bui (in preparation) include the observation that mình has an animacy
constraint (it can only refer to animate antecedents), that mình can refer to the speaker (under
certain conditions regarding honorificity) and that it is subject-oriented. The subject-orientation of
mình is apparent when comparing the mình and nó alternatives in (12) below.
(12) a. Ginny1
Ginny
nói
talk
vÓi
with
Luna2
Luna
v∑
about
mình1/⇤2/speaker.
SELF
‘Ginny talked with Luna about herself / me.’
b. Ginny1
Ginny
nói
talk
vÓi
with
Luna2
Luna
v∑
about
nó1/2/⇤speaker.
3SG
‘Ginny talked with Luna about her / herself.’
As shown in (12a), mình can refer either to the speaker or the subject, Ginny, but not the prepo-
sitional object antedecent, Luna. On the other hand, nó, illustrated in (12b), cannot refer to
the speaker, but may take either the local subject or the PP object as antecedents. The subject-
orientation of mình is also evinced in sentences where other topics are introduced in non-subject
position. The details of cases like this are further discussed in Bui (in preparation). Consequently,
we argue thatmình tracks the perspective center introduced by subjects, and that it is a long-distance
anaphor that obeys a Charnavel & Sportiche (2016) version of Condition A.
So far we have suggested that Vietnamese is not an outlier with respect to the BT conditions, since
it does obey Condition A (if mình is logophoric) and Condition C violations are common cross-
linguistically. However, the personal pronoun nó is not subject to classic Condition B or Condition
A: it can be bound by local subjects, and refer to non-local antecedents as well as to previously
introduced discourse referents. At this point, we turn to competition-based accounts of Condition
B and see how they fare with respect to the Vietnamese data.
4 Condition B in Vietnamese: the view from competition
Although the traditional view assumes that Conditions A and B are universal, independent princi-
ples, there is a large body of work in the Binding literature which generates Condition B effects
based on competition between the available pronominal forms within a language. In this section,
we sketch out the competition-based reasoning and compare it to the Vietnamese data.
4.1 Competition-based BT
The general reasoning behind competition-based accounts of the Binding Theory is based on two
main assumptions: i) Condition A holds of reflexive pronouns, and ii) reflexive and non-reflexive
pronouns compete. In this sense, Condition B effects are obtained for non-reflexive pronouns
by virtue of their competition with necessarily bound reflexive pronouns. This view stems from
the intuition put forth in Reinhart (1983) (and later on Reinhart (2006)) that the post-syntactic
competition between possible LFs for the same sentence is responsible for generating Condition
B effects for non-reflexive pronouns. Reinhart (1983) inspired competition-based accounts at a
semantic level (Schlenker, 2005), at a syntactic level (Safir, 2004; Rooryck & Vanden Wyngaerd,
2011; Safir, 2014; a.o.) as well as at a pragmatic level (Roelofsen, 2010), with the latter being
more along the lines of Reinhart (1983)’s original proposal. In order to provide a brief overview of
how competition-based models work, we lay out the main assumptions of syntactic-based Rooryck
& Vanden Wyngaerd (2011) and pragmatic-based Roelofsen (2010) below.
4.1.1 Competing Pronominal Forms
Based on Kratzer (2009), Rooryck & Vanden Wyngaerd (2011) assume that there is a morpho-
syntactic split between referential and reflexive pronouns. While referential pronouns are assumed
to enter the derivation with valued  -features, reflexive pronouns are argued to be minimal pro-
nouns which get their  -features valued via an AGREE relation with their antecedent. In this sense,
Binding is an effect of Agreement and Condition B is an artifact of feature-valuation on reflexives:
inherently featured pronouns are never bound, since they do not require an AGREE relation.
Rooryck & Vanden Wyngaerd (2011), as well as all other competition-based syntactic accounts,
make a key cross-linguistic prediction, spelled out in (13) below. The assumptions that all dedicated
reflexive pronouns are minimal pronouns and that only these minimal pronouns can (and have to)
be bound lead to the following inference: if a language has reflexive pronouns, then non-reflexive
pronouns cannot be bound, or, non-reflexive pronouns are free.
(13) A Key Prediction
The presence of Condition B effects depends on whether a language has a dedicated re-
flexive form. The absence of Condition B effects correlates with the absence of specialized
reflexive anaphors.
In fact, this prediction has been argued to be met for various languages, including, more recently,
Jambi (Cole et al., 2017) and Chamorro (Wagers et al., 2017): the lack of a specialized reflexive
form leads to an absence of Condition B effects.
4.1.2 Competing Interpretations
A core contribution of Reinhart (1983) and Grodzinsky & Reinhart (1993) concerns the distinc-
tion between binding and corefrence. The claim is that while Condition B targets proper variable-
binding, there is a separate rule regarding intrasentential coreference, which targets discourse phe-
nomena, as opposed to syntactic binding. Their version of this rule is given in (14) below.
(14) Rule I: Intrasentential Coreference
NP A cannot corefer with NP B if replacing A with C, C a variable A-bound by B, yields
an indistinguishable interpretation.
(Reinhart, 1983; Grodzinsky & Reinhart, 1993)
In essence, what drives the ungrammaticality of Ginny1 criticized her1 in (5b) is competition with
Ginny1 criticized herself1 in (5a). Furthermore, Rule I favors the use of a bound variable over a
pronoun which could express the same meaning. The assumption is that when a speaker aims to
produce a sentence that conveys Ginny talked about Ginny, they take into account various alterna-
tives of the same sentence: in this case, the personal pronoun alternative in (5b) and the reflexive
alternative in (5a). Rule I states that her cannot corefer with Ginny in (5b) if its herself alternative
in (5a), which is a bound reflexive, would yield the desired interpretation. Consequently, disjoint
reference is the only possible interpretation for her in this sentence.
This post-syntactic computation of alternatives is expanded on by Roelofsen (2010), who provides
a pragmatic take on disjoint reference. In this account, Rule I is rehashed as the Coreference Rule
in (15). An important difference between Rule I and Roelofsen (2010)’s version is that the latter
directly targets alternatives which would have the same interpretation in a given context.
(15) Coreference Rule
A speaker will never use a logical form LF in a context C if the LF is semantically indis-
tinguishable from one of its binding alternatives.6
(Roelofsen, 2010, p.119)
6Roelofsen (2010) also provides a formal description of binding alternatives, which we do not include for the sake
of brevity. Its effect is to explicitly determine that, in each context, a sentence in which a pronoun and an antecedent
corefer will have alternatives which employ variable binding of a (possibly reflexive) pronoun instead.
The context-dependent application of the rule in (15) can account for known exceptions to Condi-
tion B, such as (16), where both the himself and him alternatives are allowed in different scenarios.
(16) a. (Only) Lockhart1 voted for himself1. b. (Only) Lockhart1 voted for him1.
In a scenario like the one in (17), where the question under discussion has to do with professors
who voted for themselves, the two alternatives yield indistinguishable interpretations. Assuming
that both him and himself could express that Lockhart voted for Lockhart, either via coreference
for the former, or variable binding for the latter, the Coreference Rule would favor (17a) over (17b).
Consequently, (17b) can only be used to express disjoint reference in this context.
(17) CONTEXT: The Hogwarts professors were electing a new headmaster and were discussing
which of the professors voted for themselves.
a. (Only) Lockhart1 voted for himself1. b. # (Only) Lockhart1 voted for him1.
On the other hand, in a scenario like the one in (18), where the question under discussion has to do
with professors who voted for Lockhart, the two alternatives yield distinguishable interpretations.
While him can be used in (18) to express a reading where Lockhart voted for Lockhart, via coref-
erence, the bound-variable alternative with himself only has an interpretation where there was a
self-vote. Since (18a) is not felicitous in this scenario, (18b) survives.
(18) CONTEXT: The Hogwarts professors were electing a new headmaster and were discussing
which of the professors voted for Lockhart.
a. # (Only) Lockhart1 voted for himself1. b. (Only) Lockhart1 voted for him1.
This contextual enrichment of the rule on coreference may aid in elucidating the Vietnamese data.
The following subsection discusses Vietnamese from the perspective of syntactic and pragmatic
competition-based accounts of Condition B in the vein of those laid out above.
4.2 Competition in Vietnamese
Going back to Rooryck & Vanden Wyngaerd (2011)’s account, the key prediction in (13) was
that languages with a specialized reflexive anaphor exhibit Condition B effects. When it comes
to Vietnamese, the question is whether logophors like mình should fall under the umbrella term
of dedicated reflexives. If mình is a minimal pronoun which gets its features via AGREE (with
the logophoric operator), then Condition B effects are predicted in Vietnamese. On the other
hand, if long-distance anaphora are not specialized reflexives, in the Rooryck & Vanden Wyngaerd
(2011) sense, then this predicts an absence of Condition B effects. However, assuming that long-
distance anaphora are not dedicated reflexive forms would lead to the expectation that not only is
Vietnamese supposed to lack Condition B effects, but so would any language that only expresses
reflexivity by means of logophoric pronouns. As far as we know, this is not the case.
Assuming that mình is a a Condition A compliant logophor, along the lines of Charnavel &
Sportiche (2016) for Icelandic sig, as well as a dedicated reflexive, then, according to Rooryck
& Vanden Wyngaerd (2011), Condition B effects are predicted in Vietnamese. If Condition B does
apply in Vietnamese, then the availability of a reading where nó refers to its clausemate subject in
(19) is surprising. The fact that mình is a bound variable does not rule out coreferent readings of
nó: in (19), the personal pronoun can be interpreted as referring either to Snape or to Lockhart.
(19) Snape1
Snape
nói
say
là
that
Lockhart2
Lockhart
b¶u
vote
cho
for
nó1/2
3SG
‘Snape said that Lockhart voted for him / himself.’
However, it is surprising for (19) to have a reading where Lockhart votes for Lockhart only if Con-
dition B is assumed to rule out both binding and coreference. As mentioned above, accounts like
Reinhart (1983) and Roelofsen (2010) make a clear distinction between variable-bound pronouns
and coreferent pronouns. Crucially, under this view, it is Rule I or the Coreference Rule that would
be at play in (19), and not Condition B. With respect to the Coreference Rule in (15), the expecta-
tion is that the acceptability of either of the two readings in (19) above is context-dependent. And
so it is, as shown below.
(20) CONTEXT: The Hogwarts professors were electing a new headmaster and were discussing
which of the professors voted for themselves.
a. Chø
only
có
exist
Lockhart1
Lockhart
b¶u
vote
cho
for
mình1.
SELF
‘Only Lockhart1 voted for himself1.’
b. #Chø
only
có
exist
Lockhart1
Lockhart
b¶u
vote
cho
for
nó1
3SG
‘Only Lockhart1 voted for him1.’
The Vietnamese equivalent of (17), in (20) above, observes the same felicity pattern: the mình
sentence is available in a context where the question under discussion has to do with self-votes,
while the nó sentence is not. Similarly, the reverse is true in the scenario repeated from (18): like
in English, the alternative with the reflexive is not compatible with a scenario where Lockhart-votes
matter, but the personal pronoun alternative is felicitous in this context.
(21) CONTEXT: The Hogwarts professors were electing a new headmaster and were discussing
which of the professors voted for Lockhart.
a. #Chø
only
có
exist
Lockhart1
Lockhart
b¶u
vote
cho
for
mình1.
SELF
‘Only Lockhart voted for himself.’
b. Chø
only
có
exist
Lockhart1
Lockhart
b¶u
vote
cho
for
nó1
3SG
‘Only Lockhart1 voted for him1.’
We take the data above as evidence for the fact that a context-dependent coreference rule, like that of
Roelofsen (2010), does apply in Vietnamese. Furthermore, if Roelofsen (2010) is correct, and the
unavailability of the third person pronoun in the context in (20) is determined by the competition
with binding alternatives, then this also implies that nó is not a bound variable in these sentences:
were nó actually bound, then (20b) would not be ruled out. However, the fact that the coreferent
interpretation is possible for sentences like (19), which is not the case for the English alternative,
suggests that Rule I, in its original form in Reinhart (1983) and Grodzinsky & Reinhart (1993) does
not apply in Vietnamese. Coreference is only contextually constrained.
Above, we have examined evidence in favor of the existence of a Roelofsen (2010)-type context-
dependent Coreference Rule in Vietnamese, but against a more general Reinhart (1983) Rule I-like
restriction on coreference in general. The question at this point is whether nó can get bound-
variable interpretations. For this reason, we discuss (22) below.
(22) MÂi
every
 ˘a
HHON
con
ANIM
gái1
girl
nói
talk
v∑
about
nó?1/2.
3SG
‘Every girl talks about her.’
According to our four Vietnamese informants, although a bound variable reading of (22) is possi-
ble, there is a strong preference for the pronoun nó to have a disjoint reference reading. Despite
the dispreference for bound-variable interpretations, it seems that bound nó is not ungrammatical,
and that the plausibility of a bound-variable reading of nó increases in a restricted context: it is
much more likely for nó to be interpreted as a bound pronoun in a context where the sentence only
applies to the girls in some contextually salient room. Although this context-dependent plausibility
for a bound LF is more than intriguing, we leave the discussion of this topic for future work.
Currently, Bui (in preparation) is gathering experimental evidence which, among other things,
compares preference for bound-variable readings of nó in sentences with quantificational DP an-
tecedents and preference for coreferent readings in sentences with referential subjects. Her exper-
imental data will help separate and compare Rule I and Condition B effects, as well as adjudicate
whether we are right in assuming that a generalized Rule I is not at play in Vietnamese. With
respect to a Condition B that only targets binding, the data in the aforementioned experiment in
Bui (in preparation) can offer a lay of the land with respect to the dispreference for bound-variable
readings of nó in ‘out of the blue’ contexts. While we do argue that preference is a big factor in the
availability of these readings, we realize that there is the fine line between strong preference and
grammaticized constraints. Nevertheless, we believe that the effect that context restriction has on
both coreference and binding (as illustrated in this section), strongly suggests that it is not the case
that Condition B (or Rule I) is a hard constraint in Vietnamese.
In the final section we focus on the particle t¸ as another piece of the puzzle when it comes to the
availability of bound readings for the third person pronoun nó in Vietnamese. According to our
four consultants, the preference for the bound-variable reading increases of a sentence like (22)
increases if t¸ is present, as in the example below.
(23) MÂi
every
 ˘a
HHON
con
ANIM
gái1
girl
t¸
REFL
nói
talk
v∑
about
nó1/2.
3SG
‘Every girl talks about herself.’
Since Vietnamese can make use of the minimally different alternative in (23) to express that every
girl talked about herself, the competition between the two sentences might explain why (22) resists
bound-variable readings. In what follows we compare t¸ to emphatic VP reflexive markers.
5 An emphatic wrinkle
Besides full-fledged pronouns like mình and nó, emphatic markers, such as chính and t¸, can also
give rise to reflexive interpretations. These markers modify either DPs or VPs, and can be generally
captured as DP emphatic reflexives and VP emphatic reflexives, along the lines of Ahn (2010).7
With respect to VP emphatic reflexives, forms like herself can be used as adjuncts to contribute a
“without help” interpretation (Ahn, 2010), as illustrated below.
(24) Luna did it herself.
= Luna did it without any help.
However, in Vietnamese, the preverbal marker t¸ also greatly increases the likelihood of reflexive
readings for sentences with either mình and nó. This leads to two possible interpretations for a
sentence like (25): Luna loves herself or Luna loves someone else, of her own accord.
(25) Luna1
Luna
t¸
REFL
yêu
love
nó1/2.
3SG
‘Luna loves herself. / Luna loves someone else on her own.’
As illustrated in (26), t¸-sentences with quantified DP antecedents are also compatible with two
different readings. These interpretations are sketched out below.
(26) MÂi
every
 ˘a
HHON
con
ANIM
gái1
girl
t¸
REFL
nói
talk
v∑
about
nó1/2.
3SG
‘Every girl talks about herself.’
a. CONTEXT: # Dumbledore encouraged the girls to be outspoken and talk about them-
selves. They didn’t want to.
b. CONTEXT: X All of the girls wanted to talk about themselves and they did. Nobody
made them do it.
c. CONTEXT: X All of the girls wanted to talk about Snape and they did. Nobody made
them do it.
Comparing (26a) to (26b), it seems that t¸ requires that there be an identity relationship between
the Agent and the person who wanted for the event to happen. Although the presence of t¸ signals
preference for the bound variable reading in (26b), it is nonetheless the case that an additional
reading is available, where nó has a disjoint reference interpretation, as in (26c), where the girls
deliberately talked about Snape. The data in (26) illustrates that the ‘without help’ interpretation is
necessarily encoded in Vietnamese t¸. However, its role as a facilitator of bound variable interpre-
tations remains puzzling. The fact that t¸ merely improves the likelihood of a reflexive reading,
and does not strictly enforce it, is more difficult to account for. The fact that VP emphatic reflexive
markers encode an on their own description of the event has been discussed in Ahn (2010).
7For the sake of brevity, we focus on t¸ below, but the Vietnamese data suggest that chính fits the DP emphatic
reflexive pattern discussed in Ahn (2010).
Like other VP emphatic reflexive markers, t¸ is sensitive to the syntax-semantics of the predicate.
In particular, t¸ seems to require that there be a vPwhich introduces the agentive external argument
(Kratzer, 1994). Since the distribution of t¸ is restricted to sentences with vP, it is ungrammatical
when preceding copular or passive constructions, as shown below in (27) and (28), respectively.
(27) *Hermione
*Hermione
t¸
REFL
h§nh phúc.
happy
*‘Hermione is happy on her own.’
(28) *Luna
*Luna
t¸
REFL
b‡
PASS
 ánh.
hit
*‘Luna was hit on her own.’
Ahn (2010) argues that the distribution of VP emphatic reflexives cannot be generalized merely
through the requirement that there be an Agent thematic role. Ahn (2010) proposes that it is
volition, rather than agentivity, that VP emphatic reflexives are sensitive to: VP emphatic reflexives
are not felicitous alongside non-volitional external arguments, as shown below.
(29) a. Non-volitional: #Guess which medicine cured me itself.
b. Volitional: Guess which nurse cured me herself.
Consequently, in Ahn (2010)’s analysis, the verb to which the VP emphatic marker attaches must
license volitional agents, and not just agentive subjects. Arguably, this view also extends to t¸.
The Vietnamese VP emphatic reflexive marker can go with volitional agents, but not with non-
volitional causative ones, such as (30): the scaring event could not have been intentional. However,
this is not always the case. The marker t¸ may also occur in sentences where the subject is an
inanimate non-volitional agent. The syntactic difference between (30) and (31) is unclear.
(30) *Ti∏ng
sound
sßm
thunder
t¸
REFL
làm
make
tôi
me
sÒ.
scared
‘The thunder scares me itself.’
(31) Trái
CL
banh
ball
t¸
REFL
l´n.
roll
‘The ball rolls on its own.’
Moreover, Ahn (2010) notes that it is ungrammatical for VP emphatic reflexive markers to co-
occur with unaccusative verbs, since they lack a volitional agent. However, t¸ can surface in the
presence of unaccusative verbs, such as arrive, as shown in (32) below.
(32) Hermione
Hermion
t¸
REFL
 ∏n.
arrive
‘Hermione arrived on her own.’
The data above reflect only some of a range of exceptions to Ahn (2010)’s proposal. Ahn (2010)
argues that the properties of DP and VP emphatic reflexive markers are in complementary distri-
bution. For instance, a contrastive reading is associated with the DP emphatic reflexives, but not
the VP ones. However, t¸ in Vietnamese can also get a contrastive reading in certain contexts:
(33) Luna
Luna
t¸
REFL
tÍ ch˘c
organize
b˙a
CL
tiªc.
party
‘Luna herself (and not anyone else) organizes the party.’
It seems that the distribution of t¸ both fits and contradicts the pattern for VP emphatic reflexives
in Ahn (2010). It is unclear not only what the status of t¸ is in Vietnamese, but also how to capture
this increased preference for reflexive readings of pronominal VP complements. Further research
is needed to pinpoint an analysis for t¸; understanding the semantic contribution of t¸ would aid in
capturing the Vietnamese binding phneomena and their context-dependent interpretations.
6 Conclusion
A close examination of an understudied language like Vietnamese challenges well-established
cross-linguistic generalizations. We provide data which illustrates that, on the surface, Vietnamese
displays violations to all three Binding Principles in their classic form. However, we argue that
Vietnamese is not an outlier with respect to the Binding Theory. We show that the apparent ab-
sence of Principle A effects is in fact due to mình being a Condition A compliant logophor, along
the lines of Charnavel & Sportiche (2016). We further argue that Principle B is not a strict gram-
maticalized constraint, but rather a soft context-dependent restriction in Vietnamese. We discuss
evidence against the classic formulation of Rule I (Reinhart, 1983), but in favor of an extension
of this account, namely the Coreference Rule (Roelofsen, 2010). We argue that context-dependent
competition between the logophor mình and the personal pronoun nó is at play in deriving their
distribution and interpretation, and, finally, introduce the puzzle of the VP emphatic reflexive
marker t¸ and its effect of increasing the likelihood of a reflexive interpretation. This paper lays
the foundation for the further exploration of Binding phenomena in Vietnamese. Work on this topic
enhances our cross-linguistic understanding of the nature and source of constraints which underlie
referential relationships in natural language.
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Polar question particle -aa in Malabar Malayalam1
Sarath Chandran Manthodi, EFL University, Hyderabad
Rahul Balusu, EFL University, Hyderabad
Abstract. This paper provides an account for the properties of the polar question particle -aa
in Malabar Malayalm, which is, in some crucial aspects, similar to its Hindi counterpart kyaa.
Using instances of its occurrence in polar and alternative questions, and non-occurrence in wh-
questions and declarative disjuncts, we discuss the unique manner in which -aa attaches only to
clausal disjuncts and try to provide a semantic account for this pattern. Data from other major
Dravidian languages have also been used for this purpose. We argue that -aa qualifies as a polar
question particle since it resides in ForceP and has a presuppositional requirement of a singleton-
set question as its complement. An additional supporting argument for this claim is that it exhibits
all the diagnostic patterns of a root phenomenon. The second claim of the paper, that -oo in
Malayalam is a polar question operator, is supported by the fact that it occurs only in polar and
alternative questions. Like in more standard Hamblin semantics, we take the line that there is a
distinction between the question operator that forms polar questions and the question operator that
forms wh-questions, because the first takes a single proposition for its complement, whereas the
second takes a set of propositions.
1 Introduction
The goal of this paper is to investigate the distribution and properties of the question particle -aa in
a particular dialect of Malayalam, Malabar Malayalam, spoken in the northern regions of Kerala
adjacent to Kannada speaking Karnataka, and come up with a syntactic and semantic account
that explains its profile. The presence of the question particle -aa in Malabar Malayalam, that is
otherwise absent in Standard Malayalam which uses -oo for this function, provides an interesting
window into the polar/alternative vs. wh-question dichotomy, and matrix vs. embedded question
particle dichotomy based on morpho-syntactic evidence rather than intonation. We also examine
differences between polar question particles like -aa and question-operator particles like -oo, both
of which are present in Malabar Malayalam, like in the adjacent Kannada, Tamil, and Telugu.
We find that the question particle -aa of Malabar Malayalam is the Polar Question Particle
(PQP) a` la Bhatt & Dayal (2018) that occurs in the ForceP projection above the CP, and thus is
mostly restricted to matrix contexts. It also has a singleton-set restriction on its complement, a
presupposition, relegating its occurrence to polar questions only. Alternative questions with -aa
are essentially disjunctions of polar questions that are clausal disjuncts, and the disjuncts are larger
than CP. These do not involve any movement driven by scope. Smaller disjuncts on the surface are
never derived by reduction in Malabar Malayalam, but by clefting. All instances of sub-clausal -aa
are attachments to cleft pivots, diagnosed both by their syntax and semantics. When -aa attaches to
both disjuncts, seemingly sub-clausally, it has a narrow focus function, which we derive by a cleft
pivot focus mechanism, that is a property of clefts, a rampant strategy in general in Malayalam.
Finally, -aa cannot occur in Split Questions, as it cannot have a sub-clausal derivation.
1We would like to thank the audience of TripleA 5, Konstanz, 2018 for comments and discussion.
In section 2 we discuss the distribution and behavior of -aa in various constructions, especially
the clausal attachment pattern , the syntactic levels at which it occurs and contrast with the standard
variant -oo. In section 3, we attempt to come up with a syntactic and semantic explanation of the
data we have provided in the previous sections using cross-linguistic data and comparison with old
Malayalam. In the final section we summarize our findings and provide a broad explanation of the
signature properties of the PQP -aa.
2 The distribution of -aa in Malabar Malayalam
The particle -aa inMalabarMalayalam occurs only in polar/alternative questions, notwh-questions,
and typically in matrix contexts. It should not be confused with the phonologically shortened form
of the copula aan@, equative-BE, that occurs in clefts or exclamatives, (1).
(1) a. end@
what
goal-aa(n@)?
goal-EQ
‘What a goal!’
b. ravi
ravi
pustakam-aa(n@)
book-EQ
vaayicc-ad@
read-CLM
‘It is a book that Ravi read.’
2.1 -aa in matrix contexts
The -aa particle occurs in matrix polar and alternative questions in Malabar Malayalam. Polar
questions in Malayalam are marked syntactically, with -aa in Malabar Malayalam, and -oo in
Standard Malayalam. In Dravidian languages in general, an overt syntactic cue is needed, unlike in
languages like Hindi (and other Indo-Aryan languages like Bangla, Gujarati, Punjabi, etc) where
polar questions are indicated prosodically, and only optionally a Q-particle, polar kyaa, occurs
(Bhatt & Dayal 2018). Rising Declaratives are also absent in Dravidian.
The location of -aa in polar questions in Malabar Malayalam is always clause final, except in
clefts. Even in clefts we show that it is clause final, here the clause being the copular pivot clause,
with or without an overt copula. In alternative questions, it appears clause finally on both clausal
disjuncts. Gapping or reduction never happens. Therefore there are no instances of real sub-clausal
-aa. Information structural effects involving focus are achieved through clefts, and here the -aa
appears on both pivot clauses of the cleft structure.
2.1.1 -aa in Polar Questions
Polar questions in Malabar Malayalam, like in the surrounding Dravidian languages, Kannada,
Telugu & Tamil, but not standard Malayalam, surface with the question particle -aa, (2), in matrix
clauses. Without the particle -aa, the polar question is ungrammatical (without any bias), (3).
(2) ravi
Ravi
pustakam
book
vayicc-aa?
read-PQP
‘Did Ravi read the book?’
(3) *ravi
Ravi
pustakam
book
vayiccu?
read
‘Intended: Did Ravi read the book?’
Wh-questions do not surface with any question particle (4)-(5):
(4) ravi
Ravi
end@
what
vayiccu?
read
‘What did Ravi read?’
(5) ravi
Ravi
endaa(n@)
what
vayiccad@
read
?
‘What is it that Ravi read?’
A sub-clausal positioning of -aa is not possible, (6). There can be boolean disjunction within
the polar question, (7), and naturally, it takes scope under the question operator. There is no
ambiguity in the sentence, and an alternative reading is simply not available.
(6) *ravi
Ravi
pustakam-aa
book-PQP
vayiccu?
read
(7) ravi
Ravi
pustakam-oo
book-DISJ
patram-oo
paper-DISJ
vayicc-aa?
read-PQP
‘Did Ravi read the book?’ ‘Did Ravi read the book or the paper?’ [Y/N]
The boolean disjunction can also be that of non-finite clauses, (8). How high up can the boolean
disjunction go in finite clauses? It cannot go up to the level of two full clauses, TPs (9).
(8) R
R
vayikuga-oo
read-inf-disj
ezhutuga-oo
write-inf-disj
ceyd-aa?
do-PQP
(9) *nii
you
poy-oo
went-DISJ
avan
he
vann-oo-y-aa
came-DISJ-PQP
‘Did Ravi read or write?’ [Y/N] ‘Intended: Did you go or he come?’
It cannot go up to the evidential marker (which is possibly a little lower in the TP domain),
(10), though the -aa by itself occurs outside the evidential marker, on the verb, (11).
(10) *nii
you
poy-oo
went-DISJ
avan
he
vann-oo-nn-aa
came-DISJ-EVID-PQP
(11) pustakam
book
vaayicc-enn-aa?
read-EVID-PQP
‘Int: Apparently, did you go or he come?’ ‘Did pro apparently read the book?’
It cannot go upto the MoodP either, (12), which is in line with the claim by Jayaseelan (2014)
that Coord(ination)P and MoodP compete for the same slot in the C-domain of Dravidian.
(12) *nii
you
poy-um-oo
go-FUT-DISJ
(all-engil)
not-if
avan
he
vann-um-oo
come-FUT-DISJ
-aairukyum-aa
-might-PQP
‘Intended: Might, you go or else he come?’
Malayalam derives all these disjunctions using the clefting strategy (not illustrated here).
2.1.2 -aa in Alternative Questions
In alternative questions -aa occurs on both juncts, (13)-(14). The contrastive connective, all-engil
‘not-if’ occurs optionally in disjunctions, in XOR-YOR(-ZOR...) tuple structures, similar to other
contrastive connectives cross-linguistically (Szabolcsi 2018).
(13) nii
you
pooy-aa
went-PQP
avan
he
vann-aa?
came-PQP
(14) nii
you
pooy-aa
went-PQP
all-engil
not-if
avan
he
vann-aa?
came-PQP
‘Did you go or did he come?’ ‘Did you go or else did he come?’
Interestingly, finite clauses can be disjoined, (15), but not conjoined, as declaratives, (18).
Though, even in the disjunction, the disjunction marker -oo does not surface (16), possibly because
the clause final -oo is confused for the question particle -oo which also occurs clause finally 2. The
only way for -oo to surface in these disjunctions is to coordinate non-finite clauses, (17). The only
way to conjoin these clauses is also by coordinating them as non-finite forms, (19).
(15) nii
you
poyi
went
all-engil
not-if
avan
he
vannu
came
(16) *nii
you
poy-oo
went-DISJ
all-engil
not-if
avan
he
vann-oo
came-DISJ
‘You went or else he came.’ ‘Intended: You went or else he came.’
(17) nii
you
pook-uka-oo
went-inf-disj
avan
he
var-uka-oo
came-inf-disj
cey-tu
do-past
(18) *nii
you
pooy-um
went-conj
avan
he
vann-um
came-conj
‘You went or he came.’ ‘Int: You went and he came.’
(19) nii
you
pook-uka-um
went-INF-CONJ
avan
he
var-uka-um
came-INF-CONJ
cey-tu
do-PAST
‘You went and he came.’
The same is true of polar alternative questions (i.e. alternative questions with positive and
negative versions of the proposition), each alternative surfaces with an -aa, (20)- (21).
(20) avan
He
vaayicc-aa
read-PQP
(all-engil)
not-if
vaayicc-illa(y)-aa?
read-not-PQP
(21) avan
He
vaayicc-aa
read-PQP
illa(y)-aa?
not-PQP
‘Did he read or (else) not read?’ ‘Did he read or not?’
So far we have seen only full clauses as juncts in alternative questions. Is it possible to have
either or both parts of the alternative question as sub-clausal juncts? This is possible in both Hindi
with kyaa (Bhatt & Dayal 2018) and in Telugu with -aa (Balusu 2018). It turns out sub-clausal
juncts are just not possible in alternative questions in Malabar (or Standard) Malayalam, (22)-(23).
(22) *ravi
Ravi
kaapi-aa
coffee-PQP
caay-aa
tea-PQP
kuDiccu?
drank
(23) *ravi
Ravi
kaapi
coffee
kuDicc-aa
drank-PQP
caay-aa?
tea-PQP
‘Intended: Did Ravi drink coffee or tea?’ ‘Did Ravi drink coffee or tea?’
But what Malayalam does allow is verbal disjuncts, (24)-(25). We treat them as involving
gapping (24), or across-the-board extraction, (25).
(24) ravi
Ravi
kaapii
coffee
kuDicc-aa
drank-PQP
kala -aa?
throw-PQP
(25) aa
that
maa a
mango
ravi
Ravi
kaDicc-aa
bite-PQP
kala -aa?
throw-PQP
‘Did Ravi drink coffee or throw it?’ ‘Did Ravi bite that mango or throw it?’
2.1.3 -aa in Cleft Structures
A case where -aa disjuncts seem to appear sub-clausally on the surface involves clefting, (26).
But these are also, in fact, clausal disjuncts, with -aa suffixed to the null copula, (27), of the pivot
clause in a biclausal cleft structure, with pivot and cleft clauses (Jayaseelan & Amritavalli 2005).
2Jayaseelan (2014) notes that both conjunction and disjunction of finite clauses are bad in Malayalam.
(26) R
R
coffee-aa
coffee-PQP
tea-aa
tea-PQP
kuDicc-ad@?
drank-CLM
(27) R
R
C
C
aan-aa
EQ-PQP
T
T
aan-aa
EQ-PQP
kuDicc-ad@?
drank-CLM
‘Is it coffee or tea that Ravi drank? ‘Is it coffee or tea that Ravi drank?’
As seen in (27), the PQP attaches to the copula aan@, in line with the clausal attachment hy-
pothesis. Of course, this is also possible in polar cleft questions, (28)-(31). It is also possible to
have disjunction in the cleft pivot, (32)-(33).
(28) ravi
Ravi
coffee-aa
coffee-PQP
kuDicc-ad@?
drank-CLM
(29) ravi
Ravi
coffee
coffee
aan-aa
EQ-PQP
kuDicc-ad@?
drank-CLM
‘Is it coffee that Ravi drank? ‘Is it coffee that Ravi drank?
(30) ravi
Ravi
coffee
coffee
kuDicc-ad-aan-aa?
drank-CLM-EQ-PQP
(31) ravi
Ravi
coffee
coffee
kuDicc-ad-aa?
drank-CLM-PQP
‘Is it drinking coffee that Ravi did? ‘Is it drinking coffee that Ravi did?
(32) R
R
C-oo
C-DISJ
T-oo
C-DISJ
aan-aa
EQ-PQP
kuDicc-ad@?
drank-CLM
(33) R
R
C-oo
C-DISJ
T-oo
T-DISJ
kuDicc-ad-aa?
drank-CLM-PQP
‘Is it Coffee or Tea that Ravi drank? [Y/N] ‘Is it drinking C or T that R did? [Y/N]
The cleft constructions are how information structural effects are achieved in Malayalam polar
and alternative questions, as the above examples demonstrate. Thus, the sub-clausal placement
strategy that Hindi (Bhatt & Dayal 2018) and Telugu (Balusu 2018) adopt to deliver information
structural effects of focus and topic, is replaced in Malayalam by clefting, to deliver the same
information structural effects of focus and topic, and the sub-clausal strategy remains unavailable.
2.2 -aa in Embedded contexts
In embedded contexts, the preferred question particle is actually -oo. It surfaces in both polar and
alternative questions, (34)-(35).
(34) avan
He
vaayicc-oo
read-DISJ
((all-engil)
not-if
vaayicc-illa(y)-oo)
read-not-DISJ
enn@
QC
n˜aan
I
coodiccu
asked
‘I asked if he read (or (else) did not read).’
(35) nii
you
pooy-oo
went-DISJ
all-engil
not-if
avan
he
vann-oo
came-DISJ
enn@
QC
n˜aan
I
coodiccu
asked
‘I asked whether you went or he came.’
Embedded wh-questions do not surface with the particle -oo, or any particle at all, (36)-(37).
(36) ravi
Ravi
end@
what
vaayicc-nn@
read-QC
coodiccu
asked
(37) *ravi
Ravi
end@
what
vaayicc-oo-nn@
read-DISJ-QC
coodiccu
asked
‘(I) asked what Ravi read.’ ‘Intended: (I) asked what Ravi read.’
In embedded contexts -aa is not acceptable under plain responsive, i.e. veridical predicates,
(38), marginal with negated responsive, i.e. under non-veridical predicates, (39), and acceptable
though less preferred to -oo under rogative predicates, (40)-(41).
(38) *avan
He
kazhich-aa-nn@
ate-PQP-QC
ariyam
know
(39) ??avan
He
kazhich-aa-nn@
ate-PQP-QC
enikk@
I-DAT
ariy-illa
know-not
‘Intended: (I) know if he ate.’ ‘I don’t know if he ate.’
(40) ?avan
He
kazhich-aa
ate-PQP
enn@
QC
n˜aan
I
codiccu
asked
(41) avan
He
kazhich-aa
ate-PQP
enn@
QC
codikk@
ask-IMP
‘I asked if he ate.’ ‘Ask if he ate!’
2.3 Malabar Malayalam vs. Standard Malayalam in questions
Matrix polar, (42), and alternatives questions, (43), surface with the particle -oo instead of -aa in
Standard Malayalam. The particle -aa never shows up in Standard Malayalam, neither in matrix
contexts nor in embedded contexts.
(42) ravi
Ravi
pustakam
book
vayic-oo?
read-DISJ
(43) avan
He
vaayicc-oo
read-DISJ
ora i-oo?
slept-DISJ
‘Did Ravi read the book?’ ‘Did he read or sleep?’
So, in StandaradMalayalam, all polar and alternative questions, whether in matrix or embedded
contexts are marked with -oo, and never with -aa. Wh-questions are completely unmarked, be it in
matrix or embedded contexts.
2.4 Correlatives, Indefinites and Declarative Disjunctions
2.4.1 Correlatives
Correlative constructions in Malabar Malayalam do not permit the use of -aa at the clausal level,
even though the correlative clause has a clause final particle. Instead, -oo is the particle that attaches
clause finally, like in Standard Malayalam, and demonstratives ad@ and eed@ are used to indicate
coreference, (44).
(44) ravi
Ravi
eed@i
which
pustakam
book
vaayicc-oo
read-DISJ
ad@i
that
enikk@
I-DAT
iStamayi
liked
‘I liked the book that Ravi read .’
(Lit. ‘Which book Ravi read, that I liked.’)
2.4.2 Indefinites
Indefinites also follow the pattern of correlatives in using -oo instead of -aa to indicate epistemic
ignorance, as shown in (45).
2.4.3 Declarative Disjunctions
Disjunctions in simple declaratives are also indicated by -oo, (46). The morpheme -aa is never
used as a declarative disjunction, contra the claim of Jayaseelan (2014) for Malayalam dialects.
(45) aar-oo
who-DISJ
enn@
me
talli
hit
(46) ravi
Ravi
padikkuv-oo
studying-DISJ
ura uv-oo
sleeping-DISJ
cheyyuka-aan@
doing
‘Someone hit me.’ ‘Ravi is studying or sleeping.’
2.5 Polar Question Particle signature of -aa
As we saw in all the above subsections, the particle -aa in Malabar Malayalam is restricted to polar
and alternative questions. Sub-clausal attachment of -aa is not possible, unlike say polar kyaa in
Hindi. The particle -aa also displays selectiveness in embedding, or quasi-subordination (Dayal
& Grimshaw 2009). A summary of all the findings is given in (47). The particle -aa, unlike -oo,
has only one life –a Q-particle, in Malabar Malayalam. This is also the same in Kannada, Telugu,
and Tamil. It shows up only in polar questions and alternative questions in matrix contexts, and
displays selectiveness in embedding in embedded contexts.
(47)
Malabar Malayalam Standard Malayalam
Matrix
Polar questionss -aa -oo
Alternative questions -aa -oo
Wh-questions — —
Embedded
Polar questions -oo (*/??/?-aa) -oo
Alternative questions -oo (*/??/?-aa) -oo
Wh-questions — —
Indefinites -oo -oo
Boolean Disjunction -oo -oo
Correlative -oo -oo
3 Analysis
3.1 An earlier account of -aa
Amritavalli (2013) analyses the -aa in Dravidian as a question operator in the matrix clause, (48),
and proposes that -aa is covert in wh-questions, (49), using examples from Kannada.
(48) makkaLu
children
ba-nd-ar-aa
come-pst-3pl-Q
KANNADA (49) yeSTu
how-many
jana
people
sattaru
die.pst.3pl
aa
Q
‘Did the children come?’ ‘How many people died?’
Similarly, Amritavalli (2013) proposes that the -aa in embedded wh-clauses in Kannada is a
covert interrogative complementizer that co-coccurs with the quotative complementizer anta, (50),
and that the -aa in embedded polar questions in Kannada is an overt interrogative complementizer
that co-coccurs with the quotative complementizer, (51).
(50) [[idanna
this-ACC
yaaru
who
baredaru]-aa
wrote Q
anta]
QC
keeLide/kaNDu.hiDide
asked/discovered
KANNADA
‘(I) asked/discovered who wrote this.’
(51) tande
father
[[makkalu
children
ba-nd-ar-aa]
come.pst.3pl-Q
anta]
QC
keeLidaru
asked
KANNADA
‘The father asked if the children had come.’
Since aa-anta complements may be ambiguous between a matrix and an embedded question
reading, (52), and since the particle -aa need not always scope under anta, as we see in matrix
clauses, Amritavalli (2013) infers that -aa can occur either as an interrogative complementizer in
the embedded clause or as a question operator in the matrix clause.
(52) BBC
BBC
[[[yeSTu
how-many
jana
people
sattaru]IP
die.pst.3pl
aa]Q
Q
anta]CP
QC
heeLitu
said
. / ? KANNADA
(i) . = ‘The BBC said how many people died.’
(ii) ? = ‘How many people did the BBC said died?’
3.2 Our analysis of -aa in Malabar Malayalam
For the analysis of -aa as a question operator to go through, Amritavalli (2013) needs to posit a
covert -aa in matrix wh-questions, and to analyse it as an interrogative complementizer in embed-
ded contexts, again a covert -aa in embedded wh-questions. Transposing this analysis into Malabar
Malayalam will again need a number of covert -aamorphemes to make the question operator anal-
ysis viable. This account will also not be able to account for the selective embedding of -aa under
rogative vs. responsive predicates that we find in Malabar Malayalam.
As shown in the previous section, what we find is that the -aa of the Malabar dialect parallels
the distribution of polar kyaa in Hindi, as explicated in Bhatt & Dayal (2018) in some crucial
respects –first and foremost, it is necessarily limited to polar and alternative questions, never seen
in wh-questions. Second, it shows selectivity in embedding, i.e, it is perfectly fine in rogative-
imperatives, and ungrammatical under veridical-responsive predicates. This portends an analysis
of the syntax and semantics of -aa along the lines of Bhatt & Dayal (2018), that can explain
these properties –a morpheme residing higher up in the clausal spine than the question operator,
to explain its matrix prediliction; and a morpheme that comes with a presupposition of a singleton
propositional set complement, to explain its polar question restriction.
3.2.1 -aa in polar questions
As far as the matrix vs. embedded contrast in the distribution of -aa is concerned, it shows the
hallmark properties of a root phenomenon. Therefore it should be located on the clausal spine
above normal embedded height. It should also be above the location where the interrogative vs.
declarative split is determined, since it does not occur in declarative clauses. Following Bhatt &
Dayal (2018) we take this position to be minimally the ForceP above C[+Q], as shown in (53).
(53) ForceP
CP
TP
‘Ravi ate’
C0
 Q
-aa
Next, how do we explain the selectivity in embedding of -aa, its appearance in quasi-subordinated
embedded polar questions, but not otherwise? This is a larger pattern than just Malabar Malay-
alam -aa, or Telugu/Kannada/Tamil -aa, or even Hindi kyaa (Bhatt & Dayal 2018). It is also seen
in embedded inversion in English (McCloskey 2006). Following these authors we analyse quasi-
subordinated embedded polar questions as involving an extra CP layer, the ForceP layer, as shown
in (54). Thus, those subordinations that involve a ForceP like rogative predicates and non-veridical
responsive predicates allow for -aa to be embedded under them, but those predicates that only take
upto the interrogative-C layer like veridical-responsive predicates do not allow -aa to be embedded
under them, as we saw in the previous section on the patterning of -aa in Malabar Malayalam.
(54) a. rogatives and non-veridical responsive: [ForceP [CP C0+Q [TP ]]]
b. veridical responsives: [CP C0+Q [TP ]]
Finally, how do we explain the restriction of -aa to only polar and alternative questions, and
its non-occurrence in wh-questions? This is the trademark distribution of polar question particles
according to Bhatt & Dayal (2018), who propose all such particles to encode a presupposition of
a singleton-set denoting complement. We thus follow them in proposing a similar presupposition
for the Malabar Malayalam -aa as shown in (55).
(55) J aaK =  Qhst,ti : 9p 2 Q[8q 2 Q! q = p].Q
Going by this lexical entry, since it takes a set of propositions, it cannot combine with declar-
atives. But since the set of propositions it takes is the singleton set, it cannot combine with wh-
questions. Thus -aa’s distribution is restricted to polar questions. Then going by this denotation,
when it occurs in alternative questions, it should also compose with only a singleton-set. This is
the property we will turn to next.
3.2.2 -aa in alternative questions
The data in the previous section has laid out that in alternative questions in Malabar Malayalam, -
aamust occur on each junct (unlike in Hindi which allows a single kyaa in an alternative question).
This makes it clear that each -aa in an alternative question is composing with a polar question, and
together all the polar questions are disjoined to form an alternative question. This is also, surface
single kyaa appearance disregarding, the analysis proposed by Bhatt & Dayal (2018) for alterna-
tive questions in Hindi. The polar questions suffixed with -aa are disjoined by an interrogative
disjunction operator (optionally spelt out as all-engil), as shown in (56), and it has the semantics
shown in (57).
(56) ORQP
{p,q}
ForceP
CP
{p}
-aa
ORQ ForceP
CP
{q}
-aa
(57) JORQK =  Qhst,ti Q0hst,ti.Q [Q0
Interestingly, we saw in (15)-(19) that finite declarative clauses cannot be disjoined by the
boolean disjunctive particle -oo. They have to be coordinated only as non-finite clauses. The rea-
son for this, following Jayaseelan (2014), is that declarative disjunction (ORBOOLP) and MoodP
compete for the same slot in the TP domain. But we have seen from the data that polar juncts
can be disjoined (to form alternative questions), and the above tree is a representation of it. Thus,
interrogative disjunction of finite clauses, which happens above CP, is fine in Malabar (and Stan-
dard) Malayalam, whereas the boolean disjunction of finite clauses, which needs to happen in TP,
is ruled out because the finiteness projection and the coordination projection are competing for the
same slot. Thus in Malayalam (and other Dravidian languages), we see the opposite pattern of
what is normally observed in the literature –disjunction of interrogative finite clauses is allowed
but disjunction of declarative finite clauses is disallowed.
We also saw that deletion in the second disjunct is fine when it is verb stranding (24)-(25),
but not fine when it is not, (22)-(23). This is another constraint in alternative questions in Malabar
Malayalam, that is not found in Telugu or Hindi, where there can be one (seemingly) small disjunct
on the surface, but the other one is a surface apparent large disjunct. So the elision in (58) is fine
in Malabar Malayalam, whereas the elision in (59) is not good. However, a similar structure in
Telugu is fine, (60).
(58) [ravi
Ravi
kaapii
coffee
kuDicc-aa]
drank-PQP
[ravi kaapii kala -aa]?
throw-PQP
‘Did Ravi drink the coffee or throw it?’
(59) *[ravi
Ravi
kaapi
coffee
kuDicc-aa]
drank-PQP
(all-engil) [ravi
if-not
caay kuDiccaa
tea
-aa]
-PQP
‘Intended: Did Ravi drink coffee or tea?’ [Alt]
(60) [ravi
Ravi
coffee
coffee
taageeD-aa]
drank-PQP
(leedaa) [ravi
if-not
tea taageeD
tea
-aa]
-PQP
TELUGU
‘Did Ravi drink coffee or tea?’ [Alt]
Thus in Malabar Malayalam tupling with -aa (disjuncts of size ForceP) unambiguously leads to
alternative questions. The only way to get a polar question interpretation is to have small disjuncts
with the boolean disjunctive particle -oo, and this does not have an alternative question interpreta-
tion. Why doesn’t the low occurring boolean disjunction operator get to scope over the question
operator that -aa signals higher up in the clause, therefore delivering an alternative question inter-
pretation? This is the puzzle we take up in the next subsection.
3.2.3 Scope of -aa and boolean disjunction in questions
Why cannot a sentence like (61a) have an alternative question interpretation where the disjunction
indicated by the -oo is scoping over the question operator indicated by the -aa, as shown in (61b)?
(61) a. #ravi
Ravi
kaapi-oo
coffee-DISJ
caay-oo
tea-DISJ
kuDicc-aa?
drank-PQP
‘Intended: Did Ravi drink coffee or Did Ravi drink tea?’
b. ORBOOL > -aa > CP[+Q]
If boolean disjunction takes scope over -aa (and the question operator below it), the problem is
the type-mismatch between what -aa delivers and what boolean disjunction expects, as shown in
(62). Thus, an alternative question interpretation is not possible for a sentence like (61a).
(62) a. Jcoffee or teaK =  Phe,ti. P(coffee) _ P(tea)
b. J aaK =  Qhst,ti.Q
3.2.4 Information structural effects of -aa in cleft questions
Both in Hindi (Bhatt & Dayal 2018) and Telugu (Balusu 2018), sub-clausal or clause-medial posi-
tioning of the PQP has information structural effects, with the material to the left of kyaa as being
not-at-issue or given and the material to the right of kyaa as being not specified for this, in Hindi,
and the sub-clausal material that -aa attaches to in Telugu as being at-issue, and the rest of the
material as being not-at-issue.
In Malabar Malayalam (and Standard Malayalam) sub-clausal -aa is not possible, as we saw in
the last section. The particle -aa has to be clause final or verb final. To achieve information struc-
tural effects of not-at-issue and at-issue in polar and alternative questions, the strategy employed is
that of clefts, discussed in §2.1.3. The cleft pivot, which is marked with -aa, is at-issue, and the rest
of the cleft clause is not-at-issue. This information structural partition falls out naturally from the
syntax-semantics of clefts, as is widely discussed in the literature, which we will not go into here.
The partitioning can be tested with favored continuations in gapping (63), and Y/N congruence
(64), as discussed in Bhatt & Dayal (2018):
(63) a. ravi
Ravi
coffee-aa
coffee-PQP
kuDicc-ad@?
drank-CLM
(64) a. ravi
Ravi
coffee-aa
coffee-PQP
kuDicc-ad@?
drank-CLM
‘Is it coffee that Ravi drank?... ‘Is it coffee that Ravi drank?
b. Tea-aa? ‘or Tea?’ b. alla, Tea-aa(n@) ‘No, it was Tea.’
c. #Uma-aa ? ‘or Uma’ c. # alla, Uma-aa(n@) ‘No, it was Uma.’
3.3 An earlier account of Malayalam -oo
Jayaseelan (2001) proposes that all Malayalam questions—both polar questions andwh-questions—are
marked by a clause final -oo, and that there is a superficial deletion rule in Malayalam that deletes
an underlying -oo in wh-questions, as shown in (65)-(66).
(65) aar@
who
wannu-oo?
came-DISJ
(66) avan
he
[aar@
who
wannu-oo
came-DISJ
enn@]
QC
paran˜n˜u/coodiccu
said/asked
‘Who came?’ ‘He said/asked who came.’
Jayaseelan (2001, 2012) then makes the theoretical claim that the question operator is the dis-
junction operator universally (C[+Q] = disjunction operator). In Malayalam the question particle
-oo is a realization of the question operator, C[+Q]. Therefore the homophony of Q-particle and
disjunction marker -oo is not accidental in Malayalam, and this also explains why the question
operator (always abstract in English), is realized as the disjunction marker -ka in Japanese. This
analysis is therefore an attempt at a unifying analysis, both within the language, and also cross-
linguistically with patterns seen in languages like Japanese and Sinhala, as shown in (71).
3.4 Our analysis of -oo in Standard and Malabar Malayalam
What is the syntax and semantics of the particle -oo seen in polar and alternative questions in matrix
and embedded contexts in Standard Malayalam and in embedded contexts in Malabar Malayalam?
It cannot be the interrogative complementizer (CInt) for four reasons. First, it occurs in matrix
contexts in Standard Malayalam. Second, it doesn’t occur with wh-questions, either in matrix or
embedded contexts in Standard or Malabar Malayalam. Third, this -oo co-occurs with another
complementizer, the quotative complementizer, in both Standard and Malabar Malayalam, and
in fact always needs this complementizer in embedded contexts, (67). Fourth, it occurs on both
alternatives, (68), instead of occurring once subordinating the entire embedded clause if it were a
complementizer. For the same reasons it is not the clause-typing particle of Cheng (1997) either.
(67) ravi
Ravi
pustakam
book
vaayicc-oo
read-DISJ
*(enn@)
QC
n˜aan
I
coodiccu
asked
(=34)
‘I asked if Ravi read the book’
(68) nii
you
pooy-oo
went-PQP
all-engil
not-if
avan
he
vann-oo
came-PQP
*(enn@)
QC
n˜aan
I
coodiccu
asked
(=35)
‘I asked whether you went or he came.’
We propose that this -oo is a realization of the question operator, C[+Q], but unlike Jayaseelan
(2001), we restrict its occurrence to polar/alternative contexts, those that it actually surfaces in,
because it has a singleton-set complement requirement, a presupposition. Thus, in a sense, it is the
CP equivalent of the ForceP kya:/-aa that also have a singleton-set presupposition. We encode its
meaning as shown in (69). This is in line with what a standard compositional approach to questions
requires in a Hamblin semantics, that the question operator for polar questions and wh-questions
to be different. Thus the polar question operator contrasts with the multi-member set forming
question operator that occurs with wh-questions.
(69) J[ oo ↵hsti]K =  w.A(w) where J↵K = {A}
defined only if
9p 2 ↵[8q 2 ↵! q = p]
Our analysis thus departs from the unificatory attempt of all occurrences of -oo of Jayaseelan
(2001) for Standard Malayalam. Besides the theoretical gain of unification, the empirical evi-
dence that Jayaseelan (2001) advances for the presence of -oo in wh-questions is the data from old
Malayalam. But on closer examination, we find that these wh- contexts are actually non-intrusive
contexts, as shown in (70), like those seen in Telugu and Kannada, that Balusu (2018) discusses.
In non-intrusive questions, like canonical questions, the speaker raises an issue and thereby signals
that (s)he wishes to have it resolved. But unlike canonical questions, the speaker signals that (s)he
does not wish to put the addressee on the spot for providing the answer. So the addressee can
comply without volunteering the answer, either because (s)he does not have it or because (s)he
does not wish or is not willing to provide it. Thus there a form of ‘softened’ questions. There is no
clear evidence for a direct wh-question with an -oo particle even in old Malayalam.
(70) a. aar@
who
wannu-(w)oo
came-DISJ
aa-(w)oo?
PARTICLE-DISJ
‘(I wonder/I ask you) who came?’
b. maharSi
great-sage
nintiruwaDi
(hon.title)
entu-nimittam-aakil-oo
what-reason-be-DISJ
iwiDam
this-place
nookki
seeing
ezhunaLLi?
came(hon.)
‘For what reason is it that the great sage has been pleased to come to this place?’
Across languages, the same particle does appear in wh-questions and polar/alternative ques-
tions, in languages like Japanese and Sinhala, as shown in (71), from Slade (2011). But we
also find that there is a wh-question and polar/alternative-question particle split in Tlingit. Thus
this adds further evidence to the analysis we are advancing here that the -oo in Malayalam is a
polar/alternative-question operator. As for the unification of -oo in its various manifestations in
Malayalam, we observe that even here, whether it occurs in disjunction, or indefinites, or correla-
tives, it always composes with a singleton-set, an existential or a referent. We set aside a detailed
and compositional semantic unification of these occurrences for now.
(71)
Japanese Stan.Mal. Mal.Mal. Tlingit Sinhala
Matrix Polar/Alternative Qs ka oo aa ge´ de
Embedded Polar/Alternative Qs ka oo oo ge´ de
Wh-questions ka sa´ de
3.4.1 Scope of wh-phrases with -oo
Our semantics of the question operator -oo would prevent wh-phrases from occurring with it, be-
cause they would violate its singleton-set denoting requirement. But there are sentences where a
wh-phrase occurs in a clause with the question operator -oo, as shown in (72), though Malayalam
would actually prefer the cleft construction, (73), as observed in Jayaseelan (2001).
(72) john
John
[aar
who
pooy-oo
went-disj
enn]
QC
coodiccu?
asked
(i) ‘Who did John ask whether (he) went?’
(ii) *‘John asked who went.’
(73) John
John
[aar
who
pooy-oo
went-disj
enn]
QC
aan@
EQ
coodiccad@?
asked-CLM
‘It is whether who went that John asked?’
In (72), if -oo is a question operator without a singleton-set requirement, it should be able
to deliver the embedded wh-question interpretation as in (72)ii. But this is ungrammatical. The
wh-word has to be interpreted outside the scope of the embedded -oo, in the scope of the silent
matrix question operator, which does not have a singleton-set requirement, delivering the reading
in (72)i. The same is again true of an unconditional as in (74), taken from Jayaseelan (2001), where
the -oo’s singleton-set requirement prevents the wh-word from being interpreted in its scope, and
instead it is interpreted upstairs under the unconditional -um.
(74) aar
who
wannu-(w)oo
came-disj
enn
C
coodicc-aal-um,
ask-if-conj
awar
they
maRupaDi
reply
paRay-illa
say-neg
‘No matter for which x, (you) ask if x has come, they will not reply.’
4 Conclusion
Malabar Malayalam -aa has two of the three signature properties for a PQP that Bhatt & Dayal
(2018) discuss –restriction to polar/alternative questions, and selectiveness in appearing inside
embedded polar/alternative questions. The property it does not possess is sub-clausal or flexible
syntactic positioning, it always occurs clause finally. We analyse the lack of this property as a
result of the predominance of the clefting strategy in Malayalam in general for forming questions
and in particular for focusing sub-clausal constituents. It is thus well-suited for being identified as
another PQP cross-linguistically, that resides in ForceP and has a presuppositional requirement of
a singleton-set question as complement. In the larger South Asian linguistic picture, we surmise
that the Dravidian languages in relative contact with the Indo-Aryan languages developed the PQP
-aa, and that this PQP seeped further south into Malabar Malayalam with its close proximity to
Kannada and Tamil. Thus we find a PQP in the furthest south of the Indian peninsula.
The second major claim of our paper is that the particle -oo in Malayalam, both Standard and
Malabar, is the polar question operator. This jives well with the surface patterning and distribution
of -oo in the data. And, in principle, if theoretically there is a possibility for a question particle
that presupposes a singleton-set denotation for its complement, there is also a possibility for a
question operator that presupposes a singleton-set denotation for its complement. We propose that
the Malayalam -oo is such a question operator.
An interesting contrast that we explain in our paper is the ability of two finite clauses to be
disjoined as an alternative question but not as declaratives. This we attribute to the disjunction
operator that coordinates two question clauses (ForcePs in this case, since they contain -aa) being
at a height where it does not compete for the same slot with the finiteness marking MoodP, (75), in
the narrow C domain of the Dravidian languages (Jayaseelan 2014), as opposed to the disjunction
operator that coordinates two finite clauses which is at a height where it competes for the same slot
in the C-domain as the finiteness instantiating morpheme that resides in MoodP, (76).
(75) ORQP
{p,q}
ForceP
CP
MoodP
IP
.
Mood
C+Q
-aa
ORQ ForceP
CP
MoodP
IP
.
Mood
C+Q
-aa
(76) MoodP / ORBOOLP
MOOD / ORBOOL IP
.
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The typology of anaphor agreement effect1
Gurujegan Murugesan — Universita¨t Leipzig
Abstract. In this paper, I argue that Rizzi’s anaphor agreement effect is in fact not universal as
there are languages that show violation to this effect. To the question of why some languages
follow anaphor agreement effect and why certain other languages violate it, I demonstrate that this
is an independent consequence of whether in a given language the functional head that carries the
agreement probe merges first in the structure or the subject DP that that serves as antecedent to
the anaphor merges first in the structure. In the former case, the order is Agree   Binding, where
the anaphor do not have any ' features to control the agreement resulting in anaphor agreement
effect and in the later case, the order is Binding  Agree, where the anaphor will have acquired the
required ' features to control the agreement resulting in violation of anaphor agreement effect.
1 Anaphor Agreement Effect
Rizzi (1990) proposed a generalization called anaphor agreement effect (henceforth, AAE). Ac-
cording to this generalization, anaphors do not occur in a position construed with agreement. Rizzi
further claims that this generalization holds ‘systematically across natural languages’ (Rizzi 1990:
28). The main argument for AAE comes from the dative subject construction in Italian and Ice-
landic. In these construction (1a), it is not the dative subject but the nominative object that controls
the agreement. However if the nominative object is reflexive (1b), then the sentence becomes
ungrammatical.
(1) a. Henni
She.DAT
leidust
bored.3PL
˛eir
they.NOM
‘She was bored with them.’
b. *Konunumi
Women.DAT
leidust
bored.3PL
sigi
REFL.NOM
‘Women were bored with themselves.’ (Icelandic; Taraldsen 1995: 307 (1))
The same facts can be observed in Italian as well, where the reflexive from an agreement control-
ling nominative object position is ruled out (2a) and the same construction is rescued by having
the reflexive in the genitive case, which does not control the agreement (2b).
1I would like to thank Rajesh Bhatt and other audiences of Triple A 5 for their helpful feedback and comments.
This research is part of the research project SU 835/1 Anaphora vs Agreement: Investigating the Anaphor-Agreement
Effect funded by the German Research Fondation (DFG).
The following abbreviations are used in this paper: 1 - first person, 2 - second person, 3 - third person, I, II, III, IV -
morphological genders in Archi, b, j , v , d - morphological genders in Ingush, ABS - absolutive, ALL - allative, APPL
- applicative, CAUS - causative, CONT - continous, CVB - converb, DAT - dative, DOM - differential Object Marking,
EL- elative, ERG - ergative, F - feminine, FUT - future, FV - final vowel, GEN - genitive, IMPERF - imperfective, INF -
infinitve, IN - in localization M - masculine, N - neuter, NOM - nominative, NW - non witnessed tense, OBL - oblique,
OM - object marking, PERF - perfective, PL - plural, PRES - present, PST - past, REFL - reflexive, SBJ - subjunctive, SG
- singular, SM - subject marking, WP - witnessed past tense.
(2) a. *A
To
lorroi
them.DAT
interess-ano
matters-3PL
solo
only
se-stessii
REFL.NOM
‘Theyi only matter to themselves.i’
b. A
To
lorroi
them.DAT
import-a
matters-3SG
solo
only
di
of
se-stessii
REFL.GEN
‘Theyi only matter to themselves.i’ (Italian; Rizzi 1990: 33 (15))
Rizzi reasons out that ungrammaticality of (1b) and (2a) can be explained neither by the binding
theory nor by the empty category principle. The principle A of the binding theory requires that
anaphors be locally bound by the antecedent. In these constrictions, the dative subject serves as
a local antecedent for the anaphor, which satisfies the principle A. Similarly, the empty category
principle (ECP) requires that the trace of the moved argument should be properly governed. If the
trace is governed by the tense, then it is not properly governed but if the trace is governed by the
lexical verb, then it is considered to be properly governed. On the assumption2 that the anaphor
moves from its base position to the position adjacent to its antecedent at LF, the trace of the moved
anaphor would have violated the ECP if the anaphor is moved from the subject position, which is
governed by the Tense. On the other hand, if the anaphor is moved from the object position, then
it would not have violated the ECP because the object position is governed by the lexical verb,
which qualifies as a proper governor. Given that the anaphor in (1b) and (2a) is in object position,
it would not constitute as the violation of ECP. Having ruled out both the binding theory and the
ECP, Rizzi proposes that this ungrammaticality is due to the inability of the anaphor to control the
agreement on the verb. If the anaphor cannot control the agreement on the verb, then it cannot
occur in those agreement controlling position in (1b) and (2a).
Though Rizzi claims that AAE is universal, I will show from languages like standard Gujarati,
Archi and Ingush that AAE is not universal. To the question of why some languages follow AAE
and why certain other languages violate it, I demonstrate that this is an independent consequence
of whether in a given language the functional head that carries the agreement probe merges first
in the structure or the subject DP that that serves as antecedent to the anaphor merges first in the
structure. In the former case, the order is Agree   Binding, where the anaphor do not have any '
features to control the agreement resulting in anaphor agreement effect and in the later case, the
order is Binding   Agree, where the anaphor will have acquired the required ' features to control
the agreement resulting in violation of the anaphor agreement effect.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, I discuss empirical facts from Shona and
Kutchi Gujarati, which follow AAE and in section 3, I discuss empirical facts from Standard
Gujarati, Archi and Ingush that violate AAE. In section 4, I propose an analysis that derives both
the AAE and the violation of AAE. In section 5, I discuss the prediction and falsification of the
proposed analysis and section 6 is the conclusion.
2The proposal that anaphors move to INFL at LF comes form Lebeaux (1983), which was subsequently assumed
in Chomsky (1986).
2 AAE following patterns
Woolford (1999) tests AAE generalization to typologically different types of languages and she
suggests that there is no counter-example to this generalization. In this section, I discuss couple of
languages that are not discussed in Woolford (1999) but nevertheless prove the robustness of AAE.
2.1 Shona
Shona is a Bantu language belonging to Niger-Congo language family spoken in Zimbabwe. It
has both subject marking (SM) and object marking (OM) occuring as a part of verbal morphology.
As shown in (3a), SM and OM corresponds to the the noun class of the subject and the object
respectively. When the arguments are personal pronoun (3b), they are obligatorily pro dropped
and information about them are recovered from the SM and the OM.
(3) a. Mufaro
Mufaro
a-?-ri-bik-a
SM.1-PST-OM.5-cook-FV
bota
porridge.5
‘Mufaro cooked porridge.’ (Storoshenko 2016: 161 (5))
b. pro
1SG
ndı`-no´-mu`-ge`z-bvu`nz-a`
SM-PRES-OM-question-FV
pro
3SG
‘I question him.’ (Dechaine & Wiltschko 2012: 17 (37a))
Following Storoshenko (2016), I take the SM and OM as the agreement markers with the subject
and the object respectively. If this indeed the case, then when the reflexive pronoun occurs as the
object, an invariable -zvi morpheme occurs in the object agreement slot, which does not ' covary
with the reflexive.
(4) Shona reflexive marking:
SM PRES OM wash
1SG ndı`- no´- zvı`- ge`z-a´ ‘I wash myself.’
1PL tı`- no´- zvı`- ge`z-a´ ‘We wash ourself.’
2SG u`- no´- zvı`- ge`z-a´ ‘You wash yourself.’
2PL mu`- no´- zvı`- ge`z-a´ ‘You(PL) wash yourself.’
3SG a`- no´- zvı`- ge`z-a´ ‘She washes herself.’
3PL va`- no´- zvı`- ge`z-a´ ‘They wash themselves.’
(Dechaine & Wiltschko 2012: 17 (35))
At this point, it is unclear what exactly this -zvi morpheme is as it can be analyzed either as an
incorporated reflexive pronoun or it could be analyzed as an object agreement marker. However
Storoshenko (2016) points out that -zvi marker is in fact a class 8 marker that typically occurs in
the context of default agreement. As shown in (5a), when the object is a conjunct DP made nouns
belonging to the different noun classes, the -zvi morpheme occurs in the object agreement slot.
Similarly, in (5b), -zva3 morpheme occurs in the subject agreement slot, when the subject is not a
proper DP but rather a clause.
3-zva is an allomorph of -zvi that shows up in certain subject agreement contexts.
(5) a. Nda-?-zvi-tor-a
SM.1-PST-OM.8-take-FV
[sadza
Sadza.5
no-mu-riwo]
and-3-relish
‘I took them (sadza and relish).’
b. [Ku-tsav-ir-a
[INF-sweep-APPL-FV
mu-mba
house
ma-zuva
day
e-se]
every]
zva-ka-kosh-a
SM.8-PST-important-FV
‘Sweeping the house every day was important.’ (Storoshenko 2016: 170 (22))
If -zvi is an indeed default agreement marker, then its occurrences in reflexive context in (4) can
also be explained straightforwardly if we assume along with Kratzer (2009) that anaphors are born
without the ' features and as a result they cannot control the ' or class co-varying agreement
and therefore results in default agreement. So the default agreement that obtains with the anaphor
confirms Rizzi’s AAE.
2.2 Kutchi Gujarati
Kutchi Gujarati belongs to the western Indo-Aryan language, spoken in the Rann of Kutch in the
state of Gujarat, India. It exhibits a split agreement pattern: the agreement is with the subject in
the imperfective and with the object in the perfective, well described by Patel-Grosz (2014), and
Grosz and Patel-Grosz (2014). In this paper, I concentrate only on the perfective aspect as it gives
ideal test case scenario to check if the reflexive from the object position can control the agreement
or not. First to illustrate its basic agreement pattern in perfective aspect, as shown in (6), the DOM
marked object controls the agreement on the verb for number and gender.
(6) a. John
John
Mary-ne
Mary-DOM
jo-y-i
see-PERF-FSG
‘John saw Mary.’
b. Mary
Mary
John-ne
John-DOM
jo-y-o
see-PERF-MSG
‘Mary saw John.’ (Patel-Grosz 2014: 2 (2))
By replacing the DOMmarked object with a reflexive pronoun instead of a proper noun, the agree-
ment facts does not change as the normal expected agreement still obtains as shown below.
(7) a. John
John
potha-ne
REFL-DOM
jo-y-o
see-PERF-MSG
‘John saw himself.’
b. Mary
Mary
potha-ne
REFL-DOM
jo-y-i
see-PERF-FSG
‘Mary saw herself.’ (Patel-Grosz 2014: 4 (9-10))
At the face of it, the agreement facts in (7) looks like its the anaphors that control the ' co-varying
agreement. However, Patel-Grosz argues that it is not the reflexive that controls the agreement but
the subject DP. She argues that in Kutchi Gujarati, whenever the reflexive occurs in the agreement
controlling position, the agreement shifts to the subject DP. Her evidence for the agreement shift
comes from the following facts in Kutchi Gujarati, where the reflexive object with the dative subject
controls the default neuter agreement rather than ' co-varying agreement. If it is the reflexive
object that controls the agreement, then change in the case of the subject should not matter to the
agreement, however, since the change in the case of the subject to dative case affects the expected
agreement pattern, Patel-Grosz establishes that agreement obtains with the subject rather than with
the object.
(8) Raj-ne
Raj-DAT
potha-ne
REFL-DOM
jo-vu
see-N
par-y-u
had-PERF-N
‘Raj had to see himself.’ (Patel-Grosz 2014: 5 (12))
Given this evidence, I take Patel-Grosz’s observation to be true in which the agreement target
shifts from the object to the subject, whenever the object is reflexive. This fact further attests the
empirical validity of the AAE which predicts that anaphor can never control the agreement on the
verb.
3 AAE violating patterns
In the last section, we have seen the empirical patterns from Shona and Kutchi Gujarati, where
AAE is followed and in this section, I will illustrate the empirical patterns from standard Gujarati,
Archi and Ingush, where AAE is violated.
3.1 Standard Gujarati
Standard Gujarati is a closely related language to Kutchi Gujarati. It also exhibits a split agreement
pattern: the agreement is with the subject in the imperfective and with the object in the perfective.
As shown in perfective aspect in (9), the DOMmarked object controls the ' co-varying agreement
on the verb. An important difference between Kutchi Gujarati and standard Gujarati is that the
subject DP in perfective aspect is marked with the overt ergative case in standard Gujarati but
unmarked in Kutchi Gujarati.
(9) Raaj-e
Raj(M)-ERG
sudhaa-ne
Sudha(F)-DOM
uúhaaã-i
awakened-FSG
‘Raj awakened Sudha.’ (Mistry 2000: 344 (18))
Again, when the object is reflexive, it does not affect the agreement pattern as normal agreement
obtains.
(10) a. raaje
Raj(M)-ERG
potaa-ne
REFL-DOM
sanãov-yo
involved-MSG
‘Raj involved self.’
b. Sudhaae
Sudha(F)-ERG
potaa-ne
REFL-DOM
sanão-vi
involved-FSG
‘Sudha involved self.’ (Mistry 2000: 344 (19))
However, the question with regard to (10) is whether it is the reflexive that controls the agreement
or is it the case of agreement switch like Kutchi Gujarati. It can be easily established that it is the
reflexive object that controls the agreement rather than subject. In (11), when there is a clausal
object and ergative subject, there is a default agreement. This shows that ergative subject can never
control the agreement. If ergative argument can never control the agreement, then there cannot be
any agreement switch in (10).
(11) Raajei
Raj-ERG
jaïaav-yu˜
informed-N
[ke
that
Sita
Sita
jarur
definitely
aavsˇe]
come.FUT-3
‘Raj informed that Sita will definitely come.’ (Kinjal Joshi p.c.)
Further evidence for the reflexive object controlling the agreement can be seen by comparing the
dative subject construction in standard Gujarati (12a) with that of Kutchi Gujarati (12b). In (12a),
the ' co-varying agreement suggests that it is the reflexive controlling the agreement rather than
the subject because if the subject controls the agreement, then it would result in default neuter
agreement with the dative subject as in the case of Kutchi Gujarati in (12b).
(12) a. Sita-ne
Sita(F)-DAT
pota-ne
REFL-DOM
apnav-i
adopt-FSG
che
be
‘Sita wants to adopt herself.’ (Gujarati; Kinjal Joshi p.c.)
b. Raj-ne
Raj(M)-DAT
potha-ne
REFL-DOM
jo-vu
see-N
par-y-u
had-PERF-N
‘Raj had to see himself.’ (Kutchi Gujarati; Patel-Grosz 2014: 5 (12))
The empirical facts prove that it is the reflexive that controls the agreement in Gujarati and thereby,
violating AAE.
3.2 Ingush and Archi
Ingush, a Nakh-Daghestanian language, also presents a clear case of AAE violation. It is also an
ergative-absolutive language, where only the absolutive argument can control the agreement. In
(13), the letters B an J in the gloss of the verbal morphology corresponds the morphological gender
of argument in the absolutive case.
(13) a. aaz
1SG.ERG
jett
cow(B).ABS
aara-b.oala-b.yr
out-B.go-B.CS.WP
‘I led the cow out.’
b. aaz
1SG.ERG
Mariem
Mariem(J).ABS
aara-j.oala-j.yr
out-J.go-J.SC.WP
‘I led the Mariem out.’ (Ingush; Nichols 2011: 432 (5-7))
Given this agreement pattern, it can be shown that reflexive occurs as an absolutive argument and
then controls the agreement.
(14) Muusaaz
Muusa.ERG
learrha
on.purpose
shie
REFL.ABS
xoada-veav
cut-V.CAUS.NW.V
‘Musa cut himself on purpose.’ (Ingush; Nichols 2011: 641 (27))
The source of verbal agreement in (14) can be shown to be from the reflexive object rather than
from the ergative subject by changing the case of the subject DP into dative case as in (15). The
change in the case of the subject doesn’t affect the agreement pattern because the agreement is
from the reflexive object.
(15) Suona
1SG.DAT
sie
REFL.ABS
kizjgaa-chy
mirror.GEN-IN
bwarjga+j-eira
eye+J.see.WP
‘I(female speaker) saw myself in the mirror.’ (Ingush; Nichols 2011: 641 (22))
Again, there is no agreement switch in (15) by comparing it with (16), where it is shown that
the argument in dative case cannot control the agreement. If dative argument can never control
the argument, then it must be the case that it is the reflexive in absolutive case that controls the
agreement (14) and (15). All these facts in Ingush point to the fact that it is a clear case of AAE
violation like standard Gujarati.
(16) Suona
1SG.DAT
[yz
3SG
dika
good
sag
person
voliga]
V.BE.SBJ
xou
know.PRES
‘I know he is a good person.’ (Ingush; Nichols 2011: 547 (40))
Archi, an another Nakh-Daghestanian language, also presents an AAE violation. It is also an
ergative-absolutive language, where only the absolutive argument controls the agreement4.
(17) zari
1SG.ERG
noQsˇ
horse(III)SG.ABS
darc’-li-r-sˇi
post-SG.OBL-CONT-ALL
e-b-t’ni
III.SG-tie.PERF
‘I tied the horse to the post.’ (Archi; Chumakina, Bond and Corbett 2016: 60 (29))
Similar to Ingush, reflexives occur as an absolutive argument in Archi and then controls the agree-
ment.
(18) a. Zalik-li-s
Zalik(I)-SG.OBL-DAT
inzˇa-w
REFL.ABS-I.SG
w-ak:u
I.SG-see.PERF
daXon-n-asˇ
mirror(IV)-SG.OBL-IN-EL
‘Zalik saw himself in the mirror.’ (Archi; Bond and Chumakina 2016: 69 (52))
b. laha-s
child(I).SG.OBL-DAT
inzˇ-w
REFL.SG.ABS-I.SG
w-ak:u
I.SG-see.PERF
‘A boy saw himself.’ (Archi; Sadler 2016: 158 (19))
To conclude this section, we have seen empirical patterns in Standard Gujarati, Ingush and Archi
presenting a clear case of AAE violation, which is to be contrasted with the empirical patterns in
Shona and Kutchi Gujarati which presents a case where AAE is strictly followed. These two con-
trasting patterns raise the interesting question of why AAE behaves the way it is in these languages
and how to account for them. I will present an analysis in the following section that accounts for
this question.
4The roman letter III in the verbal morphology refers to an agreement marker.
4 Analysis
In this section, I will demonstrate that AAE or the violation of AAE arises as an independent
consequence of whether in a given language the functional head that carries the agreement probe
merges first in the structure or the subject DP that that serves as antecedent to the anaphor merges
first in the structure. When the agreement probe that seeks to agree with the anaphor merges in the
structure before the subject DP, the agreement with the anaphor precedes before the binding of the
anaphor as schematized in (19). In this order of derivation, the anaphor will not have the required
' features to control the agreement on the verb and as a result AAE holds.
(19) Agree   Binding! AAE holds
On the other hand, when the subject DP that serves as antecedent to the anaphor merges first in the
structure before the agreement probe, the binding of an anaphor will precede the agreement with
the anaphor as schematized in (20). In this order of derivation, the subject DP will have acquired
the required ' features from binding and can then value the probe from the functional head and
eventually resulting in violation of AAE.
(20) Binding   Agree! AAE violation
Given this proposal, first, I will specify the set of assumptions that are needed for the analysis
before actually deriving the AAE facts in the languages.
4.1 Assumptions
I assume that anaphors are born without any ' features (Kratzer 2009) and they acquire their '
features as a result of undergoing agree with their antecedent in syntax. Therefore I take binding to
be nothing but an agree operation that operates between the anaphor and its antecedent (Reuland
2001, 2011). Similarly, for the actual verbal agreement, I follow the standard approach of Chom-
sky’s (2000) agree that operates between the uninterpretable and the unvalued features of a probe
and the interpretable and the valued features of a goal and as result of agree, the probe’s features
get checked and valued. For the sake of concreteness, I will continue to refer the agree relation
between anaphor and its antecedent as ‘binding’ and the agree relation between the functional head
and its DP as ‘agree’. In addition, I assume the direction of agree can be both upward (Zeijlstra
2012) and downward. I also assume the earliness principle (Pesetsky 1989), which demands that
an operation apply as soon as its context are met.
4.2 Default agreement in Shona
Given the background assumptions that I have highlighted above, first, I’ll derive the AAE facts
in Shona. As we have already seen in (3) (repeated as (21) below), Shona has both subject and
object agreement. I take this agreement configuration in syntax as T agreeing with the subject and
v agreeing the object as shown in (22).
(21) Mufaro
Mufaro
a-?-ri-bik-a
SM.1-PST-OM.5-cook-FV
bota
porridge.5
‘Mufaro cooked porridge.’ (Storoshenko 2016: 161 (5))
An important thing to note from the structure in (22) is that by the time v agrees with the object,
the subject would not have merged in the structure. So in the structure with reflexive (23), there
is no way that binding could have happened before agree because the subject merges later in the
structure. As a result, when v probes down to agree with the reflexive object, the reflexive would
not have the required ' features to value the uninterpretable feature of v. As a result, default
agreement obtains with the reflexive.
(22) Shona agreement:
TP
T’
vP
v’
VP
V’
ObjV
spec
v
spec
T
Subj
(23) Agree   Binding :
TP
T’
vP
v’
VP
V’
ReflV
spec
v
spec
T
Subj
1 
2 
4.3 Agreement switch in Kutchi Gujarati
We have already seen that Kutchi Gujarati employs the agreement switch strategy to get around the
violation of AAE. It turns out that Kutchi Gujarati is also a language with two agreement probes
and this is seen overtly in analytic tense in (24), where the overt tense auxiliary agrees with the
subject and the perfective verb agrees with the object.
(24) Hu
I
chokra-ne
boys-DOM
jo-y-a
see-PERF-PL
ha-is
be--FUT.1SG
‘I will have seen the boys.’ (Grosz & Patel-Grosz 2014:11 (9b))
This would again translate in syntax as T agreeing with the subject and v agreeing with the object
as in (25) and in the reflexive construction in (26), it is first v that agrees with the object and only
then subject DP merges in the structure. So the order of derivation is Agree   Binding.
(25) Kutchi Gujarati agreement:
TP
T’
TvP
v’
vVP
V’
VDPobj
DPsubj
(26) Agree   Binding:
TP
T’
TvP
v’
vVP
V’
VRefl
DPsubj
1 2 
Further to derive agreement switch, here, I follow Be´jar and Rezac’s (2009) cyclic architecture
of agreement. In the first cycle, v agrees with the internal argument and if there are features of
v that have not undergone agree with the internal argument, then the domain of agree expands to
second cycle, where the features that have not undergone agree in earlier cycle, would now undergo
agree with the external argument. This cyclic expansion of agree allows the choice of agreement
controller to switch from the object to the subject5.
4.4 AAE violation in standard Gujarati
Compared to the nested pattern of agreement in Kutchi Gujarati, there is no nested pattern of
agreement in standard Gujarati because when the verb agrees with the object (27), the auxiliary
also agrees with the object rather than with the subject.
(27) mene
I-ERG
khasi
cough(F)
av.t-i
come.PROG.-FSG
ha-ti
was.PROG.FSG
‘I have had a cough.’ (Gujarati; Suthar 2005 :58 (279))
This pattern is very similar to object agreement in Hindi as reported in Bhatt (2005).
(28) Rahul-ne
Rahul-ERG
kitaab
book.F
parh-ii
read-PERF.FSG
th-ii
be-PST-FSG
‘Rahul had read the book.’ (Hindi; Bhatt 2005 :759 (2b))
For constructions such as (28), Bhatt (2005) proposes that there is just one probe on T that estab-
lishes agree not with the subject DP (because of its ergative case) but with the object DP through v.
Therefore when the object DP values the ' features of T, v also get its ' features covalued (though
v by itself is not a probe). One way to think about it is that agreement on v is parasitic on T. Fol-
lowing Bhatt (2005), I assume the same for Gujarati as illustrated in (29). And for the construction
with reflexive (30), the subject DP merges in the structure before the agreement probe T. Therefore
the order of agree operation would be Binding   Agree, which predicts AAE violation.
(29) Gujarati:
TP
T’
TvP
v’
vVP
V’
VDPobj
DPsubj
(30) Gujarati: Binding   Agree
TP
T’
TvP
v’
vVP
V’
VReflobj
DPsubj
2 
1 
5I would like to refer the readers to Patel-Grosz (2014) and Murugesan & Raynaud (to appear) for different ap-
proaches regarding the exact implementation of agreement switch.
4.5 AAE violation in Ingush and Archi
For Ingush and Archi, I adopt the same analysis proposed for Gujarati, where T is the actual probe
and v gets its value as a result of co-valuation. The evidence for T being the only probe in these
languages comes again from the analytic tense, where both the overt auxiliary and the perfective
verb agrees with the object. As a result of T being a probe, subject DP would be merging in the
structure before T and this would result in the order of derivation Binding   Agree and eventually
resulting in AAE violation.
(31) a. Aaz
1SG.ERG
gazat
newspaper.ABS
dieshazh
D.read
dy
D.PROG
‘I am reading a newspaper.’ (Ingush; Nichols 2011: 497 (168))
b. laha-s
child(II).SG.OBL-DAT
dija
father(I).SG.ABS
w-ak:u-r-sˇi
I.SG-see-IMPERF-CVB
w-i
I.SG-be.PRES
‘A girl sees (her) father.’ (Archi; Chumakina and Bond 2016: 92 (30))
5 Conclusion
In this paper, first, I have shown that Rizzi’s AAE is not universal as there are languages like
standard Gujarati, Archi and Ingush, where there is a violation of AAE. I have argued that this
violation comes about as a natural consequence of subject DP merging in the structure before the
agreement probe that seeks to agree with the anaphor. Given this derivational timing of merge, the
binding of an anaphor will precede the agreement with the anaphor and as a result, the anaphor
will have acquired its required ' feature to control the agreement. It should be, however, noted
that the reason why AAE violation does not come about in all the languages is because following
three things need to hold for it to happen: (1) T must be an active probe and v should be an
inactive probe. (2) The subject should not act as a suitable goal. (3) The language should not
resort to default agreement at the first instance of failed agree with the subject. I have shown in this
paper that all these three condition holds in standard Gujarati, Archi and Ingush leading to AAE
violation.
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Degrees and scales of Kunbarlang1
Ivan Kapitonov — ARC CoEDL, University of Melbourne
Abstract. This paper discusses novel data from the non-Pama-Nyungan language Kunbarlang in
the domain of degree semantics. I show these data to be problematic for an influential typological
account couched within the degree-based framework by Beck et al. (2009). I propose an alternative
that builds on the delineation approach in the spirit of Klein (1980), and in particular on recent
developments employing measurement theory, such as van Rooij 2011b. The proposed solution both
accounts for Kunbarlang data and offers a basis for an alternative semantic typology of comparative
constructions.
1 A degree-based typology
There are two main types of approaches to the semantics of comparative and other degree con-
structions, with an important difference lying in their ontological commitment. One type, usually
called degree-based approaches, includes analyses by Cresswell (1976) and von Stechow (1984),
and much subsequent work. These analyses crucially rely on degrees as a primitive type in the
semantic ontology: type d. The other type, known as delineation approaches, avoid positing a
special semantic type for the degrees and treat gradable adjectives as vague predicates (e.g. Kamp
1975, Klein 1980, van Rooij 2011a). I begin here by discussing the degree-based approach and a
semantic typology that has been advanced within it. The delineation framework will take center
stage in §3, after a discussion of Kunbarlang and the problems it poses for the degree-based typology
in §2.
In the degree-based approaches, owing to the availability of the dedicated semantic type d,
gradable adjectives are analyzed as binary relations between degrees on a scale and individuals.
Generally, an expression of type ⌧ will be treated as hd, ⌧i if it is a gradable predicate, which takes a
degree as an argument. By way of example, the English adjective deep receives semantics as in (1):
(1) [[deep]] =  d x.DEPTH(x)   d type hd, he, tii
A comparative sentence like (2) may then be rendered along the following lines (3):
(2) Lake Baikal is deeper than Lake Tanganyika.
1. I am very grateful to my Kunbarlang teachers who shared their language with me and were very patient in working
on the complex constructions in this paper. In particular, I would like to acknowledge the contribution of Na-kangila
Solomon Yalbarr and Ngal-ngarridj Sandra Makurlngu. I wish to thank Liz Coppock for getting me thinking about
Kunbarlang comparatives and for helpful discussion at the outset of this work. Nick Sgro-Traikovsky made valuable
suggestions to an earlier version of the paper. Last but not least, I am grateful to the audiences at the 2017 Australian
Languages Workshop and AAA5 at the University of Konstanz, especially Vera Hohaus, for excellent feedback and
discussion. This research was conducted with support from the ARC Centre of Excellence for the Dynamics of
Language (Project ID: CE140100041).
(3) 1d[deep(d, Baikal)]   1d[deep(d, Tanganyika)]
The logical representation (3) is intended to capture the intuition that what (2) says is that the
(maximal) degree of depth that Baikal reaches is greater than the (maximal) degree of depth that
Tanganyika reaches.
Recently Beck et al. (2009) have conducted a small-scale, but in-depth typological study that
included 14 languages from the different types in Stassen’s (1985)/Bobaljik’s (2012) morphosyntac-
tic classification.2 These authors used a 19-item questionnaire, paying particular attention to the
following 7 representative constructions:
• differential comparative (DiffC; 2in taller than)
• comparison with a degree (CompDeg; taller than 6ft)
• degree phrase scoping above a modal verb (Scope)
• negative island effect (NegIs; negation in the than-clause)
• degree questions (DegQ; how tall. . . ?)
• measure phrases (MP; 6’4” tall)
• comparative subdeletion (SubC; x is longer than y is deep)
Based on the availability of the specific constructions in each given language, an interesting pattern
emerges. Rather than choosing a random subset of the possible degree constructions, these languages
group into four clusters, further motivating three clusters of constructions: every language has
either all or none of the constructions in each group. Moreover, the three clusters of constructions
appear to be organized along an implicational hierarchy (see table 1), suggesting some underlying
hierarchy of the semantic devices that are required for a language to be able to “constructionalize” a
particular type of meaning. That is, in this sample of 14 languages there were no languages that
would exhibit some of DegQ, MP, and SubC, without also having a (lexicalized) way to express
DiffC and CompDeg, or not showing Scope and NegIs effects.
Since in Motu there are no lexical resources (such as words or morphemes) to express any
comparative/degree semantics, it is hypothesized to lack the type d from its semantic ontology
altogether. This concept of “degree-less” languages, or languages that have only implicit comparison
constructions, has received further cross-linguistic support from work on such languages as Fijian
(Oceanic; Pearson 2010), Washo (isolate/Hokan; Bochnak 2015) and Warlpiri (Pama-Nyungan;
2. That is, languages with
• explicit comparatives (Bulgarian, Guaran, Hindi-Urdu, Hungarian, Mandarin Chinese, Romanian, Russian,
Samoan, Spanish, Thai, Turkish; they also refer to English and German)
• ‘exceed’ comparatives (Yoru`ba´ and Moore´)
• implicit, or conjoined, comparatives (Motu)
Table 1: Clusters of degree constructions after Beck et al. (2009)
DiffC CompDeg Scope NegIs DegQ MP SubC
Motu N N n/a n/a N N n/a
Yoru`ba´, Samoan Y Y N n/a N N n/a
Russian, Guaran Y Y Y Y N N N
Thai, English Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bowler 2016).3 The semanticists working on those languages have argued in favour of different
approaches, both degree-based (e.g. Bochnak) and based on delineation (e.g. Bowler and Pearson).
Beck et al. 2009 offer a parametric solution to this emerging typology, which uses three privative
parameters to capture the three clusters of constructions:
• Degree Semantics Parameter (DSP): does L have gradable predicates of type hd, ⌧i?
• Degree Abstraction Parameter (DAP): does L have binding of degree variables in the syntax?
• Degree Phrase Parameter (DegPP): can the degree argument position of gradable predicates
be overtly filled?
In Beck et al.’s (2009: 28) own words,
[t]he following are the dependencies between the parameter settings: It only makes
sense to ask whether a language has abstraction over degree variables if that language
has a degree ontology in the first place—i.e. only if we determine a setting [+DSP]
need we inquire into the setting of the DAP. If we determine a setting [ DSP] we must
have [ DAP] as well. Similarly, the phrases we call DegPs are operators over degrees.
They can only occur if the language allows such operators, i.e. has the setting [+DAP].
In this way the parameters explain the dependencies between the data clusters.
Therefore, the parameters can be organized into a decision tree (4), which reflects the observed
implicational hierarchy between the clusters in table 1, and thus defines the linearly increasing array
of degree constructions available in the language.
(4)
 DSP +DSP
 DAP +DAP
 DegPP +DegPP
3. See Deal & Hohaus (2018) for a discussion of various senses of degreelessness.
Terminals in the tree (4) define the four classes of languages: from the ones that do not show
any lexicalization of degree semantics expressions to those that exhibit the full range of relevant
constructions. This analysis, which I shall refer to as the DSP-approach, makes a number of
predictions that will be of crucial relevance for the ensuing discussion. As the authors point
out, it is “very important for our theoretical reasoning that empirical properties can be seen as
coming in clusters, and that there are dependencies between them in that some options appear to
be prerequisites for others” (Beck et al. 2009: 29–30). Thus, on this view, we expect some sort
of ‘connectedness’ among the parameters (as well as among their diagnostic constructions). We
notice further that the “theory could be falsified by the discovery of a language that has degree
questions and measure phrases, but an (otherwise unexpected) absence of scope mechanisms
for degree operators, for instance. . . More concretely, according to our analysis it should not be
possible for a language like Motu to develop degree questions, but not change in any other respect”
(op.cit.: 30–31).
There is, of course, a certain logical independence between the parameters and the particular
expressions that their positive setting enables: strictly speaking, while presence of a construction
indicates the [+] setting of a parameter, absence does not necessarily entail the [ ] setting. This is
because there can be occasional gaps or other variation in lexicalization of a particular operator, such
as equality or inequality operators. I shall explore the limits and consequences of this independence
after I have shown the empirical problems presented by Kunbarlang in the next section.
2 Kunbarlang
In this section I give the necessary background on Kunbarlang (§2.1) and then describe the expression
of degree-semantics constructions in Kunbarlang (§2.2), showing that it does not fit into Beck et al.’s
(2009) typology in a neat way. This will prompt me to explore a different solution to the observed
cross-linguistic diversity, one that is based on measurement scales (§4).
2.1 Language background
Kunbarlang is an indigenous Australian language spoken by approximately 40 people in central
Arnhem Land. It belongs to the Gunwinyguan family (Alpher, Evans & Harvey 2003; non-Pama-
Nyungan), and like other Gunwinyguan languages is highly polysynthetic. The verb is the core of
morphosyntactic complexity in Kunbarlang, showing a templatic organization with nine prefixal
and two suffixal slots, in addition to the root. Every verb obligatorily indexes person and number
of its subject and (if transitive) object, and inflects for tense and mood (there are no non-finite
forms); the subject prefixes also indicate tense/mood features.4 Argument structure can be altered
via derivational morphology, and some nominals and adverbials may be incorporated into the verb.
In the nominal domain, morphology is noticeably simpler than in other Gunwinyguan languages, but
there is a noun class (i.e. grammatical gender) system with five classes. Noun class is an agreement
category in the noun phrase: the class is inherent for the nouns and all their modifiers agree in it.
4. I do not separate tense/mood inflection from the verbal root in glossing examples here.
Kunbarlang is an understudied language. Harris’s (1969) tagmemic sketch grammar and
Coleman’s (1982) unpublished honours thesis offer some important descriptive groundwork in the
core areas of its grammar, but remain inaccessible to a wide audience, and moreover many aspects
of the language have not been discussed in enough detail there. There is currently a full-scale
documentation project that aims to expand on that previous work and produce a comprehensive
reference grammar of this language (Kapitonov n.d.). All data in the present paper are from the
author’s original fieldwork in Warruwi, Northern Territory, in 2016–2018.
2.2 Kunbarlang comparative/degree constructions
Kunbarlang is interesting in that its specific array of degree constructions is not quite like any
other attested so far. At first glance, it resembles a degree-less language very much. There
are no morphological comparatives or superlatives in Kunbarlang, and in that respect it falls
within Stassen/Bobaljik’s class of implicit comparison languages (which is a widespread type in
Australia). In other words, it only has paratactic, but not hypotactic, constructions. The analogue of
a predicative phrasal comparative in Kunbarlang is most often expressed via conjunction of clauses
with antonymous predicates (5a) or via conjunction of clauses one of which contains a semantically
gradable predicate and the other—a predicative negator karlu ‘not’ (5b).5 Moreover, inequality
may be expressed by a conjunction of clauses with the same gradable predicate in each, where one
instance is contrasted with the other through intensification with ngemek ‘yet’, as in the comparative
of quantity example (5c).
(5) a. Kundulk
tree
bi-nungku
DAT-you.GEN
man-djurrkmi,
III-short
la
CONJ
mayi
NM.III
bi-ngaybu
DAT-I.GEN
man-kukkarlyung.
III-long
‘My stick is longer than yours.’ [lit. ‘Your stick is short and mine is long.’]
[IK1-160618 000-01]
b. Ngal-bangardi
II-skin.name
kin-kukkarlyung,
II-long
la
CONJ
Ngal-ngarridj
II-skin.name
karlu.
NEG.PRED
‘Ngalbangardi is taller than Ngalngarridj.’ [lit. ‘Ngalbangardi is tall and Ngalngarridj is
not.’] [IK1-160616 000-01]
c. Bedbe
they
kadda-kalng
3PL.NF-get.PST
na-rleng,
I-many
la
CONJ
ngayi
I
ngemek
yet
nga-kalng
1SG.NF-get.PST
na-rleng
I-many
bonj˜bonj.
RDP˜exactly
‘I caught more [fish] than they did.’ [lit. ‘They got plenty, yet I got plenty, too.’]
[IK1-160802 002-01]
5. Abbreviations used here are: 1 first person; 2 second person; 3 third person; CONJ conjunction; DAT dative; DEM
demonstrative; GEN genitive; I class I; II class II; III class III; IV class IV; NEG negative; NF non-future; NM noun
marker; NP non-past; OBJ object; PL plural; PRED predicative; PROX proximal; PST past; RDP reduplication; SG singular
.
It is important to note that comparison is implied/inferred with the use of these conjoined
constructions, rather than entailed. Consider example (6). It exhibits the crucial ambiguity between
a literal and a comparative reading.
(6) Ninda
DEM.PROX.I
nayi
NM.I
djarrang
horse
na-wanjak
I-little
la
CONJ
ninda
DEM.PROX.I
nayi
NM.I
djaddi
frog
na-rlengbinbin.
I-big
LITERAL: ‘The horse is little [for a horse], the frog is big [for a frog].’
COMPARATIVE: ‘The frog is bigger than the horse.’ [IK1-160816 000-01]
The intuition is that the two readings correspond to the different ways to construe the comparison
class against which the adjective is evaluated. On the literal (and plausible: the real-life horse
is bigger than the real-life frog) reading, which one may call the global construal, the horse is
evaluated against other horses, and the frog—against other frogs. The comparative reading (which I
confirmed by showing the speaker a drawing of these implausibly-sized animals), on the other hand,
construes the class as consisting of just those two animals, the mentioned horse and frog. Thus,
I conclude that comparison is not constructionalized as the meaning of a conjunction. This will
play a role in section 4 when I discuss the difference between the languages with implicit and with
explicit comparatives.
This conjoined, or implicit, strategy is used for the vast majority of degree semantics construc-
tions in Kunbarlang:
• predicative phrasal comparatives
• adverbial comparatives
• attributive comparatives
• comparatives of quantity
• clausal comparatives
• differential comparatives [with a measure phrase]
• comparison with a degree [with a measure phrase]
• comparative subdeletion
A systematic survey of the constructions from Beck et al.’s (2009) questionnaire reveals that only
one of them has a lexicalized expression in Kunbarlang—namely, measure phrases (7). There
is not enough diachronic information to conclude this with certainty, but it is plausible that the
construction is a recent borrowing from English; the numerals and measure units, such as foot or
meter, are often loanwords (7b). Notice, however, that original Kunbarlang lexicon can be used as
well (7a,c).
(7) a. Nga-karrme
1SG.NF-get.NP
kaburrk
two
la
CONJ
kaburrk
two
djanga
foot
man-kukkarlyung
III-long
mayi
NM.III
kundulk.
tree
‘I’ve got a four feet long stick.’ [IK1-170620 1SY-03]
b. Nginda
DEM.PROX.II
ngunda
not
6
6
foot
ft
kin-kukkarlyung,
II-long
karlu,
NEG.PRED
nginda
DEM.PROX.II
kin-djurrkmi,
II-short,
yimarne
like
4
4
foot.
ft
‘She’s not 6 feet tall, no, she’s short, maybe 4 feet.’ [IK1-170616 1SY-01]
c. kun-djorlok
IV-deep
korro
at
middjaba=ngaybu
knee=I.GEN
‘knee-deep’ [ibid.]
Measure phrases are a [+DegPP] construction, since the syntactic phrase that expresses the
measure is supposed to occupy the argument position of the gradable predicate. There are no
constructions for differential comparatives or comparison with a degree, which are required for
the diagnosis of the [+DSP] setting, on Beck et al.’s (2009) analysis. These constructions are
morphosyntactically prerequisite for the [±DAP] diagnostics, so testing the scope and the negative
island effects is trivially not applicable in Kunbarlang. Neither are there other DegPP constructions
available: English comparative subdeletion prompts in elicitation yield conjoined clauses, and the
only way to form a question is pragmatic: that is, there is a general ‘what kind of’ question that
could be interprered as referring to a kind, some property, or the quantity depending on context (8a).
The manner interrogative pronoun for ‘how’ is not used for degrees and may not directly combine
with a gradable predicate (8b).
(8) a. Birlinj
how
nayi
NM.I
durduk
dog
ki-buddu-karrme?
2SG.NF-3PL.OBJ-hold.NP
‘What have you got, dog-wise?’ [given in response to promt: ‘How many dogs do you
have?’] [IK1-180606 1SM-01]
b. *Birlinj
how
man-bakkarlyung
III-long
manda
DEM.PROX.III
kundulk?
tree
intended: ‘How long is that stick?’ [IK1-170620 1SY-02]
This means that the only parameter that has the positive setting in Kunbarlang is the Degree
Phrase Parameter. Moreover, even the DegPP cluster itself is not homogenous: we have MPs, but
not DegQs or SubCs, as summarized in table 2. This picture is potentially inconsistent with the
implicational hierarchy, viz. the prediction that [+DegPP]) [+DSP].
There are two main analytical possiblities: (i) try to modify and rescue the DSP-approach, or
(ii) seek an alternative analysis. In the following section I begin by discussing the lexicalization
solution to the presented problem. I shall conclude that this is not very desirable as it radically
weakens the predictive value of the theory, and in its stead I shall propose an alternative analysis
stemming from the delineation family of approaches.
Table 2: Kunbarlang against the background of Beck et al.’s (2009) typology
DiffC CompDeg Scope NegIs DegQ MP SubC
Motu N N n/a n/a N N n/a
Yoru`ba´, Samoan Y Y N n/a N N n/a
Russian, Guaran Y Y Y Y N N N
Thai, English Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Kunbarlang N N n/a n/a N Y N
2.3 A lexicalization quirk?
There is on-going cross-linguistic work within the degree-based paradigm, which indicates consid-
erable variation in the inventories of degree operators, such as equative or comparative operators
(e.g. Berezovskaya & Hohaus 2015). This gives us an insight into how the DSP-approach can be
upheld. As I have mentioned above, absence of a particular construction in a given language does
not per se count as evidence for the negative setting of the relevant parameter, strictly speaking. It
remains a logical possibility that an underlying semantic device, such as the degree type, or the
order relation, exists in this language, but an accidental lexicalization gap conceals it. For the sake
of concreteness, absence of a morphological comparative operator (like the English -er or more),
does not immediately indicate unavailability of the comparison operation (x > y) on a conceptual
level. Rather, it can be an idiosyncrasy of the lexical inventory.
Following the above reasoning, one may say, in regard of the Kunbarlang data, that the presence
of the measure phrase construction validates not just the [+DegPP], but also the [+DSP], even in
the absence of independent evidence for the latter. That is, perhaps unit names happened to be the
only degree-related kind of expression that got lexicalized in Kunbarlang. This should be enough to
resolve the contradiction outlined above.
I wish to argue, however, that such a move is highly undesirable. The main reason is that in
this attempt to rescue the DSP-approach, one would render it unfalsifiable. As soon as negative
evidence does not count for the negative setting of parameters, there remain no grounds to classify
any language at all as degree-less, i.e. not even Motu, Washo or Warlpiri. As soon as lexicalization
is allowed to explain away any puzzling gap in the data, all predictive power of the parameters is
lost.
I venture that this also was the original intention of Beck et al., and adduce these two quotes to
support my claim: “Perhaps [all languages] start with a [ /  / ] setting and may then incorporate
scales into the grammar, moving to [+/   / ]. This is a change that Samoan, perhaps, has just
undergone” (op.cit.: 31). That is their conjecture about the directionality of language change.
And further we read: “[m]ore concretely, according to our analysis it should not be possible for a
language like Motu to develop degree questions, but not change in any other respect” (ibid.).
How can one remedy the situation instead? I shall argue now that one can preserve the
typological insight and at the same time accommodate the Kunbarlang data by using tools from the
measurement theory within a delineation framework.
3 Delineation approaches and measurement theory
The main alternative to the degree-based approaches is the family of delineation approaches. Here
the gradable adjectives are simple predicates (rather than relations between degrees and individuals),
whose extension is crucially context-sensitive. Delineation approaches have a number of appealing
features (see Klein 1980 for the original argument and more detail). One is that the meaning of
the comparative form of an adjective is a function of the meaning of the positive form. This is in
accordance with the compositionality principle and is plausible from the cross-linguistic point of
view, since the comparative form is usually morphosyntactically marked w.r.t. the positive form. This
is unlike the degree-based approaches, where the positive and the comparative forms are typically
derived independently from a common abstract representation (see e.g. an analysis of the abstract
positive morpheme in Kennedy & McNally 2005: 350; but to the best of my knowledge, there are
no known languages that have an overt POS morpheme). Another is that nonlinear adjectives, like
the English clever, do not give rise to a total ordering, which is required on a degree-based analysis,
but not under the delineation approaches.
I follow Klein’s (1980) proposal here in assuming that every gradable adjective is interpreted
with respect to a comparison class, i.e. a set of individuals. Thus, the truth of a sentence like Lake
Tanganyika is deep is contingent on the contextually supplied comparison class: it is true in the
comparison class c iff Tanganyika counts as deep in this class, as represented in (9).6
(9) [[deep(Tanganyika)]]c = 1 iff Tanganyika counts as deep in c
Thus, the truth of (9) depends not only on the physical depth of Lake Tanganyika, but on the context
c in which it is evaluated.7 However, a comparative sentence like Lake Baikal is deeper than Lake
Tanganyika is context-independent, and is true just in case there exists a comparison class in which
Baikal counts as deep, but Tanganyika does not. One straightforward comparison class that verifies
it is the class that contains only these two members, Baikal and Tanganyika. A welcome result is
that the truth of the comparative statement does not entail that (9) should be false in any random
context. Thus, vagueness and context sensitivity of gradable adjectives are preserved.
3.1 Measurement theory
Measurement theory is a framework for mathematical reasoning about measurement and comparison
originally developed by Krantz et al. (1971). It uses real numbers as a model of other ordering
structures (e.g. scales). The rationale behind this is that the properties of real numbers are well
studied and using them as a model could lead to a better understanding of scales in other, non-
numerical, domains. The abstract scales can vary in their expressive power, corresponding to
different types of natural phenomena. Crucially for our enterprise here, measurement theory can be
used in degree semantics (see, a.o., Klein 1991, Sassoon 2010, van Rooij 2011b). These are the
6. I shall use context as synonymous with comparison class in what follows.
7. Klein (1980), following Kamp (1975), formalizes the ‘counts as’ notion via the POSITIVE and NEGATIVE EXTENSION
of each given predicate ⇣ , and the EXTENSION GAP that lies in-between accounts for the borderline cases phenomenon
shown by vague predicates, i.e. the existence of objects to which it is not clear if the predicate applies (cf. Burnett
2017: 17).
important four types of scales (after Stevens 1946) in the order of increasing informativeness, such
that each next one implies the preceding one:
• nominal (classification, e.g. eye colour)
• ordinal (ordering, e.g. competition outcomes)
• interval (difference, e.g. temperature in F or C)
• ratio (proportions, e.g. length or age)
These types of scales can all be represented as ordering structures of the form hX,Ri, where
X is a set of individuals and R a relation on that set. The difference between the types of scales
lies in the different properties of R. Expositions of this framework in its linguistic applications (e.g.
Klein 1991, van Rooij 2011b) typically begin with the ordinal scales, since this is where explicit
comparison starts. In this case the relation, let’s call it RO, is a strict weak order, i.e. it is irreflexive
(IR), transitive (TR) and almost connected (AC).8
(IR) 8x : ¬R(x, x)
(TR) 8x, y, z : (R(x, y) ^R(y, z))! R(x, z)
(AC) 8x, y, z : R(x, y)! (R(x, z) _R(z, y))
We can use this class of structures, hX,ROi, to formulate the semantics for an (explicit)
comparative, e.g. the English suffix -er. Writing c for a context, i.e. c ✓ (De), and P for a gradable
adjective, which to each context c assigns its subset (i.e. the positive extension of that adjective):
(10) [[P]]c =  x.P (c)(x)
(11) [[ er]]c =  x P y9c0.P (c0)(y) ^ ¬P (c0)(x)
We notice two things here. First, the formulation of the conditions in (11) renders the comparative
adjective a (strict) weak ordering on the set of individuals exactly as defined above (i.e. a particular
kind of RO relation). We may alternatively say y  P x, intending  P to be the ordering that the
gradable adjective P imposes on its domain. Second, we have the desired result: the comparative
form of an adjective is a function of its positive form (10).
8. Note that IR and TR together imply asymmetry, i.e. the property that 8x, y : R(x, y) ! ¬R(y, x). PROOF: suppose
R is symmetric; then R(x, y) ^R(y, x). Then by (TR) it must follow that R(x, x); but that contradicts (IR). ⇤
4 Towards a measurement-theoretic typology
As the natural next step from the analysis of the comparative, I observe, together with van Rooij
(2011b), that ordinal scales are insufficient to accurately represent more informative ordering
structures, i.e. some more complex comparative constructions. In particular, we need to be able to
express addition for the differential comparatives, and multiplication—for the ratio comparatives
(such as Lake Edward is twice as deep as Lake Albert).9 Consequently, one has to make use of
other classes of ordering structures, which yield the other scales: algebraic difference structures for
the interval scales, and closed extensive structures for the ratio scales. For space considerations,
I do not give full definitions here, but refer the interested reader to van Rooij (2011b: 340–4). I
just note informally that the former ones utilize a quaternary, rather than a binary, relation; and the
latter ones involve a concatenation operation   on X in addition to the strict weak order relation (so,
hX,RO,  i).
I argue that the nominal scales, usually left out from the (Anglo-centric) linguistic discussion of
the comparision, are directly relevant for the analysis of implicit comparatives. Arguably, at least
some of the paratactic comparatives can be faithfully represented via nominal scales. I would like to
propose that nominal scales can be captured by the ordering structures of type hX,RNi, where RN
is an equivalence relation, i.e. one that is reflexive (RF), transitive (TR above) and symmetric (SM).
(RF) 8x : xRx
(SM) 8x, y : xRy ! yRx
Equivalence relations in a structure hX,RNi partition the set X into equivalence classes, i.e.
subsets such that within each such subset, RN holds between all its members, but never between
members of different subsets (Partee, ter Meulen & Wall 1990: §3.4).
A picture emerges along the following lines: languages differ with respect to which is the most
complex type of a scale that they can refer to in their degree-semantics constructions. For instance,
in Motu only nominal scales are available, and therefore we only find conjoined comparatives,
and no other constructions, there. In Yoru`ba´ or Samoan, on the other hand, the presence of DiffC
indicates that interval scales must be available. What does it mean for a language to only have
access to ordinal scales? One would expect to find morphological phrasal comparatives, but not any
of the [+DSP] constructions. It seems that Nez Perce is exactly such a language (Deal & Hohaus
2018). Presence of ratio comparatives, e.g. in English, would attest to ratio scales being available.
• conjoined comparatives: nominal
• morphological comparatives: ordinal
• differential comparatives (3in taller than): interval
• ratio comparatives (twice as tall as): ratio
9. Notice that ratio comparatives are not part of Beck et al.’s (2009) questionnaire.
Let us now return to the Kunbarlang measure phrases, which served as the impetus for this
investigation. Van Rooij (2011b: 340–1) suggests that ratio scales are required to represent measure
phrases, since they allow for multiplication. This is in line with Sassoon’s (2010) compositional
analysis of unit names. However, I propose that at least in some languages MPs can be analyzed as
equivalence classes. That is, some languages treat them as non-decomposable, basic units.10 If this
is on the right track and Kunbarlang MPs are such non-decomposable units, then nominal scales
would suffice. This is precisely the purpose that nominal scales serve and the type of information
they represent: classifying individuals into groups. Thus, I analyze the puzzling MPs in Kunbarlang
as lexicalized unit names. An example rendition follows in (12) for the phrase kaburrk djanga
man-kukkarlyung [two foot III-long] ‘two feet long’ (e.g., stick) from example (7a) above.
(12) [[kaburrk djanga mankukkarlyung]]c =  x.2ftkukkarlyung(x)
The representation in (12) suggests that semantically a measure phrase in Kunbarlang is simply
a characteristic function of the ‘2ft’ class, and not a ratio between the length degree of x and the
length degree of a unit-object (say, foot; cf. Sassoon 2010).
Piecing the foregoing discussion together, I now make a concrete proposal which shows how
the different types of scales can provide a framework for the cross-linguistic variation that we have
seen. Table 3 summarizes it concisely:
Table 3: Beginnings of a measurement-theoretic typology
Language Highest available scale Degree-based type
Motu, Washo nominal without unit names  DSP
Kunbarlang nominal with lexicalized unit names  
Nez Perce ordinal  
Samoan interval +DSP
English ratio +DegPP
The lightnings ( ) in the degree-based type column indicate that such a language does not have
a natural place in the Beck et al.-style typology. At least to the extent that it allows inclusion of Nez
Perce and Kunbarlang as subtypes of degree-less languages, the measurement-theoretic typology
offers the benefits of a finer gradation than the DSP-approach, as it stands, has to offer.
The final point I want to touch on is the absence of degree questions in Kunbarlang. Intuitively—
and indeed on Beck et al.’s analysis (ex. 15–16, pp. 7–8)—DegQ is a direct counterpart of the
MP, differing only in that a question word is used in place of the measure unit phrase. I suggest
that the reason why Kunbarlang has one but not the other is a genuine lexical gap. It is probable
that the construction was borrowed from English and subsequently generalized to include original
Kunbarlang numerals and measure units (7a, c). It is then not surprising that a question word is
lacking. Recall that there is only one way to form a ‘kind’-question, which may be interpreted as
referring to degree, manner, quality or quantity, depending on context (8). An alternative hypothesis
10. Cf. also Tiemann, Hohaus & Beck’s (2012) degree individuals, i.e. pronominal measure phrases such as this big
(accompanied by a gesture).
about the absence of DegQ in Kunbarlang would be that these questions and measure phrases are
in fact underlyingly dissimilar; for instance, perhaps DegQ necessarily involves quantifier raising,
while this can be avoided for MP. To determine whether this is a possibility, further analysis of the
Kunbarlang syntax-semantics interface is required.
5 Conclusions and further directions
In this paper I have laid out the groundwork for a measurement-theoretic typology of comparison
constructions, building on the ideas of Klein (1980) and their recent development, e.g. by van
Rooij (2011b). I have adduced data from the degree sematics domain in Kunbarlang, which prove
problematic for the current main typological framework, namely the degree-based one of Beck et al.
(2009). The measurement scales of increasing informativeness, I argue, may provide a basis for a
typology that is both more fine-grained and empirically more adequate. Essentially, the different
approaches make different predictions about which constructions would be more basic due to
the inherent mechanics of these formalisms. That is, in a degree-based framework, differential
comparatives require a less complex representation. In delineation frameworks, on the other hand,
equatives and DegQs are simpler to account for. I contend that we need to broaden our empirical
basis beyond the 15–20 languages examined to date, before further-reaching conclusions can be
made. That means that a formidable amount of work remains to be done before this proposal can be
fully evaluated.
Some of the pressing issues to be explored, as I see them, are these. I have claimed that the
different scales form a natural progression, according to the information they can encode, but I have
not elaborated on it in detail. In other words, a full formalization of the typology sketched here
still needs to be done. Next, I have not discussed, nor indeed analyzed, some of the constructions
that were crucial in Beck et al.’s (2009) questionnaire, in particular DegComp, SubC and the ones
pertaining to the [±DAP] parameter. That is, part of the challenge that the present proposal has
to meet, is to accurately capture the full range of the empirical findings in the previous work. It’s
relevant to note, however, that the empirical picture that we need to capture is not exactly that
presented above, e.g. in (4). For one, Tiemann, Hohaus & Beck (2012) argue that DegPP can be set
independently of DAP, and thus the implicational relations are somewhat more relaxed than in Beck
et al.’s original formulation.
Finally, I would like to point out that the matters of concern here are most probably more
intricate than a choice between a degree-based or measurement-based typology could decide. As
has been pointed out by Beck et al. (2009), the principles underlying individual constructions may
be more semantic or more syntactic (for instance, the [±DegPP] parameter is a syntactic parameter).
Exploring the syntax/semantics interface as manifest in the realm of comparison is one of the
overarching tasks in this research program.
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The semantics of perfect in Nafsan and implications for typology1
Ana Krajinovic´ — Humboldt-Universita¨t zu Berlin/University of Melbourne
Abstract. This paper offers an analysis of the semantics of the perfect in Nafsan (South Efate)
and argues for several implications for the typology of the perfect aspect. I show that all the
functions of the perfect in Nafsan can be derived from placing the Topic Time in the posttime of
the event in question, equal to Klein (1994) analysis of the English perfect. The main typological
implications discussed within this analysis are: a) perfect in a tenseless language can have present,
past, and future perfect readings, b) the interpretation of change of state can arise with perfects
through aspectual coercion of states, c) duality with negation can arise as a consequence of the
aspectual coercion process and not necessarily from the meaning of ‘already’. These three points
are taken to argue against the proposed typological category of “iamitive” that unites the meanings
of the resultative function of the perfect and ‘already’ (Olsson, 2013).
1 Introduction
This paper deals with the category of perfect aspect in Nafsan, also known as South Efate [erk]
(Southern Oceanic, Vanuatu), and the implications of its semantic analysis for typology.2
Perfect aspect has been extensively studied on English and other Indo-European languages,
and many semantic theories have been proposed with the aim of unifying the functions of this cat-
egory (among others, Comrie, 1976; McCoard, 1978; Klein, 1994; Iatridou et al., 2003; Portner,
2003). In typological studies, perfect has been treated as a valid cross-linguistic category (Dahl &
Velupillai, 2013), and recently also complemented with another typological category of iamitives
(Olsson, 2013). In this respect, the data from Oceanic languages is crucial for our understanding
of the typology of perfect aspect. First of all, the mention of the perfect is ubiquitous in Oceanic
grammars, which means that this category is strongly represented in this language family. Sec-
ondly, it has been noted by several Oceanic linguists that the perfects in Oceanic languages do
not behave as expected from our current theories of the perfect. This is the case in Toqabaqita
(Lichtenberk, 2008) and Neˆleˆmwa (Bril, 2016), where the perfect expresses a change of state, and
in the latter it can also co-occur with temporal adverbials (Bril, 2016:83). These unusual features
have led to two different ways of analyzing the perfect. In the typological approach, these differ-
ent functions of the perfect, common in Austronesian languages, were taken as symptomatic of a
1I would like to thank to Kilu von Prince, Manfred Krifka, and the rest of MelaTAMP project for feedback on
previous versions of this paper. I would also like to thank to Nick Thieberger for sharing the Nafsan data and his feed-
back on my work. Furthermore, I wish to thank the audience of TripleA 2018 for a fruitful discussion, and especially
so to Jozina Vander Klok, Vera Hohaus, and Andrew Koontz-Garboden. I am most grateful to all Nafsan speakers
that participated in this project, and to Lionel Emil and Gray Kaltap˜au for their help in elicitation and transcription.
This work has been funded by the German Research Foundation DFG (MelaTAMP project, 273640553) and the ARC
Centre of Excellence for the Dynamics of Language (Australia).
2All the examples in this paper follow the Leipzig Glossing Rules except DP – direct possession, NEG1 – first
marker of discontinuous negation, NEG2 – second marker of discontinuous negation, and PSP.REAL – prospective
realis, V – epenthetic vowel preceding suffixes of direct possession.
new typological category, called iamitive (Olsson, 2013; Dahl & Wa¨lchli, 2016).3 This category is
understood as uniting the function of the resultative perfect and the meanings of ‘already’. On the
other hand, in the formal semantics approach, it has been shown that the analysis of the perfect and
perfect-like functions can vary depending on the language. For instance, Koontz-Garboden (2007)
argues for a well-behaved perfect in Tongan, whose change-of-state meaning is derived through
aspectual coercion. A marker diachronically related to the Tongan perfect has been reanalyzed
as an inchoative marker in Samoan (Hohaus, 2017) and Niuean, where it additionally places the
event in the Perfect Time Span4 (Matthewson et al., 2015). In Javanese, Vander Klok & Matthew-
son (2015) show that the perfect-like marker wis should be semantically analyzed as equivalent to
the meaning of ‘already’.
Following these different perspectives on the perfect in Oceanic languages, the Nafsan perfect
lends itself as a good case study, particularly because it can co-occur with temporal adverbials in
certain contexts, and it can encode a change of state with stative verbs. In the semantic analysis
of the perfect in Nafsan presented in this paper, I show that all functions of the perfect, including
the “unexpected” ones, can be be derived from Klein (1994) definition of perfect as placing the
Topic Time (TT) in the posttime of the Situation Time (TSit).5 I analyze all the attested functions
of perfect in Nafsan and show how their meanings are derived. By analyzing the processes through
which certain “unexpected” meanings are derived, I argue for three main generalizations regarding
the nature of Oceanic perfects:
1. Present perfect is incompatible with temporal adverbials. If perfect can occur with temporal
adverbials in a tenseless language, this might be due to the reinterpretation of perfect as past
or future perfect. In this case, the temporal adverbial is interpreted as being in TSit instead
of TT.
2. In languages without any dedicated morphology for the expression of change of state, this
meaning can be achieved through aspectual coercion of states marked by perfect (cf. Koontz-
Garboden, 2005, 2007).
3. Duality in negation does not necessarily arise from the meaning of aspectual particles like
‘already’ (Lo¨bner, 1989). It can also arise as a consequence of aspectual coercion of states
into changes of state marked by perfect.
Finally, these three points are taken to show the importance of language-internal and system-
dependent factors that govern how a specific TMA category will be expressed. This speaks against
the category of iamitives, which neglects complex language-internal interactions between seman-
tics, pragmatics, and syntax. In contrast to iamitives, I argue that the perfect as a category that
places the TT in the posttime of the TSit is a good candidate for a typologically valid category,
3Some of the languages said to have a iamitive category are Indonesian, Mandarin Chinese, Mwotlap (Oceanic),
Toqabaqita (Oceanic), Thai, and Vietnamese (Olsson, 2013).
4(Matthewson et al., 2015) defines it in the following way: “This is an interval whose left boundary is provided by
some temporal adverbial, and whose right boundary is provided by tense, and within which an event is placed by the
perfect (Iatridou et al., 2001:158).”
5TT is the time the assertion is about and TSit is the time at which the event took place (see Klein, 1994).
whose cross-linguistic differences can be explained by different processes operating in individual
language systems, without the need to posit different lexical definitions of the perfect.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the methodology, Section 3 outlines
the main predicate structure in Nafsan, Sections 4 and 5 analyze different functions of the perfect,
Section 6 compares the functions of the perfect and ‘already’, and Section 7 is a conclusion.
2 Methodology
In this section I describe the methodology for deriving the analysis of the semantics of the perfect
and elicitation methods used to elicit specific structures in Nafsan.
In the grammar of Nafsan, Thieberger (2006:168) described the category of perfect aspect by
offering a few examples with a resultative function. In order to understand the full distribution of
the perfect and all of its available functions, I consulted the corpus of Nafsan (Thieberger, 1995–
2018) and collected further data in two field trips to Erakor village (see Figure 1) in 2017 and 2018.
During my 2017 field trip I elicited the perfect and future questionnaires designed by Dahl (2000)
with one speaker. I also elicited storyboards developed in the MelaTAMP project and Totem Field
Storyboards with several speakers,6 ranging from 2 to 9 speakers depending on the storyboard. The
elicitation process would start by me telling the story in Bislama and then letting the speaker retell
it in Nafsan. Depending on the speaker, there was a different level of independence in retelling the
story, as some speakers required to consult the text in Bislama referring to a storyboard picture.
However, there was no indication of translation effects with any of the speakers, which might
result from the fact that categories related to perfect in Bislama behave differently from the Nafsan
perfect. In 2017 I used two storyboards targeting change-of-state meanings (von Prince, 2018b;
TFS, 2012) I hypothesized that they could be expressed with the perfect, and others targeting
modal contexts. Regardless of the intentionally targeted contexts, all the storyboards as parallel
texts proved to be an important source for the data on perfect aspect. After developing an analysis
of the perfect based on the data collected in 2017, I designed storyboards targeting crucial functions
of perfect aspect (Krajinovic´ , 2018; Krajinovic´, 2018). In my second field trip in 2018 I elicited
these storyboards together with the Totem Field Storyboard “Miss Smith’s bad day” (Matthewson,
2014). Relevant examples from storyboards will be referenced and explained in the sections below.
All the examples with a reference starting by AK1 and including a time stamp come from my
fieldwork data archived in PARADISEC (Krajinovic´, 2017). Examples referenced by an identifier
number are taken from the corpus of Nafsan (Thieberger, 1995–2018).
3 The structure of Nafsan
Nafsan is an SVO language with a predicate structure often termed verbal complex in Oceanic
languages. The verbal complex usually consists of a marker with the person and number reference
of the subject and other tense, mood, aspect (TMA) or polarity markers, typically preceding the
verb. Subject proclitics are portmanteau morphemes that carry TMA values and they are also the
6Storyboards are picture-based stories which contain the intended semantic context and targeted meanings (see
also Burton & Matthewson, 2015). All the relevant storyboards are cited throughout the article.
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Figure 1: A map of the island of Efate showing the locations where Nafsan is spoken
only obligatory marking of the verb (Thieberger, 2006:149). They attach to any following word: a
TMA marker, an auxiliary verb, a benefactive phrase, or the verb (Thieberger, 2006). Each marker
occupies a specific morphosyntactic position and its position in the verbal complex is fixed relative
to the other elements. Table 1 shows the ordering of these elements in the Nafsan predicate. Each
category is exemplified with a given functional word in the second row.
Table 1: Exemplified verbal complex in Nafsan adapted from Thieberger (2006:243)
SBJ.AGR TMA NEG1 AUX BEN Verb COMPL NEG2
i= (3SG) pe (PRF) ta(p) to (PROG) ga (3SG) su mau
Table 2: Subject proclitics in Nafsan based on Thieberger (2006:150)
General Irrealis Perfect-agreeing
1SG a= ka= kai=
2SG ku= p˜a= kui=
3SG i= ke= ki=
1DU.INCL ta= tak= takai=, tai=
1DU.EXCL ra= rak= rakai=
2DU ra= rak= rakai=
3DU ra= rak= rakai=, rai=
1PL.INCL tu= tuk= tu=, tui=, tukoi=
1PL.EXCL u= ko= ui=, koi=
2PL u= ko= koi=
3PL ru= ruk= rui=, rukui=
Table 3: TMA markers in Nafsan
TMA marker Proclitic Function
pe perfect-agreeing, general perfect
fe irrealis immediate future
po general prospective realis
fo irrealis prospective irrealis
f general, irrealis conditional
fla general, irrealis potential
ta general, irrealis ‘still’
Thieberger (2006) divides the subject proclitics in three paradigms: realis, irrealis, and perfect.
In my work on Nafsan, I reanalyzed realis as a general subject marking unspecified for mood
(Krajinovic´, 2018), and the perfect paradigm as being perfect-agreeing, and not encoding perfect
aspect on its own. The perfect-agreeing proclitics can only encode perfect aspect in combination
with the perfect marker pe. The three subject proclitic paradigms are exemplified in Table 2.
TMA markers attach to the subject proclitics and depending on their meaning, they can com-
bine with only one or two paradigms presented in Table 2. These restrictions are listed in Table 3
for all the TMA markers of that slot.7 In this paper, I focus on the perfect marker pe which can
combine with either the general or perfect-agreeing proclitics without a difference in the meaning,
although the combination with perfect-agreeing proclitics is considerably more frequent.
4 Past, present, and future perfect meanings
In this section I analyze the functions of the perfect in Nafsan which are equivalent to the functions
of past, present, and future perfect in English. These functions are resultative, experiential, and
universal perfect, as well as the presence of adverbial restrictions and anteriority readings.
The resultative function of the perfect was tested with the storyboard “Making laplap” (Kra-
jinovic´, 2018). This story is about two friends who are preparing laplap, Vanuatu’s national dish.
One of the steps of the cooking process shown in the storyboard is the grating of the taro. One of
the friends finishes grating the taro and produces the sentence in (1). For this targeted sentence 6
out of 6 consulted speakers produced perfect aspect on the verb.
(1) Kineu
1SG
kai=pe
1SG.PRF=PRF
maa
grate
ntal
taro
su.
COMPL
I have grated the taro. (AK1-146-02, 00:02:32.335-00:02:41.410)
As we can see, the process leading up to the completion of grating the taro in the story ensures
that a resultative reading is unambiguously intended. Interestingly, when there is no indication of
a clear preceding cause of the event, the perfect marking is optional. We can confirm this with
an example from the storyboard “Miss Smith’s bad day” (Matthewson, 2014). In this storyboard,
7This is the TMA slot in Table 1. Auxiliary verbs in the slot AUX do not have restrictions on subject proclitics.
Miss Smith tries to teach her class but gets continuously interrupted by her students. At one point,
one student tells her that Bob has fallen asleep, as in (2). In this context, there is no clear cause
or a process leading up to Bob falling asleep. This means that the speaker can choose whether
they want to express that Bob falling asleep is a resultative state or not. This is confirmed in the
Nafsan data, where only 1 out of 5 speakers used the perfect in this context and others resorted to
the general marking on the verb.
(2) Bob
Bob
ki=pe
3SG.PRF=PRF
matur.
sleep
Bob has fallen asleep. (AK1-146-04, 00:03:25.753-00:03:30.766)
The second function discussed here is the experiential function of the perfect. In the storyboard
“Miss Smith’s bad day” this meaning is targeted by Miss Smith asking a question in (3) and a
student’s answer in (4). Perfect was used in both sentences by 5 out of 5 speakers. The analysis
that experiential meanings are a function of perfect is supported by the fact that speakers judge
sentences without perfect unacceptable with the experiential reading (cf. recording AK1-123-01).
(3) Fei
who
kin
COMP
ki=pe
3SG.PRF=PRF
pag-ki
climb-TR
ntaaf?
mountain
Who has ever climbed a mountain? (AK1-147-04, 00:00:48.786-00:00:50.800)
(4) Kineu
1SG
kai=pe
1SG.PRF=PRF
pag-ki
climb-TR
ntaf
mountain
i=skei
3SG=one
su.
COMPL
I have climbed a mountain. (AK1-147-04, 00:00:57.590-00:01:01.796)
Experiential readings are also possible with stative verbs. In (5) the state of being red8 receives an
experiential reading.
(5) Nasum˜
house
neu
1SG.POSS
ki=pe
3SG.PRF=PRF
pei
first
miel,
red
me
but
ki=pe
3SG.PRF=PRF
tap
NEG1
miel
red
malfanen
now
mau.
NEG2
My house has been red before, but it’s not red anymore. (Lionel Emil, 04/02/18, based on
Koontz-Garboden 2007:142)
Universal (‘since’) readings of perfect in Nafsan were targeted in the storyboard “Haircuts” (Kra-
jinovic´ , 2018). In this storyboard two friends who have not seen each other in a long time meet
and comment on their haircuts. After his friend points out how his hair has grown, the character
produces the sentence in (6). In this context, all the speakers that produced the targeted ‘since’
structure used the perfect.9
(6) nal-u-k
hair-V-1SG.DP
ga
that
ki=pe
3SG.PRF=PRF
pei
first
top
big
malpei
before
mai
come
malen
when
kin
COMP
a=to
1SG=PROG
lag
sing
em˜rom
inside
ni
of
band
band
i=skei
3SG=one
My hair has been long since I started singing in a band. (AK1-152-03, 00:03:00.705-
8In Nafsan all property concepts are verbs.
93 out of 5 speakers produced the targeted ‘since’ structure.
00:03:14.338, based on Koontz-Garboden 2007:142)
I turn to the expression of anteriority in Nafsan, which is equivalent to the meaning of past and
future perfect in English. In Nafsan, the same form of perfect can express anteriority in relation to
the TT in past and future contexts. One such future context is presented in (7).
(7) Context: [B is setting out on a journey. A intends to sell her own house while B is away. A
tells B:] (Dahl, 2000:TMAQ 84)
malraan
when
p˜a=ler
2SG.IRR=return
mai
come
ntau
year
nen
that
tu
next
me
and
kai=pe
1SG.PRF=PRF
sor
sell
nasum˜
house
neu
1SG.POSS
kia.
that
When you come back next year, I will have sold my house. (AK1-132-01)
The interesting property of anteriority readings is that, unlike other readings mentioned so
far, they allow a co-occurrence with temporal adverbials. This can be illustrated by the contrast
between (8) and (9).
(8) Context: A question asked at 9 o’clock a.m.: Why do you look so tired? Answer: I WAKE
UP at 4 o’clock this morning (TT). (Dahl, 2000:TMAQ 16)
*kai=pe/
*1SG.PRF=PRF
a=pilo
1SG=wake.up
4
4
oklok
o’clock
p˜ulp˜og.
morning
I woke up at 4 o’clock this morning. (AK1-119-01)
(9) Context: If your alarm is set for 5 a.m. (TT), but by chance you woke up at 4 a.m. (TSit).
Kai=pe
1SG.PRF=PRF
pilo
wake.up
4
4
oklok
o’clock
p˜ulp˜og.
morning
I had woken up at 4 o’clock in the morning. (AK1-119-01)
Example (8) evidences that specific temporal adverbial of 4 a.m., which sets the TT, is incompatible
with perfect. This is equal to the English present perfect. However, (9) shows that 4 a.m. can be
reinterpreted as being in TSit, if there is an indicated TT which is temporally posterior to it (5 a.m.
in this case).
This leads us to the semantic analysis of perfect aspect in Nafsan. I adopt the analysis proposed
by Klein (1994) for perfect in English, as outlined in (10) and visualized in (11).
(10) Perfect places TT in posttime of TSit (Klein, 1994).
(11) ——pretime——TSit——[TT=posttime]——
This analysis explains the resultative, experiential, universal, and anteriority readings where TT
is in the posttime of the event described by the verb. It can also explain the incompatibility with
temporal adverbials, as in (8). Since perfect places TT in the posttime of the event, the temporal
reference of when the event took place is incompatible with its own posttime. However, if the
context provides a salient TT posterior to the event, then perfect can co-occur with a temporal
adverbial situated in TSit. Perfect expresses being in the posttime of the TSit, and thus, the event
achieves a reading of anteriority in relation to TT.
As a tenseless language, Nafsan has shown that perfect can have either past, present or future
readings, which has important implications on adverbial restrictions with perfect. One of the main
tests for the perfect cross-linguistically is to see whether it can co-occur with temporal adverbials,
since that is not expected from the present perfect. However, in a tenseless language or a language
where the perfect cannot combine with tense, the perfect can easily be reinterpreted as either past
or future perfect and temporal adverbials as being in TSit.10 This property needs to be expected
from perfects in tenseless languages and included in the typology of the perfect.
5 Change-of-state meaning
In this section I analyze the meanings of change of state that arise with the perfect and I show how
they can be derived from the analysis presented in Section 4.
Olsson (2013) observed that in some languages resultative perfect behaves differently from the
English perfect when it comes to states. He illustrates this difference by comparing examples (12)
and (13), where (12) has the meaning of English perfect and (13) has the meaning of what he calls
“iamitives”.
(12) The fruit has been ripe.
(13) The fruit is/has become ripe.
Unlike the English perfect, iamitives necessarily express a change of state with stative verbs, in
which they resemble the meanings of the aspectual particle ‘already’. Essentially, the meaning of
change of state is only possible with states which have an initial boundary like ‘ripe’, but not with
properties like ‘raw’ (Olsson, 2013). This prediction is borne out in Nafsan, where perfect can be
used with the property of ‘ripe’ (14), but not ‘raw’ (15).
(14) (Imagine some fruit that is common in your area) You can eat this one. It BE RIPE.
(Olsson, 2013:47)
ku=tae
2SG=can
paam
eat
tene,
that
ki=pe
3SG.PRF=PRF
mam.
ripe
You can eat that, it’s ripe. (AK1-156-01)
(15) (Imagine some fruit that is common in your area) You cant eat this one. It BE RAW.
(Olsson, 2013:47)
ku=kano
2SG=cannot
paam
eat
tene,
this
(*ki=pe)
3SG.PRF=PRF
i=ta
3SG=still
met.
raw
You can’t eat this, it’s still raw. (AK1-156-01)
10Cleary-Kemp (2015) has observed this type of behavior with perfect in Koro, a tenseless Oceanic language of
Admiralty Islands.
In the storyboard “Haircuts”, the meaning of change of state of the hair color was also derived
by the perfect, as shown in (16). This shows that the perfect gives rise to a change of state inter-
pretation with states11 and contrasts with individual-level properties marked only with the general
marking, as in (17).
(16) Malfane
now
nal-u-k
hair-V-1SG.DP
ki=pe
3SG.PRF=PRF
taar.
white
My hair is blond now. (AK1-146-03, 00:03:31.991-00:03:33.853)
(17) ku=lek
2SG=look
faat
stone
ne
this
faat
stone
nen
that
i=top
3SG=big
You look at that stone. That stone is big. (015.033)
In contrast to the iamitive analysis (Olsson, 2013), I account for these properties of the perfect by
maintaining the analysis of placing the TT in the posttime of TSit and adopting the analysis of
aspectual coercion proposed by Koontz-Garboden (2007) for Tongan. In Nafsan, like in Tongan,
there is no derivational change-of-state morphology, which leads to the possibility of one same
verb having both stative and change-of-state interpretations. Although in an example like (17)
only a stative meaning is possible, in specific contexts where a stage-level property is described,
a stative verb can be coerced into the meaning of change of state. As we can see in (18), the
otherwise stative verb pi ‘be’ is interpreted with the change-of-state meaning of ‘become’.12 Since
pi is marked by the general subject marking, this effect is triggered by the meaning of pan go
‘until’ (literally ‘go and’).
(18) ra=po
3DU=PSP.REAL
lekor
watch
wes
3SG.OBL
pan
go
go
and
i=pi
3SG=be
teesa
child
p˜ur
big
They looked after him until he became a big boy. (074.009)
Example (18) shows that, depending on the context, stative verbs in Nafsan can be coerced into
changes of state. This is exactly what happens with functions of perfect that require a dynamic
interpretation – the change-of-state interpretations with perfect arise only with the resultative per-
fect in Nafsan. Experiential and universal functions of perfect are compatible with states without
triggering a change-of-state meaning, see examples (5) and (6).13 A definition of resultative perfect
is given in (19).
(19) Definition of the resultative perfect by Koontz-Garboden (2007:124): “A perfect in the
resultative reading denotes a state   which is true at an interval R iff there is an interval
E, the final moment in E is the initial moment in R, and   is false at the initial bound of E
and true at the interval R.”
When resultative perfect semantics combines with states, it gives rise to an inference that the state
11The meaning of change of state can also be derived with dynamic verbs marked with the progressive marker and
perfect.
12This is not the only strategy to express the meaning of ‘become’. A more frequent strategy in Nafsan would be to
say mai pi, literally ‘come be’.
13This also shows that an inchoative analysis as suggested by Matthewson et al. (2015) for Niuean would not explain
Nafsan data.
denoted by it was preceded by a change into it, which is in conflict with the stative semantics, and
this leads to coercion of states into changes of state (Koontz-Garboden, 2007). Thus, the change of
state is interpreted as TSit and TT is placed in the posttime of this change of state. This is illustrated
in (20). Regarding the definition in (19), TSit corresponds to E, TT to R, and the posttime to  .
(20) ¬P——[TSit=change-of-state][TT=P]——
Although the iamitive analysis attempts to capture the connection between resultative perfects
and the meaning of change of state by analyzing them as a new typological gram, it fails to show
the semantic connection between the change-of-state meaning and other functions of the perfect.
The case of Nafsan shows that the meaning of change of state is not unrelated to experiential and
universal perfects, and anteriority readings. Instead of positing a new typological category, we
should focus on the language-internal processes that lead to the perfect developing the change-of-
state meaning. The question here is why aspectual coercion of states happens with the perfect in
Nafsan. Following Koontz-Garboden’s (2007) observations, there are two typological features of
Oceanic languages that might make them susceptible to developing this meaning. Firstly, Oceanic
languages do not encode the meanings of change of state derivationally and thus need to employ
other processes triggered in specific contexts, such as aspectual coercion, to disambiguate the
change of state readings from states. Secondly, they do not distinguish verbs from adjectives in the
predicate position. This means that property concepts behave like verbs and in a resultative perfect
reading require a dynamic interpretation of change of state.
6 ‘Already’: earliness implication and duality
It has been shown that the meaning of change of state, as described in Section 5, is related to the
meaning of ‘already’ (Vander Klok & Matthewson, 2015). Olsson (2013) considers the meaning
of ‘already’ to be an integral part of the iamitive semantics. Coming back to the example of ‘fruit
being ripe’ (Section 5), we can see that the change-of-state meaning in Nafsan is semantically
closer to a sentence like (21) in English than it is to the version with English perfect in (12).
(21) The fruit is already ripe.
This section addresses the relationship of the Nafsan perfect meanings with the meaning of ‘al-
ready’. There are two defining semantic properties of ‘already’ I explore here. These are the
earliness implication and effects of duality with negation. ‘Already’ has an implication that the
event took place earlier than expected (Krifka, 2000). Olsson (2013) also takes “expectedness”
that an event was going to take place as a defining characteristic of iamitives. However, in Naf-
san the perfect does not have the earliness implication or expectedness as a part of its semantics.
Example (22) comes from the storyboard “Fat pig” (von Prince, 2018a), where the main character
gets a pig he needs for his big traditional ceremony. He fenced the pig off, but the next day, to his
surprise, the pig was not there. As we can see, perfect is used here to indicate the anteriority of the
event of ‘pig escaping’ and the interpretation that the event was expected would not be possible.
PERFECT NEG
‘not anymore’
SBJ=still
SBJ=still NEG
PERFECT
with unbounded
predicates
already (English)
not yet (English)
not anymore (English)
still (English)
outer negation
inner
negation
Figure 2: Duality schema with Nafsan perfect (in black font), based on Lo¨bner (1989) and Krifka
(2000)
(22) Me
but
malnran
when
kin
COMP
i=pan
3SG=go
“check”,
check
i=pan
3SG=go
lak
see
tp˜er
fence
ni
of
waak
pig
me
but
i=laka
3SG=see
na
COMP
waak
pig
ki=pe
3SG.PRF=PRF
p˜rai
break
tp˜er,
fence
ki=pe
3SG.PRF=PRF
sef.
escape
But when he went to check, he went to see the fence with the pig and he saw that the pig
had broken the fence, it had escaped. (AK1-022-01, 00:03:24.726 - 00:03:37.121)
The earliness implication does not arise in Nafsan even in the case of resultative readings. Example
(23) shows a context from the iamitive questionnaire (Olsson, 2013:48) where an unexpected event
is targeted. In Nafsan, perfect can be felicitously used in this case, which shows it does not behave
like ‘already’ in this respect.
(23) How strange, my uncle COME. (He wasnt invited/I thought he wouldn’t come.) (Olsson,
2013:48)
Kau,
Oh
ga
3SG
ki=pe
3SG.PRF=PRF
mai!
come
Oh, he came! (AK1-156-04)
The second property of ‘already’ considered here is duality, which has to do with the interaction
of ‘already’, ‘still’, ‘not yet’, and ‘not anymore’ in negation. Lo¨bner (1989) noticed that the outer
negation of ‘already’ is ‘not yet’, which is truth-conditionally equivalent to the internal negation of
‘still’. Also, the outer negation of ‘still’ is ‘not anymore’, which is truth-conditionally equivalent
to the inner negation of ‘already’ (Lo¨bner, 1989) . The set of these relationships is illustrated in
Figure 2, including both Nafsan and English strategies for expressing these meanings.
As we can see in Figure 2, perfect enters the duality schema entirely only with unbounded
predicates, with which the negated perfect obligatorily gives rise to the meaning of ‘not anymore’,
as in (24).
(24) totur
during
ntau
year
i=nru
3SG=two
nal-u-k
hair-V-1SG.DP
ga
3SG
i=miel
3SG=red
me
but
malfane
now
nal-u-k
hair-V-1SG.DP
ki=pe
3SG.PRF=PRF
ta
NEG1
miel
red
mau.
NEG2
During these two years my hair was red, but it’s not red anymore. (AK1-154-03, 00:03:36.645-
00:03:52.483)
In the case of perfect-marked bounded predicates, the meaning of ‘not anymore’ does not arise
with negation and we can see this in (25), where the intended meaning is a simple negation of the
described event.
(25) Malen
when
p˜a=ler
2SG.IRR=back
kai=pe
1SG.PRF=PRF
ta
NEG1
mtir
write
natus
letter
mau.
NEG2
When you come back I will not have written the letter. (by Lionel Emil, 19/06/2018)
However, even with bounded predicates the meaning of ‘not yet’ cannot be expressed with negated
perfect. As we can see in (26), the perfect can only be chosen for positive resultative readings, but
not for the negative ones expressing ‘not yet’. Instead, the negation of ta ‘still’ and general subject
marking is the only possible structure. The reason for this comes from the fact that the only way to
express ‘not yet’ is to negate ta ‘still’. Since ta ‘still’ is a TMA marker which occupies the same
slot as the perfect pe (see Table 1), they are morphosyntactically incompatible. In fact, none of the
TMA markers of that slot can combine with each other. Thus, the reason perfect is incompatible
with ‘still’ and ‘still not’(=‘not yet’) is only morphosyntactic, rather than semantic.
(26) Ale
then
ki=pe
3SG.PRF=PRF
ptu-ki
give-TR
nuan
fruit
me
but
tomat
tomato
i=ta
3SG=still
tap
NEG1
ptu-ki
give-TR
nuan
fruit
mau.
NEG2
It [pumpkin] gave fruit, but tomato hasn’t given fruit yet. (AK1-038-01, 00:01:28.459-
00:01:39.486)
In contrast, the ‘not anymore’ meaning with unbounded predicates deserves a semantic explana-
tion. As shown in Section 5, these predicates are aspectually coerced into changes of state. Thus,
if P is the posttime of the change of state, we need to assume that prior to the change of state ¬P
was the case, see (27). If we negate P, then, given that it resulted from a change of state, we must
assume that prior to that P was the case (28), and this is the meaning of ‘not anymore’.
(27) Positive perfect: ¬P——[change-of-state][TT=P]——
(28) Negation of perfect: P——[change-of-state][TT=¬P]——
In conclusion, the meaning of ‘not anymore’ is simply a result of the aspectual coercion process
that affects all unbounded predicates marked with perfect. Equally, the marker ta ‘still’ is mor-
phosyntactically incompatible with the perfect pe because they occupy the same morphosyntactic
slot. Thus, the effects of duality we see in Nafsan result from different language-internal processes
and, in contrast to ‘already’ in English, these effects are not related to the semantic definition of
the perfect.
7 Conclusion
In this paper I analyzed different readings of the perfect in Nafsan, which can all be derived from
its definition of placing the TT in the posttime of TSit. These perfect readings were analyzed in
comparison to the functions of English perfect, ‘already’ and the proposed iamitive gram. The
semantic space of these three categories, together with the outlined functions of perfect in Nafsan,
is illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Outlined functions of perfect in Nafsan
The analysis of past, present, and future perfect functions in Section 4 showed that Nafsan
does not have adverbial restrictions with perfect in the same sense as the English perfect. Since
Nafsan is a tenseless language, the perfect can easily be interpreted with any temporal reference.
Thus, although temporal adverbials are incompatible with present perfect readings, in the presence
of a temporal adverbial with perfect in Nafsan, it is possible to reinterpret it as past or future
perfect. In this case, the temporal adverb is interpreted as being in TSit and another contextually
available reference point, posterior to TSit, is the TT where the posttime of the event is situated.
This observation has important consequences on the expected behavior of the perfect in tenseless
languages. Crucially, co-occurrence with temporal adverbials is not necessarily a sign that we are
not dealing with the category of perfect. These co-occurrences might be specific to the meanings
of past and future perfect.
The analysis of the meaning of change of state in Section 5 showed that states marked by
perfect in Nafsan are aspectually coerced into changes of states. When the resultative perfect
combines with states in Oceanic languages, its semantics requires there to be a dynamic event
leading to the result state, which causes the aspectual coercion of states into changes of state.
Cross-linguistically, there might be several factors that make Nafsan and other Oceanic languages
likely to have a change of state interpretation with perfect-marked states. Koontz-Garboden (2005)
found that only in languages where states are lexicalized as verbs and not adjectives, as is the case
in Oceanic languages, these verbs can be used with both stative and change-of-state meanings.
Thus, since the meanings of change of state are not marked derivationally and stative verbs can be
coerced into changes of state in certain contexts, perfect aspect is just another context where the
aspectual coercion is possible.
Section 6 argued that duality effects with the Nafsan perfect are caused differently from ‘al-
ready’ in English. Firstly, perfect pe cannot combine with ta ‘still’ because they occupy the same
syntactic position, which explains the lack of ‘still not/not yet’ and ‘still’ meanings with perfect.
The second duality effect has to do with the meanings of ‘not anymore’ which arises only when
the posttime of a change of state is negated. This duality effect is a consequence of the aspectual
coercion into a change-of-state meaning which implies that the negated posttime did hold prior to
the change of state.
The three main arguments made in Sections 4, 5, and 6 evidence that specific “unexpected”
meanings of the perfect can be derived successfully without positing the iamitive category. Iami-
tives are semantically broadly defined by the change of state meaning that differentiates it from
“ordinary” perfects (Olsson, 2013). The change of state meanings are taken to derive from the
meaning of ‘already’ and other iamitive functions stem either from the resultative perfect or ‘al-
ready’. This means that other perfect functions such as experiential or anteriority readings are
excluded from its definition as a typological gram. In the case of Nafsan we have seen that neither
the change of state meaning nor duality with perfect are semantically related to ‘already’. Sepa-
rate language-internal processes, such as aspectual coercion, and possibly lack of change-of-state
morphology lead to such interpretations of perfect-marked verbs. This speaks against the iamitive
idea that these change-of-state interpretations are a piece of evidence for a combination of perfect
and ‘already’ meanings. Although some of the meanings analyzed in this paper might superficially
resemble ‘already’, they are in fact instantiations of perfect aspect with the same lexical definition
as in English (Klein, 1994). This puts us in a position to conclude that the perfect as a category
that places the TT in the posttime of TSit is a good candidate for a typologically valid category.
This case study showed us that the differences attested between perfects across languages can of-
ten be explained by specific processes operating in their systems and are not necessarily related to
different lexical definitions of perfect.
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The Perfect in Mee: New Evidence for a Result State Approach1
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Abstract. In this paper, we present new evidence for a result state analysis of the perfect. In
Mee (Trans-New-Guinea, Indonesia) the perfect combines a resultative and a universal reading,
excluding the experiential one. This contrasts with graded past markers in the language. We argue
that only an analysis that makes direct reference to the result state can correctly derive the data.
1 Introduction
Mee, also known as Ekari or Ekagi, is a Trans-New-Guinea language spoken in the West Central
Highlands of the Papua province in Indonesia. The latest official count in 1985 put the number
of speakers at 100.000 (Simons and Fenning 2018; Pawley and Hammarstro¨m 2017). Speakers
are usually at least bilingual, speaking Mee and Indonesian and potentially another local language.
The data presented here belong to the Lake Paniai dialect.
All Mee data in this paper are the result of primary urban fieldwork, conducted by the three
authors. The data were elicited with a native multilingual speaker in Leipzig, Germany from
October 2016 to August 2018 and checked with a second native speaker. Our contact language
was German. In elicitations, we mostly used translation tasks, and asked for acceptability and
grammaticality judgments. We also used the storyboardMiss Smith’s Bad Day (Matthewson 2014).
Verbal predicates in Mee contain an obligatory tense/aspect morpheme that is suffixed to the
stem. This affix is followed by an obligatory subject agreement vowel. The verbal morphology
template is illustrated in (1), (2) gives a concrete example2.
(1) Verbal morphology
(object agreement) – verbal root – TAM – subject agreement – (Mood)
(2) Okai
3SG
ki
DET.M
okai
3SG
e-doo-p-i-gaa.
3SG.OBJ-see-PRF-3SG.M-HYP
“He might have seen him.”
Mee has a number of morphemes that convey that the event expressed by the verb is situated
anterior to a reference time (RT) or the utterance time (UT). As will be discussed below, Mee ex-
hibits a graded past tense system. The relevant morphemes are: -eteg (REM.PST), -emeg (EXP.PST),
1We would like to thank our consultants Antonius Zaverius ’Verry’ Agapa and Agustinus ’Gusti’ Giyai for sharing
their language with us, and Martina Martinovic´ and Ryan Bochnak, the audiences at TripleA5 and the ‘Syntax and its
interfaces’ colloquium at Universita¨t Leipzig, as well as three anonymous reviewers for valuable comments.
2Abbreviations: ABS–absolutive, C–complementizer, CAUS–causative, DEM–demonstrative, DET–determiner,
EXP.PST–experiential past, F–feminine, HAB–habitual, HYP–hypothetical, INDEF–indefinite, INTENS–intensifier,
INTRANS–intransitivizer, LOC–locative, M–masculine, NEG-negation, OBJ–object agreement, PL–plural, POSS–
possessive, PRF–perfect, REC.PST–recent past, REM.PST–remote past, SG–singular
-eg (REC.PST), and -p (PRF). Present tense is zero-marked.
In the following, we aim to (i) give an overview of the past tense system in the language,
(ii) describe the properties of the perfect marked by -p and compare them to those of the English
Present Perfect, and (iii), propose an analysis of this kind of resultative perfect. The rest of this
paper is structures as follows: section 2 characterizes the anteriority markers and shows their
distribution. Section 3 discusses the possible readings of the perfect in Mee, its interaction with
verbal aspectual classes, the possibility of temporal adverbials, and pragmatic effects. We offer
our analysis in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The anteriority markers
Languages vary in how they encode temporal relations: some languages show a binary or ternary
distinction, whereas so called tenseless languages such as Paraguayan Guarani lack tense morphol-
ogy altogether and express temporal distinctions through adverbs and context (Tonhauser, 2011;
Comrie, 1985; Bittner, 2005; Lin, 2006). Most Indoeuropean languages utilize a binary or ternary
system, like the past/non-past distinction in German or the three-way distinction between past,
present and future in English (Bohnemeyer, 2002; Matthewson, 2006). Other languages make
more fine-grained distinctions. In these so called graded tense languages, the degree of tempo-
ral distance is encoded in addition to anteriority/posteriority, e.g. in Gı˜ku˜yu˜ (Cable, 2013). The
tense morphology serves to track the distance between the event described and the time of speech,
providing explicit information about how far into the past or future a reported event occurs.
2.1 Graded past tense in Mee
Mee exhibits a graded past tense, distinguishing two degrees of temporal remoteness. There are
three past tense morphemes, -eg, -eteg and -emeg. In general, -eg is used for more recent events
and -eteg for more distant ones, cf. (3).
(3) Geto
yesterday
ko,
C
Robert
Robert
ki
DET.M
pasar
market
uwe-eg-i/
go-REC.PST-3SG.M/
#uwe-eteg-i.
go-REM.PST-3SG.M
“Robert went to the market yesterday.”
(4) Context: Robert went to the market three days ago / last week / last month.
Robert
Robert
ki
DET.M
pasar
market
uwe-eteg-i/
go-REM.PST-3SG.M/
#uwe-eg-i.
go-REC.PST-3SG.M
“Robert went to the market.”
The use of -eg is usually confined to events that occurred during the day of the utterance time or one
day before. With events that are more distant, -eteg is used. Even though this generalization holds
in most contexts, the temporal threshold for the use of -eg and -eteg is not always clear-cut, but
can vary across contexts. This vagueness and context-sensitivity sometimes leads to occurrences
of these morphemes in contexts where they are not expected.
The remote past marker -eteg alternates with -emeg, a remote past marker with an existential
reading, signaling that the event has been experienced only once in the indefinite past (Katz, 2003;
Chen et al., 2017; Bowler, 2018). In general past contexts, -emeg is used; -eteg is infelicitous.
(5) You are discussing food preferences with your friends. Your friend Maria is notoriously
picky. You ask your mutual friend Petrus: Has Maria ever eaten sushi?
a. #Maria
Maria
kou
DET.F
sushi
sushi
no-oteega
eat-PST
me
or
beu?
NEG
‘Has Maria ever eaten Sushi?’
b. Maria
Maria
kou
DET.F
sushi
sushi
no-omeega
eat-PST.EX
me
or
beu?
NEG
‘Has Maria ever eaten Sushi?’
Further evidence comes from the fact that -emeg exhibits scopal interactions with negation, unlike
-eteg. Under negation, -emeg yields a ’never’ reading, where negtion scopes over the existential
past. Negation of -eteg, in contrast, negates the occurence of an event at a specific point in time, as
illustrated in (6).
(6) You are discussing food preferences with your friends. Your friend Maria is notoriously
picky. Your your mutual friend Petrus asks you: Has Maria ever eaten sushi?. You answer
the question with ”No, Maria has never eaten sushi.”.
a. Beu,
no
Maria
Maria
kou
DET.F
sushi
sushi
te-no-omega.
NEG-eat-PST.EX.3SG.F
‘No, Maria has never eaten sushi.’
b. #Beu,
no
Maria
Maria
kou
DET.F
sushi
sushi
te-no-otega
NEG-eat-PST.3SG.F
‘No, Maria has never eaten sushi.’
The above data indicate that the past tense reading of -emeg is existential rather than referential,
since -emeg is used to refer to general past contexts, as opposed to -eteg, which is used to refer to
to specific events in the past.
2.2 -p is not a past tense
In addition to the three anteriority markers discussed above, Mee exhibits a third morpheme -p that
can be used to describe past events. The -p morpheme has previously been described as a recent
past marker in Doble (1987). However, as (7) shows, -p can be used to refer to an event that it
anterior to a future time. It is thus not restricted to past contexts.
(7) Context: You talk about what you want to do when you are an old man.
a. Ani
1SG
adama
old
ki-p-a
become-PRF-1SG
ko,
C
ani
1SG
uno
sleep
umina
much
ta-it-a.
do-FUT-1SG
“When I will have gotten old, I will sleep a lot.”
b. *Ani
1SG
adama
old
ke-eg-a
become-REC.PST-1SG
ko,
C
ani
1SG
uno
sleep
umina
much
ta-it-a.
do-FUT-1SG
Additionally, a past tense would be predicted to be able to combine with progressive aspect to yield
a past progressive reading. However, -p cannot combine with the progressive morpheme -ete, (8).
(8) Context: What were you doing when I called you yesterday?
a. *Ani-ki
1SG-M
kou
DET.F
gaa
moment
kou
DET.F
buku
book
ebate-ete-p-a.
read-PROG-PRF-1SG
“(Yesterday when you called) I was reading a book.”
b. Ani-ki
1SG-M
kou
DET.F
gaa
moment
kou
DET.F
buku
book
ebate-ete-(e)g-a.
read-PROG-REC.PST-1SG
“(Yesterday when you called) I was reading a book.”
This might, however, be attriuted to the fact that most tense and aspect morphemes in Mee are
not compatible with one another in general. For example, the habitual -ig and the progressive -ete
are ungrammatical in combination with the remote past morpheme -eteg, as in (9).
(9) a. *Ani-ki
1SG-M
pasar
market
uw-ig-eteg-a.
go-HAB-REM.PST-1SG
”I went to the market.”
b. *Ani-ki
1SG-M
noota
sweet potatoe
kou
hide-PROG-REM.PST-1SG
bone-ete-eteg-a.
”I was hiding the sweet potatoe.”
We are unsure how to account for the impossibility of combining TMA-suffixes and leave this
topic to further research.
3 The Perfect
The perfect is a heterogeneous category. Many semantic studies have focused on the English
Present Perfect (a.o. Klein (1994); Mittwoch (1995); Portner (2003)). Cross-linguistic studies like
Bybee et al. (1994); Dahl and Velupillai (2011); Bertrand et al. (2017) reveal its diverse properties.
We focus on the following properties of the perfect, drawing on Bertrand et al. (2017); McCaw-
ley (1971); Comrie (1976); McCoard (1978): (i) the perfect may have an experiential reading and
show certain pragmatics effects, so called lifetime effects; (ii) it may have a universal or continuous
reading; (iii) it may have a resultative reading, and the result state may or may not be canceled; (iv)
it may show a recent past interpretation; (v) there may be restrictions on its compatibility with time
adverbials; and (vi) it may show interaction with different lexical aspectual classes (Aktionsarten).
Bertrand et al. (2017) examine these properties in a sample of 14 languages, and propose that
there are three types of perfects: First, the experiential perfect allows the experiential reading, does
not show lifetime effects, and is compatible with time adverbials. It disallows all other readings and
does not show interaction with Aktionsarten. Second, the resultative perfect allows the resultative
reading while an experiential interpretation is impossible. Languages that employ this strategy
do not behave completely homogeneously and show substantial variation with respect to the other
properties. Lastly, there is a hybrid strategy, in which both the experiential and the resultative
reading are allowed, and languages vary on their behavior with respect to the other characteristics.
We will argue in the following that Mee shows a resultative strategy with its -p morpheme. By
examining the concrete characteristics of the perfect in this underdescribed language, we aim to
enrich the typology of the perfect. This contributes to an uncovering of commonalities between the
members of the resultative perfect group and ultimately to a better understanding of this strategy.
In the rest of this section, we describe the readings and other properties of the perfect mentioned
above with English examples and compare these to the Mee data.
3.1 Experiential reading
The experiential interpretation of a perfect sentence like (10) conveys the meaning that there is a
time period prior to RT in which it is true at least once that the event occurred (based on Mittwoch
2008). The event is not necessarily ongoing at RT.
(10) Verry has been to Paniai (and he is still there).
It is possible to follow the expression in (10) with the clause in parentheses without redundancy,
because it is not part of the meaning that the time period in which the event occurred overlaps with
RT.
This reading is not available with -p. In (11) and (12), where the context encourages an expe-
riential reading, only the remote or experiential past forms are felicitous.
(11) Context: The teacher asks the children ‘Have you ever been to the forest?’ Child answers:
Ani
1SG
aiko
there
buguwa
forest
uwe-emeg-a/
go-EXP.PST-1SG
*uwi-p-a.
go-PRF-1SG
“I have been to the forest.” from storyboard (Matthewson, 2014)
(12) (Tika
earlier
miyoka
last
tawani
year
wii
four
ko)
C
ani
1SG
ki
DET.M
ani
1SG.POSS
weneekane-ido-ma
little.sibling-PL-with
Ugida
Ugida
dimi-ipa
summit-LOC
uwe-eteg-e/
go-REM.PST-1PL
*uwi-p-e.
go-PRF-1PL
“Four years ago, me and my siblings went up mount Ugida.”
3.2 Universal reading
The experiential reading contrasts with the universal one, sometimes also called continuous read-
ing. Under the universal interpretation, an event or a state induced by an event at some point prior
to RT holds from that point until RT (Bertrand et al., 2017). In this case, the sentence in parentheses
in (13) is infelicitous, since its is redundant.
(13) Verry has been living in Paniai (#and he is still there).
Mee -p yields this reading, see (14) and (15). In both examples it is clear that the state still holds at
the utterance time – in both sentences from the explicit adverbial and in (14) additionally from the
explicit mention in the context. Note that the predicates in both examples denote states. We will
come back to this observation in section 3.4.1.
(14) Context: You moved to Paniai in 2002 and you still live there.
Ani
1SG
ki
DET.M
(tawani
year
2002
2002
make
since
ko)
C
Paniai
Paniai
umi-p-a/
live-PRF-1SG
#ume-eg-a.
live-REC.PST-1SG
“I have lived in Paniai since 2002.”
(15) Ani
1SG
ki
DET.M
(tawani
year
2002
2002
make)
since
didi
ill
to-p-a.
stay-PRF-1SG
“I have been sick since 2002.”
3.3 Resultative reading
Resultative reading refers to the use of the perfect where the result state of an action still holds at
the reference time. Therefore, a continuation with cancellation of the result state is not felicitous,
as seen in example (16). In English, this contrasts with the past tense, which can be used with such
a cancellation. In the past tense the result state is thus not required to hold at the reference time.
(16) a. Sally has bought a new dress #but she gave it away. (Tallman and Stout, 2016)
b. Sally bought a new dress, but she gave it away.
In Mee, the resultative reading is obligatory for the perfect -p. -p is infelicitous when the result
state ceases to hold, compare (17) and (18). In (17), the result state (=glasses being lost) still holds
at the reference time. The perfect -p is felicitous here, as well as the remote past -eteg. In (18)
on the other hand, only the remote past -eteg is felicitous. The perfect -p is not accepted by the
speaker. The reason is a difference in the context. In (18) the result state already ceased to hold,
i.e. the lost glosses have been found again. This cancellation thus blocks the use of the perfect.
(17) Context: I lost my glasses 2-3 weeks ago. They’re still gone.
Ana
1SG.POSS
dou-peka
see-eye
kou
DET.F
iga-p-a/
lose-PRF-1SG/
iga-ateg-a.
lose-REM.PST-1SG
“I lost my glasses.”
(18) Context: I lost my glasses 2-3 weeks ago. I found them again some time later.
Ana
1SG.POSS
dou-peka
see-eye
kou
DET.F
#iga-p-a/
lose-PRF-1SG/
iga-ateg-a.
lose-REM.PST-1SG
“I lost my glasses.”
3.4 Further Properties
3.4.1 Interaction of the perfect with lexical aspectual classes
In languages like German or English, the perfect receives an anteriority interpretation in all lexical
aspectual classes or Aktionsarten. However, not all languages display this behavior. Recent studies
like Matthewson et al. (2015) and Tallman and Stout (2016) show that the perfect in Niuean and
Chacobo can receive readings other than anteriority, depending on the lexical aspectual classes of
the verb. In Niuean, stative predicates can receive an inchoative or present interpretation with the
perfect, see (19) for stage level and (20) for individual level statives.
(19) Kua ita (tei) a Malia.
PRF angry recent ABS Mary
“Mary is angry/ Mary has become angry.” (Matthewson et al. 2015:18)
Only accomplishment and achievement verbs have the anteriority reading with the perfect in
Niuean. The perfect of activities can get either an in-progress or an inchoative reading (Matthew-
son, 2016). Mee shows a high degree of interaction between the perfect and lexical aspectual
classes. Stative predicates receive a present/ action-in-progress reading. This is true for both,
individual level and stage level statives, see (20).
(20) a. Okai
3SG
ko
DET.F
modo-ma
belly-with
to-p-a.
be.in.state-PRF-3SG.F
“She is pregnant.”
b. Okai
3SG
ki
DET.M
emoge
angry
to-p-i.
be.in.state-PRF-3SG.M
“He is angry.”
Statives can also have a change-of-state reading, as in (21). This is not the same as the inchoa-
tive reading reported for Niuean stative verbs. An inchoative interpretation indicates that the state
described by the verb has just (recently) begun and lasts (at least) until the time of uttering. The
change of state in (21), however, signifies that the state in question is about to cease.
(21) a. John
John
ki
DET.M
owa-apa
house-LOC
to-p-i.
be.in.state-PRF-3SG.M
“John is at home, but he might leave soon.”
b. Kou
DET.F
damo
door
ko
DET.F
digimita
dark
to-p-a.
be.in.state-PRF-3SG.F
“The door is black now, but that is about to change.”
Activities marked with the perfect -p receive an anteriority/recent past interpretation, see (22).
Note that a state like ‘be angry’ can be turned into an activity with the verb tai ‘do’.
(22) a. John
John
ki
DET.M
emoge
angry
umina
very
ti-p-i.
do-PRF-3SG.M
“John was very angry (a short time ago).”
b. Mee
person
naka
INDEF
totaa
story
mana
voice
wega-p-i.
tell-PRF-3SG.M
“Somebody told a story.”
c. Okai
3SG
ki
DET.M
kou-ko
DEM-DET.F
rantang
container
duba
in
tumi-yawi-p-i.
flow-CAUS-PRF-3SG.M
“He poured it into the container.”
Accomplishment and achievement predicates also exclusively receive an interpretation of anteri-
ority, cf. (23). They are incompatible with a reading in which the action is still in progress. More
specifically, they can only receive a resultative reading with the perfect.
(23) a. Petrus
Petrus
ki
DET.M
iya
new
tivi
TV
nako
INDEF
edamaki-p-i.
buy-PRF-3SG.M
“Petrus has bought a new TV.”
b. Okai
3SG
ki
DET.M
damu-do
door-PL
idikima
all
muni-yawii-p-i.
close-INTENS-PRF-3SGM
“He closed all the doors.”
Accomplishment and achievement verbs differ in the possibility of canceling the result state in-
terpretation. In achievement predicates, the result state caused by the event has to hold at RT
obligatorily, recall (18). For accomplishment verbs, however, the interpretation of event culmina-
tion can be revoked, cf.(24).
(24) a. Miyoka
last
tawani
year
ko,
C
inii
1PL
ke
DET.F.PL
inii-ya
1PL-POSS
owaa
house
migi-p-e...
build-PRF-1PL
“Last year we have built a house...”
b. ... kodoya
but
ito
now
too
until
ko
C
migi-doke-tai
build-INTRANS-do
beu.
NEG
“... but until now, it is not finished building.”
SC: Without the clause in (b), it is understood that the house is finished.
It seems that Mee shows the familiar divide between the interpretation of stative predicates and
all other lexical aspectual classes: states marked with the perfect are interpreted as ongoing, while
perfect-marked activities, achievements and accomplishments have an anteriority interpretation.
Mee differs from languages like Niuean and Javanese in lacking the inchoative reading for states.
Instead, it exhibits a change-of-state meaning. Future research should determine the exact condi-
tions under which this reading can surface.
3.5 Occurrence with time adverbials
Specific time adverbials are infelicitous in combination with the English Present Perfect. This
phenomenon is known as Klein’s (1992) Present Perfect Puzzle, see (25). Giorgi and Pianesi
(1997) and Chung (2012) already note that not all languages show this restriction.
(25) #Ilya has gone to Omsk yesterday/ last week/ two years a go.
The data in (26) demonstrate that Mee belongs to the group of languages in which the perfect may
combine with specific time adverbials. In both sentences the -p perfect form occurs in the same
sentence with a specific past time adverbial.
(26) a. Miyoka
last
tawan
year
inii
1PL
iya
new
owa
house
migi-p-e.
build-PRF-1PL
“Last year we built (our) new house.”
b. Geto
yesterday
ko
C
ani
1SG
ko
DET.F
pasar
market
uwi-p-a.
go-PRF-1SG
“I went to the market yesterday.”
3.6 Lifetime effects
The perfect has been observed to exhibit certain pragmatic effects, called lifetime, repeatability, or
current relevance effects (see e.g. McCawley 1971; Inoue 1979; Katz 2003; Portner 2003 among
many others). They rule out sentences like the ones in (27).
(27) a. #Einstein has visited Princeton.
b. #Columbus has discovered America.
The perfect seems to be only compatible with actions that are considered repeatable in the future
by the speaker, and to some extent the hearer (Katz, 2003).
While the scope of this paper cannot do the decade long discussion about the pragmatic effects
justice, the data below seem to indicate that these effects also obtain in Mee. The perfect is incom-
patible with actions that cannot be repeated, like deceasing (cf. (28)) or going to a restaurant that
is not open anymore (cf. (29)).
(28) An-ukai
1.SG.POSS-female
adamaa
old.person
ko
DET.F
#boka-p-a/
die-PRF-3SG.F
bok-ateg-a.
die-REM.PST-3SG.F
“My grandmother died.”
(29) Context: There used to be a restaurant called Mekong in the city, where you ate two or
three times. It is now closed. You tell me about it.
Mekong-pa
Mekong-LOC
ko
DET.F
ani
1SG
ki
DET.M
kigi
times
wiya
two
to
only
nota
food
#no-p-a/
eat-PRF-1SG
no-oteg-a.
eat-REM.PST-1SG
“I ate at Mekong twice.”
This section examined some properties of the perfect that have been discussed extensively in the
literature. We have shown that the perfect in Mee exhibits the universal and resultative interpre-
tation, but lacks the experiential reading, making it a resultative perfect in Bertrand et al.’s (2017)
terms. It interacts with lexical aspectual classes, giving rise to present and change-of-state readings
for stative verbs. We have briefly explored the compatibility with time adverbials and indicated that
Mee also shows lifetime effects. The next section develops an analysis of the perfect in Mee that
makes direct reference to a result state, and collects some arguments against alternative analyses.
4 Analysis & Discussion
4.1 Previous Analyses
As noted by Nishiyama and Koenig (2010:614), previous analyses of (mainly the English) perfect
have generally tried to categorize perfect readings in one of the following ways: a tripartite distinc-
tion between experiential, resultative and universal reading (e.g. Pancheva 2003); a grouping of
experiential and resultative vs. universal as done in the perfect time span analysis (Iatridou et al.,
2001); or a monosemous analysis of the perfect, as posited for example by a temporal precedence
analysis. None of these analyses fit the Mee perfect, since it groups the universal and resultative
perfect and excludes an experiential reading. We argue that this pattern can only be accounted for
in an analysis that makes explicit reference to a result state.
In this subsection, we will discuss the concrete shortcomings of three approaches to the seman-
tic analysis of perfect if applied to the Mee data, namely a temporal precedence analyses, a perfect
time span analysis and an extended now analysis.
Firstly, an analysis that simply places the reference time in the posttime of the event time, as
done i.a. by Klein (1994), cannot exclude the experiential reading. An event that has once taken
place before the reference time, i.e. an experiential reading, is included. This is true, even if we
introduce a notion of current relevance (Inoue, 1979). As seen in example (30), repeated from (11),
single events that are relevant for the current discourse and happened before the reference time do
not allow the -p form in Mee.
(30) Context: The teacher asks the children ’Have you ever gone to the forest?’ Child answers:
Ani
1SG
aiko
there
buguwa
forest
uwe-eteg-a/
go-REM.PST-1SG
#uwi-p-a.
go-PRF-1SG
“I have gone to the forest.”
In addition, an analysis based on temporal precedence naturally has problems with the universal
perfect reading (Nishiyama and Koenig, 2010). If a state continues into the reference time, it is
difficult to keep the assumption that the event has to precede the reference time. This is necessary
for the Mee -p perfect, since the analysis needs to include the resultative and the universal reading.
An ‘extended now’ analysis (i.a. Portner 2003) additionally runs into problem, because the
Mee -p perfect is compatible with definite time adverbials, contrary to the assumption that time
adverbials define the extended now. A perfect time span analysis easily groups experiential and
resultative perfect (existential quantification) vs. universal perfect (Iatridou et al., 2001). An anal-
ysis of the Mee data would thus need to introduce further distinctions between experiential reading
and resultative readings to exclude the experiential reading. This would effectively lead to a tripar-
tite distinction between the three readings (Pancheva, 2003). Such a move notably decreases the
empirical content of this approach. It is thus clear that none of these analyses can derive the Mee
data, because they do not easily group together the resultative and the universal perfect reading to
the exclusion of the experiential reading.
4.2 Result State Analysis
The gist of our analysis is that the perfect morpheme -p in Mee introduces a state and relates it (i)
to the event denoted by the verb via a result relation R(e,s) (cf. i.a. Bohnemeyer 2014), and (ii) to
a reference time by requiring the state to hold at the reference time (cf. susection 2.2).
The denotation of the perfect, as given in (31), makes direct reference to the result state and
thus has no difficulties in deriving the resultative reading of the perfect in Mee. It states that there is
some event for which the predicate is true and for which there is a state such that the two conditions
mentioned above hold. The event and the state are in a result relation R(e,s) and the reference time
is included in the time interval at which the state holds (ST).
(31) Denotation of -p
! -p "g,c = λP.λt.∃e [ P (e) = 1 & ∃s [ R(e, s) & t ⊆ ST ]]
This denotation already excludes the experiential reading. If an event has taken place at least once
in the past, the resulting state has most probably ceased to hold. In the universal reading, a state
still holds at the reference time, even though there is no punctual event time. For the resultative
reading the state caused by the event has to hold at the reference time. The temporal relation of the
state time (ST) to the reference time (RT) are schematized in (32).
(32) Schematic representation of ST in different contexts
a. *Experiential reading
ET RT
ST
b. Universal reading
RT
ST
c. Resultative reading
ET RT
ST
The following example derivation shows how a resultative reading can be derived. The sentence
in (33) is repeated from (17). The event of the speaker losing his glasses in combination with the
resultative reading entails that the glasses are still lost. In the example derivation in (34), the perfect
marker is combined with the event of the speaker losing his glasses. This event is then substituted
in the appropriate places. The last lambda-bound variable t is substituted by default with UT. The
sentence then asserts the existence of an event e of losing glasses. In addition, there is a state s for
this event e, which (i) is in a result relation with the event, and (ii) is true at the utterance time. In
other words, the glasses are still lost.
(33) Resultative perfect
Ana
1SG.POSS
dou-peka
see-eye
kou
DET.F
iga-p-a.
lose-PRF-1SG
“I lost my glasses (and they are still lost).”
(34) Derivation
a. Combination of perfect marker with the sentence
λP.λt.∃e [ P (e) = 1 & ∃s [ R(e, s) & t ⊆ ST ]] (λ e. lose(e,I,glasses))
b. Substitution
λt.∃e [ lose(e, I, glasses) = 1 & ∃s [ R(e, s) & t ⊆ ST ]]
c. Default substitution of t with UT
∃e [lose(I, glasses)(e) = 1 & ∃s [ R(e, s) & UT ⊆ ST ]]
i.e. ‘There is an event such that this event of me losing my glasses is true and there
is a state such that it is a result state of me loosing my glasses and this state holds at
the utterance time’ = ‘My glasses are still lost.’
To illustrate the exclusion of an experiential interpretation, recall the examples from section 3.1.
We repeat here (11) from above as (35). In our analysis, the perfect in this context is infelicitous,
because at the reference/utterance time the children are not in the forest anymore. They are in the
classroom. Therefore the result state (=being in the forest) does not hold anymore.
(35) Context: The teacher asks the children ’Have you ever gone to the forest?’ Child answers:
Ani
1SG
aiko
there
buguwa
forest
uwe-eteg-a/
go-REM.PST-1SG
#uwi-p-a.
go-PRF-1SG
“I have gone to the forest.”
The resultative relation of course needs some elaboration. We assume that its application is de-
pendent on the Aktionsart of the predicate verb, thereby mirroring the interaction with Aktionsart
in the data. The most straightforwardly accounted for Aktionsart are achievement verbs. These
are lexically specified for a result state (Wunderlich, 2012). The same is true for accomplishment
verbs. There are however, a multitude of possible result states here, since an accomplishment has
intermediate states before its culmination. We assume that the result relation holds between any of
the intermediate stages and the event as well as between the event and the culminated state. The
culmination is thus only implicated, but can be canceled. States pose a more serious problem, since
they arguably do not involve an event. We will hypothesize that this issue is resolved by relating
the state of the verbal predicate to itself inside the resultative relation. In other words, the result
relation again picks a lexically specified state, in this case the only one. The remaining Aktionsart
are activities. These notably do not involve any lexically specified state. We have to assume that in
this case – as a last resort – the result relations relates every event to a state of the event having just
ended, similar to the posttime in Klein (1994). This yields the recent past reading of the perfect in
Mee. The interaction of the result relation with the Aktionsart of the verb is summarized in (36).
We leave the question about crosslinguistic variation of the result relation open for future research.
(36) Result relation R
Input Output
statei statei
achievementi result statej
accomplishmenti result statej (culmination only implied)
activityi posttime (Klein, 1994)
These properties of the result relation explain the universal perfect reading, that is also available
in Mee. Recall the example (20-a), repeated here as (37). In our analysis, the result relation yields
the state itself as the state of being pregnant, i.e. the state of the predicate itself. Therefore it
only requires the state of the predicate to include the reference time. In this specific example the
reference time is the same as the utterance time. The following sentence is thus true if the state of
being pregnant holds for the referent at the speech time.
(37) Okai
3SG
ko
DET.F
modo-ma
belly-with
to-p-a.
be.in.state-PRF-3SG.F
“She is pregnant.”
4.3 Presupposition or Denotation
In the above descriptions we assumed that the meaning of the perfect in Mee is part of the deno-
tation instead of being a presupposition, thus achieving more similarity to approaches to aspect
than (pronominal) approaches to tense (Kratzer, 1998). This hypothesis can be tested by looking
at examples with negation. If the denotation of the perfect were just a presupposition, one would
expect the result state reading to project through the negation. For activities that would mean that
the state of the activity not taking place is still required to hold at the reference time. As seen in
(38), the perfect state acts more like a part of the denotation. In the example ‘not having talked to
him’ can only mean that the speaker did not talk to Gusti at the party. The universal reading of the
negated activity is not possible, i.e. the answer with the -p perfect cannot mean that the speaker
has not talked to him since. Therefore, the result state condition is part of the denotation and not a
presupposition.
(38) Context: You were at a party last week and saw Gusti there. I ask you about him, but you
can’t tell me any news, since you didn’t talk to him.
Ani
1SG
ki
DET.M
okai
3SG
ma
with
mana
voice
te-ewega-p-a.
NEG-talk-PRF-1SG
“I did not talk to him (at the party / *since).”
4.4 Evidentiality
Kobepa (2015) – in a paper on the recent past in Mee – analyzes the difference between past
tense -g3 and perfect -p as a difference in verbal definiteness, i.e. evidentiality. -p is analyzed as
expressing that the speaker has not witnessed the event and only infers its occurrence from the
result state. Perfect is also known to influence evidentiality in other languages (see e.g. Lindstedt
2000). Similar to our account, Bowler and Ozkan (2018) and Bowler (2018) derive the evidentiality
meaning as a biproduct of aspectual meaning in Turkish and Kazan Tatar. Kobepa’s approach is
not necessarily incompatible with our analysis. In our case, the relation between the result state
and the reference time is encoded in the lexical entry, in Kobepa’s account it is the inference from
the result state (cf. also Nishiyama and Koenig 2010).
In this section we have thus seen that only an analysis that makes direct reference to a result
state in the denotation of Mee -p perfect forms can derive resultative and universal perfect readings
to the exclusion of an experiential perfect reading. The resultative relation between an event and a
state also accounts for the fact that the reading in Mee depends on the Aktionsart of a predicate.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we provided a description of the perfect -p in Mee. This form can have a resultative
reading as well as a universal reading, but it excludes experiential readings. Additionally, it can be
used in contexts where the reference time is in the future. This contrasts with the past tense forms,
which express that an action occured before the utterance time. As our data show these forms do
not necessitate a resultative reading and even exclude a universal reading. Therefore, we analyse
the perfect in Mee as making direct reference to a result state by requiring the event to be in a
result relation with the event of the predicate. This result state then has to hold at the reference
time. The result relation also accounts for the interaction between the Aktionsart and the perfect
in Mee. Since only achievement and accomplishment verbs have a lexically specified result state,
only these verbs can get a resultative reading. In our analysis, states and activities get a universal
or recent past reading, respectively, only as a last resort, because the result state is not specified
lexically.
3Kobepa (2015) analyzes the past morpheme as -g, while in our analysis, it is -eg.
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